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ABSTRACT 
This R&D/marketing interface study is of a multi-disciplinary nature. In the 
study the role of the R&D/marketing interface is re arded as the pursuit of 
competitive advantage through negotiated exchange process between the two 
parties. As a result, iportant research constructs 
are 
identified with reference 
to several academic disciplines, including organization theory, innovation 
studies, marketing and strategic management. These constructs are (a) the 
environmental constructs, (b) the organizational constructs, and (c) the strategic 
constructs. 
A case study methodology is applied to examine the R&D/marketing interface 
patterns and tendencies found in twelve drug innovation projects. However, the 
research theoretical framework is not constrained to a particular industry. Thus, 
on the basis of the framework, the study aims to offer a higher level explanation 
on why these variations and tendencies regarding the R&D/marketing interface 
have been observed. 
The research findings indicate that the twelve drug innovation projects studied 
in this research belong to three project types. These include a' related- 
technology and existing-market' t of project, an "unrelated-technology and 
new-market" type of project and 
anew-technology 
and new-market" type of 
project. The research findings further reveal that the effectiveness and the 
desired level of the R&D/marketing interface are influenced by both the 
environmental constructs and the organizational constructs. Meanwhile, several 
unexpected findings are derived from the research, such as the serious effect of 
contingent technical problems upon the R&D/marketing interface, the crucial 
balance between development speed and development risk and so on. 
The research has resulted in a more precise definition of the R&D/marketing 
interface in five dimensions. These are (a) the corporate strategic dimension, (b) 
the corporate technical dimension, (c) the product strategic dimension, (d) the 
product technical dimension and (e) the operational dimension. These 
dimensions form a integral part of the R&D/marketing interface. This finding 
will provide the future research in this field with a crucial link to those 
academic areas indicated earlier. It will also help top management, marketing 
managers and R&D managers identify more accurately their responsibilities and 
detect quickly the weak interface dimensions that need to be strengthened. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I. Research Background 
The interface of R&D and marketing refers to the area between the R&D and 
marketing departments in which they affect or have links with each other. The 
term "interface" is sometimes interchangeable with "interaction", "relationship", 
"linkage" or "cooperation". The R&D/marketing interface is further divided into 
five dimensions in the current research. 
Numerous studies have identified the R&D/marketing interface as an important 
determinant of successful product innovation. In addition, previous research has 
exploited, theoretically as well as normatively effective ways of managing the 
R&D/marketing interface. 
However, most existing studies on the R&D/marketing interface have been 
limited to a single field such as organization studies or innovation research, 
which emphasises either the internal factors affecting the interface or the 
external influence upon the interface activities at particular innovation stages. In 
addition, these studies have focused only at one level of the interface problems, 
either relating to the efficacy of structural linkages for achieving better 
corporate performance (Horwitch and Thietart, 1987) or concerning the 
effectiveness of functional integration for successful product innovation. 
Consequently, little has been known about the synthetic process of the 
R&D/marketing interface influenced by both internal and external factors. 
A pilot study has been carried out before defining the more specific research 
objectives and the research population. Ten British firms from several high-tech 
industrial sectors are investigated and important preliminary findings are 
generated. These include (a) the further diversification of the R&D and 
marketing departments according to their responsibilities relating to the stages 
of the product development process, (b) the internationalization of the high-tech 
firms, especially in the pharmaceutical industry, which has resulted in an 
increased importance of the strategic marketing and (c) the considerable 
variation of the R&D/marketing interface with regard to its roles and 
effectiveness. A further investigation on factors affecting the R&D/marketing 
interface and the underlying reasons are thus needed. 
1 
The current research is therefore designed to (a) investigate empirically the role 
of the R&D/marketing interface in product innovation and (b) offer theoretical 
explanation of the tendencies and variations of the R&D/marketing interface in 
relation to the market, technological and organizational environment. According 
to the research objectives, three groups of constructs are identified from the 
literature. They are the organizational constructs, the strategic constructs and 
the environmental constructs. The organizational constructs are identified as (a) 
type of the interface coordination mechanism, (b) interface communication 
flows, (c) interface conflict and (d) relative influence of R&D and marketing. 
Meanwhile, the strategic constructs are related to the strategic role of the 
R&D/marketing interface in product innovation. Five dimensions are identified 
in the interface. They are (a) the corporate strategic dimension, (b) the corporate 
technical dimension, (c) the product strategic dimension, (d) the product 
technical dimension and (e) the operational dimension. These five dimensions 
of the interface are interrelated and they together fulfil the strategic role of the 
R&D/marketing interface, which is the pursuit of the firm's competitive 
advantage. 
The environmental constructs are designed to reflect both external market and 
technological uncertainties facing product innovation and internal marketing 
and technological strength. These constructs include (a) market uncertainty, (b) 
technological uncertainty, (c) internal technological and marketing expertise. In 
addition, Six types of innovation projects have been categorized by using a 
"technology-market dimension" matrix. 
The identification of the three groups of constructs reflects the emphasis of the 
current research on the evaluation of the impact of a series of process activities, 
technological factors and market factors on the eventual outcome. Three 
research propositions are developed, addressing respectively the role of the 
R&D/marketing interface, the environmental influence on this role and the 
effect of organizational factors upon the role fulfilment. The early development 
of the theoretical propositions is helpful in guiding data collection and data 
analysis with a theoretical orientation. However, it is important to recognize 
that they are only tentative. Therefore, in order to avoid any unnecessary data 
elimination, the theoretical propositions are developed in such a way that they 
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remain at a relatively general and abstract level, thus allowing further 
elaboration in the final cross-case analysis. 
Case study strategy is decided to be most appropriate for the current research. 
This is because this strategy has a distinct advantage in a situation where a 
"how" or "why" question is being asked about a contemporary set of events 
over which the investor has little or no control (Yin, 1984). In addition, it 
focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In the current research, the case studies are used to describe 
the R&D/marketing interface patterns in product innovation and to further 
generate theoretical explanation regarding these patterns. 
The UK pharmaceutical industry is selected as the research population from 
which a research sample of four innovative pharmaceutical firms, each 
involving three drug innovation projects, is drawn. The four pharmaceutical 
firms are Glaxo, SmithKline Beecham, ICI Pharmaceuticals and Wellcome. The 
total of twelve drug innovation projects are the Zantac project, the Imigran 
project, the Serevent project, the Tagamet project, the Augmentin project, the 
Eminase project, the Tenormin project, the Diprivan project, the Zoladex 
project, the Zevirax project, the Retrovir project and the Lamictal project. The 
research sample is selected for theoretical rather than statistical reasons. It is 
chosen to replicate previous cases, extend emergent theory and provide 
examples of polar types (Eisenhardt, 1989). It is necessary to note that in order 
to avoid bias in data collection, decisions on product sample selection were 
made independently according to predesignated criteria. Companies did not 
exert influence during this process. The UK pharmaceutical industry shares 
several common characteristics with other high-tech industrial sectors, such as 
high complexity of product development and environment, high 
competitiveness on the basis of technological innovation and high R&D 
expenditure. Meanwhile it has a few unique characteristics including high risk 
in the R&D investment and highly effective product differentiation as a entry 
barrier. Moreover, the UK industry is one of the few industries in which Britain 
is a genuine leader, and its innovation performance is a major successful factor. 
Thirteen out of the world's top fifty prescription products were developed by the 
UK pharmaceutical firms in 1990, which is only second to the US. An 
understanding of the industry's problems and achievements and especially of its 
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innovation in some of the leading innovative firms would be instructive for 
many of us both outside and inside the industry (Freeman, 1968). 
As a result of this population selection, findings from the current research will 
not be generated directly to other industries. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that the design of the research theoretical framework is not constrained to a 
particular industry, in terms of the research questions posed and the research 
constructs identified. Therefore, with certain adjustment on the measurements 
of some constructs, the research framework should be applicable to other 
industries. 
In the current research, special effort has been made to ensure the reliability of 
the data. Multiple data collection methods including archives, statistic data from 
industry reports, stock broker reports, face-to-face and telephone interviews, 
field observation and participation of industry meetings were all applied. Every 
interview was carefully prepared by sending in advance an outline of the 
research and the area of interview to each interviewee and by studying 
background information relating to the company. With the aid of these materials 
the author could also monitor the interview and help the interviewees recall past 
events. In addition, All the case study reports were send back to the 
interviewees for final comments and error correction. In particular, opinions on 
the checklists method used in the data analysis for measuring the environmental 
constructs were invited and positive responses were received. 
11. Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized into nine chapters. In Chapter 1, "The Literature 
Review", an overview of previous studies in the R&D/marketing interface field 
is provided. With reference to the frequently reported R&D/marketing interface 
problems, the limitation of the previous research is evaluated. The chapter is 
then proceeded to explore interlinks between the various disciplines and the 
R&D/marketing interface study. Organization studies, innovation research, 
strategic management and marketing are all included for this purpose. This 
provides a basis for the development of the inter-disciplinary research 
theoretical framework in Chapter 3. 
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Before the development of the framework, a description of the research 
methodology is provided in Chapter 2. This is because the development of the 
framework has also received certain input from the pilot study, which is 
described in Chapter 2. Following the specification of the research objectives, 
the decision on case study methodology is justified and the research population 
and sample are then selected under several major criteria. Next methods of data 
collection and precautionary measures on data reliability are described. At the 
end of this chapter methods of data analysis are explained. 
In Chapter 3, on the basis of the literature review the role of the 
R&D/marketing interface is identified as the pursuit of competitive advantage 
by incorporating negotiated exchange between the two parties. Having defined 
specific research questions, three groups of potentially important research 
constructs from the literature are identified and research propositions regarding 
the relationships between the constructs are generated. Meanwhile, six major 
types of innovation projects are defined on the basis of a existing study by 
Calantone and Cooper (1981). At the end of Chapter 3, measurements of some 
constructs are developed in relation to the pharmaceutical industry. 
Next in Chapter 4, the background of the pharmaceutical industry is provided as 
a necessary preparation for the four within-case studies regarding four 
pharmaceutical firms, which are to be carried out in the following chapters. 
This chapter is divided into six distinct sections. It contains comprehensive 
information regarding government regulation and patent law, market structure 
and competition, drug innovation process, risk and return in the R&D, the 
characteristics of the R&D/marketing interface in this industry and the 
performance of the U. K. pharmaceutical industry. 
Before Chapter 5- the first chapter of the four within-case studies -a brief 
introduction to the case studies is denoted. The structures of the four chapters, 
i. e. Chapters 5-8, are identical. Each starts with a introduction of the history, the 
innovation performance and the organizational structures of the case company. 
The main part of each chapter consists of the detailed case study write-ups of 
three specific drug innovation projects from the case company. Data from each 
drug innovation case study are organized under the three constructs identified in 
the theoretical framework. The constructs are then assessed by using qualitative 
methods defined in the framework, such as the checklists method, and a 
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preliminary discussion is provided. At the end of each chapter the results from 
the three within-case studies are summarized, which is guided by the research 
propositions. 
Finally in Chapter 9, a cross-case analysis based on the previous four within- 
case analyses is carried out. It starts with a brief summary of the limitations of 
the existing studies which have inspired the current research. Next, an analysis 
of the empirical findings in relation to each of the three research questions is 
conducted. This then allows a general discussion at the end of the chapter on the 
theoretical and managerial implications of the empirical findings. Meanwhile 
several unexpected findings are emphasized. 
III. Summary of the Important Research Findings 
The case studies' results have generally supported the research propositions and 
further elaborated them. The results have confirmed that the role of the 
R&D/marketing interface in drug innovation covers the five dimensions. They 
are (a) the corporate strategic dimension, (b) the corporate technical dimension, 
(c) the product strategic dimension, (d) the product technical dimension and (e) 
the operational dimension. 
However, the effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface in the five 
dimensions varies considerably and the variation is influenced by the market 
and technological environment. According to the framework, the twelve drug 
innovation projects studied in the current research are classified into three major 
types, i. e. the "related-technology and existing-market" type, the "unrelated- 
technology and new-market" type and the "new-technology and new-market" 
type. It is found that (a) the R&D/marketing interface tends to be most effective 
in a "related-technology and existing-market" type of project and (b) the 
R&D/marketing interface tends to be more difficult to achieve in a "new- or 
unrelated-technology and new-market" type of project. Moreover, the results 
indicate that the desired level of the interface is not identical for all the 
innovation projects. It is higher for a "unrelated-technology and new-market" 
type of project than for a "new-technology and new-market" type of project. 
Nevertheless, although the market and technological environment is a major 
factor affecting the effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface, it is not the 
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sole influence. The environmental factors and the organizational factors have a 
combined effect upon the R&D/marketing interface. A weak R&D/marketing 
interface is found to be associated with poor drug innovation performance. 
Meanwhile it is found that both the "marketing-driven" and "research-driven" 
projects can lead to successful product innovation. However, they are likely to 
be suitable for different technological and market situations. For instance, a 
"research-driven" project is likely to be associated with high technological 
uncertainty. 
Several unexpected findings have been derived from the research. First it is 
found that a contingent technical problem occurred at the later stage of the 
innovation process can substantially increase the drug's technical complexity, 
thus seriously affecting the effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface. 
Secondly, the results have revealed that fast development speed is an important 
but not an essential factor for every successful innovation project and a balance 
between development speed and development risk is more crucial. Finally, a 
lack of the strategic R&D/marketing interface in dealing with drug regulatory 
affairs is found. 
The current research findings have several important managerial implications. 
The definition of the five interface dimensions can help managers identify more 
precisely their responsibilities and detect more accurately the weaker interface 
dimensions that need to be strengthened. Managers should also assess carefully 
the likely occurrence of any contingent technical problems and their impact 
upon the project so that necessary precautionary measures can be taken 
beforehand. 
Finally, the current research has certain implications for the future research. The 
definition of the five dimensions of the R&D/marketing interface will provide 
the future research in this field with a crucial link to several academic areas. 
Also the research framework which has not been constrained to the 
pharmaceutical industry will provide the future research with the opportunity to 
study the R&D/marketing interface in other industries. 
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CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The R&D/marketing interface is a multi-disciplinary issue. As the title suggests, 
it is related to cross-functional interaction, R&D management, marketing 
management and so on. Numerous studies have identified the R&D/marketing 
interface as an important determinant of successful product innovation. In 
addition, previous research has exploited, theoretically as well as normatively, 
effective ways of managing the R&D/marketing interface. 
However, most existing studies on the R&D/marketing interface have been 
limited to a single field such as organization studies or innovation research, 
which emphasizes either the internal factors affecting the interface or the 
external influence upon the interface activities at particular innovation stage. In 
addition, these studies have focused only at one level of the interface problems, 
either relating to the efficacy of structure linkages for achieving better corporate 
performance (Horwitch and Thietart, 1987) or concerning the effectiveness of 
functional integration for successful product innovation (Souder, 1988). 
Consequently, little has been known about the synthetic process of the 
R&D/marketing interface influenced by both internal and external factors. 
Specifically, this synthetic process can be described as a process in which 
functional areas pursue competitive advantage by incorporating negotiated 
exchange with internal coalitions. 
This chapter starts with an overview of the existing studies in the 
R&D/marketing interface. In the organizational literature, for instance, the 
R&D/marketing interaction is viewed as a particular form of open social 
system, where interdependent processes emerge because of the specialization 
and division of labour (Ruekert and Walker, 1987). Meanwhile, in the 
innovation research, the interface pattern is related to the conditions of 
customers and internal R&D (Souder, 1988). With reference to the frequently 
reported R&D/marketing interface problems, the limitation of the previous 
research is evaluated. 
Next, in order to improve our understanding of the multi-disciplinary nature of 
the R&D/marketing interface, we proceed to explore interlinks between the 
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various disciplines and the R&D/marketing interface. Organization studies, 
innovation research, strategic management, and marketing literature are 
included. The purpose is to establish a basis for the development of the 
theoretical framework in Chapter 3. 
In the organizational literature, three major pairs of interrelated forces shaping 
the organization are outlined. They are interdependence and coordination, 
differentiation and integration and the relative influence of functional 
departments and organizational uncertainty. Apparently, the negotiated 
exchange process between R&D and marketing is influenced by these three 
pairs of forces. 
Next, after product innovation is defined in terms of types, stages and activities, 
the R&D/marketing relationship is investigated in relation to its technological 
context. Two major issues are discussed, including the interface management 
within the R&D function and the incorporation of the interface activities in the 
corporate technological decision-making. 
Finally, the potential of integrating R&D and marketing is explored from a 
marketing perspective. The central issues include (a) strategic marketing, (b) 
high technology marketing and (c) marketing research for product innovation. 
The emphasis is on the practical values of the existing marketing theories for 
the current empirical study. 
1.2 THE EXISTING THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN 
THE R&D/MARKETING INTERFACE 
1.2.1 Organization Theory on Relationships 
Researchers in this field stress the complexity and importance of managing 
interfunctional relationships within organization. One of the studies in the 
R&D/marketing interface was pursued by Ruekert and Walker (1987). From a 
social system perspective, they developed a conceptual framework to 
understand how, why and with what results marketing personnel interact with 
personnel in other functional areas in carrying out marketing functions. Like all 
social systems, the interfunctional interaction has two important characteristics: 
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(a) Behaviour among the members of the social system is 
motivated by both individual and collective interests. 
(b) Interdependent processes emerge because of the specialization 
and division of labour. 
Ruekert and Walker suggest that an important aspect of such coordination is the 
use of roles and standard operating procedures to increase the efficiency of 
repetitive interactions. On the other hand, because formalized rules cannot be 
developed for every eventuality, the opportunity for informal influence over 
decision is present. 
The study defines several important variables including environmental, 
structural, and process variables. The major internal environmental variables 
influencing the interaction are defined as 
(a) resource dependence, 
(b) domain similarity 1, and 
(c) the nature of the strategy. 
Whilst, the structural and process variables are divided into 
(a) transactions, 
(b) communication flows, including the amount of 
communication2 and communication difficulty3, and 
(c) coordination mechanisms. 
An empirical test based on this framework was conducted. This was however, 
limited to the internal environment. One of the important findings of the 
research is that the more dependent the two functions are on each other, the 
more communication they have. However, more communication flows also lead 
to more conflict, which in turn reduces the effectiveness of the interaction. This 
indicates that to increase the amount of communication is not sufficient for an 
effective interaction. 
Research has been carried out by Saghafi, et al. (1990) on an attempt to identify 
the states of the R&D/marketing interface and the causes of the interface 
problems. Managers were asked to compare between the desired level and the 
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actually achieved level of the R&D/marketing integration. The lack of an 
appropriate level of R&D/marketing integration was found. Inadequate 
communication, marketing's lack of understanding of technology and R&D's 
lack of market orientation were cited as the most important barriers to effective 
integration. 
Similarly, Gupta and Wilemon (1988) found that, in technology intensive 
companies, the lack of credibility of marketing information perceived by R&D, 
influenced the R&D-marketing cooperation. Credible marketing information is 
characterized by its feasibility, validity, and consistency. 
However, neither of these studies has identified the specific market and 
technological conditions under which the interface problems have occurred. 
1.2.2 The R&D/Marketing Interface in Product Innovation 
Researchers in innovation management have approached the R&D/marketing 
interface issue from an external perspective. For instance, having observed 
seven R&D/marketing interface states4, Souder (1988) proposes a framework 
for the R&D/marketing integration: the Customer-Developer-Condition (CDC) 
model. In this model, according to their levels of sophistication, customers and 
the firms' R&D departments are divided into different groups respectively. 
Customers' level of sophistication is defined in terms of their need awareness 
and their ability to communicate their needs. R&D's level of sophistication 
refers to their understanding of products and their technical means to develop 
the products. 
Souder suggests that, according to the condition of the customers and the R&D 
groups, the interface pattern may be different. For instance, for customers who 
fully understand their needs but are unable to translate them into product 
specifications, marketing plays a leading role. A series of activities such as need 
translation and development of prototypes based on these translations will be 
carried out with a continued interfacing of R&D and marketing. 
It is apparent that these two dimensions of R&D and customers correspond to 
the dimensions of technology and market. For example, that customers do not 
understand their needs is possibly associated with a new market situation. While 
low level of R&D sophistication is likely to be associated with a new 
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technology situation. Thus, the R&D/marketing interface needs and states are 
directly linked to the market and technological condition. 
In addition, the R&D/marketing interface has been examined in both market- 
driven and innovation-driven high technology situations. Shanklin and Ryans 
(1984) suggest that: 
'for the purpose of discussing marketing-R&D 
linkage, the most important distinction is between 
what we have called market-driven and innovation- 
driven high technology" (pp. 166) 
According to Shanklin and Ryans, the R&D/marketing interface need is 
different in these two situations. In an innovation-driven situation, the 
company's top strategic and marketing objective is to achieve profitable 
commercial applications for laboratory output. In this case, possibilities for 
commercial applications may be less obvious or so numerous that the company 
must establish priorities for exploitation. Thus R&D is the prime mover behind 
marketing's efforts. 
On the other hand, a market-driven high technology situation emerges as high- 
tech markets mature. In this market-driven situation, R&D's task is to respond 
to the specific market needs identified by marketing and other sources. The 
linkage comes primarily through R&D's active participation in the market 
planning process. 
Research in the R&D/marketing interface is also concerned with particular 
stages of product innovation. Product design stage has been the main emphasis. 
It is concerned with the role of the R&D/marketing interface in the translation 
of an industrial idea or concept into a product with tangible properties and 
features (Gersterfeld, 1976). Studies in this field hold that product design is an 
important segment of the new product development process and there is an 
essential need for marketing and R&D to effectively interface during the design 
step (Bonnet, 1986; Gerstenfeld, 1976; and Souder, 1981). The quality and 
adequacy of market research techniques and their implications on the effective 
R&D/marketing cooperation are the main theme. 
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Chakrabarti and O'Keefe (1981) revealed in their study that two of the most 
important factors leading to product success were clearly related to market 
intelligence and information gathering: recognition of customer needs and 
superior techniques for data gathering, analysis and decision-making. However, 
R&D/marketing problems were observed that product developers did not 
always incorporate important market data in their development and launch 
decisions, and market researchers did not achieve adequate acceptance because 
they failed to sell their services effectively. 
Bonnet (1986) emphasizes a design link between R&D and marketing in 
technology advanced firms by dividing the R&D/marketing interface into two 
key areas, respectively the market dimensions assessment and the product 
dimensions assessment. The purpose of the market dimensions assessment is to 
investigate the commercial viability of a new project and the way in which it 
fits the firm's internal strategy. Meanwhile, in the product dimensions 
assessment, R&D by its technical capability and marketing by its market 
knowledge, try to optimize the design characteristics of the product. Bonnet's 
study revealed that one of the major areas of difficulty in product dimension 
assessment was the extrapolation of customer requirements over the 
development period and the reconciliation of differing requirements from 
customers over the same period. There was a lack of appropriate marketing 
research methods in this situation. Bonnet stresses that, ideally, such an 
assessment would provide the R&D department with a satisfactory balance 
between technically viable and commercially viable product characteristics 
which would then be integrated into the product design to maximise its 
marketability. 
In summary, the role of the R&D/marketing interface in the pursuit of firm's 
competitive advantage through product innovation has been addressed in the 
innovation research field. The differences in the R&D/marketing interface need, 
states and effectiveness under different market and technological situations are 
recognized. However, the negotiated exchange process with internal coalitions 
during the pursuit of competitive advantage has been largely ignored. 
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1.2.3 Studies Towards an Integration of Organizational Theory and 
Innovation Research 
The most recent development in the R&D/marketing interface area has been 
toward a cross-disciplinary fertilization. Moenaert et al. (1992) point out that 
"the studies that have investigated the effect of new product 
development on project success have not examined the 
interfunctional interfaces for each of the innovation cycle stages 
separately (e. g. pre-development, development, launch)" (pp. 382) 
They propose a model linking concepts from organizational theory to 
innovation management at the earlier planning stage. They maintain that 
successful project teams are characterized by a maximum uncertainty reduction 
during planning. Information flows between functions help those functions 
achieve this efficient uncertainty reduction. Moreover, they suggest that the task 
uncertainty of a project varies, depending on market newness and technological 
newness. Thus, entering new markets implies that the marketing members of 
the project cannot refer to an in-house body of marketing knowledge that has 
been accumulated through past experience. Therefore, the marketing task 
uncertainty will be higher. Similarly, if the organization begins a project in 
unknown technologies, the task uncertainty faced by R&D will be much higher 
than that of projects launched in areas that show a strong technological synergy. 
Moenaert's research provides a critical link between the newness of market and 
technology, and the interface activities of the project team. Therefore, different 
interface patterns at the planning stage of product innovation are expected for 
different types of innovations carried out. However, as the research 
concentrates only on one of the several critical stages of product innovation, the 
planning stage, data regarding the relationship between the types of innovation 
and the interface activities at the other stages of product innovation were not 
provided. 
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1.2.4 Common R&D/Marketing Interface Problems and Limitations of the 
Existing Research 
The R&D/marketing interface has been assessed by previous research at two 
levels and in two dimensions. The two levels are the departmental level which 
is not concerned with the specificity of projects (Ruekert and Walker, 1987) and 
the project team level (Souder, 1988; Moenaert, et al. 1992). In the meantime, 
the R&D/marketing interface is evaluated along two dimensions, including 
market (or strategic) dimension (Souder, 1988; Moenaert, et al. 1992; Shanklin 
and Ryans, 1988) and product (or technical) dimension (Bonnet, 1986). 
Problems have been reported at each level and in each dimension from different 
perspectives. Ruekert and Walker (1987), for example, found that 
interdependence between the R&D and marketing leads to more communication 
flows. However, more communication flows also lead to more conflict, which 
in turn reduces the effectiveness of the interaction. The dilemma here is how to 
increase the amount of communication flows, at the same time to reduce the 
conflict which may occur as a result of the frequent contact between these two 
parties. 
Souder (1988) discovered that the interface need between the R&D and 
marketing may vary, depending on the market and technological condition. This 
in turn calls for the R&D and marketing parties to establish a team relationship 
that permits them to flexibly swap roles in response to evolving technologies, 
markets and customer needs. However, this type of activity has been 
considerably limited by the present organization structures, which largely 
emphasize a clear separation of roles and specialization of functions between 
R&D and marketing. 
Shanklin and Ryans (1984) illustrated a contrasting picture of the 
R&D/marketing interface in a market-driven high technology situation as 
opposed to that in an innovation-driven high technology situation. While R&D 
is the prime mover behind marketing's efforts in the latter, R&D's task is 
restricted to responding to the specific market needs identified by marketing 
and other sources in the former. Consequently, interface problems may occur 
from this substantial power deviation between these two parties. 
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The inappropriateness of marketing research techniques, especially in assisting 
new product design, is another source of the R&D/marketing interface problem 
(Bonnet, 1986). This sometimes results in the R&D's perception of marketing 
information as non-credible, which has a negative effect upon the 
R&D/marketing cooperation (Gupta & Wilemon, 1988). 
Meanwhile, McNulty and Whittington (1992) has revealed the R&D/marketing 
interface problems under special circumstances, i. e. within R&D organizations. 
They suggest that the interface problems between R&D and marketing may 
stem from R&D's biased view of marketing's role. They found that professional 
technologists in the R&D organization often perceive marketing's role simply as 
selling, for which they are lacking of technical expertise. In this sense, R&D 
people think they are natural marketers and look down marketing. 
Odioso (1987) who worked as a R&D director in a large chemical company for 
thirty years suggested several potential sources for the interface problems 
between R&D and marketing. They are: 
(a) the desire of R&D staff to develop truly superior and unique 
products and the limited ability of marketing in relating to a 
completely new product category; 
(b) the risky and trial-and-error nature of an innovative project 
and the unfeasible expectation of marketing sometimes toward 
new product development; 
(c) the strategic need to move into new technologies where results 
are uncertain and the adherence to mature technologies that offer 
immediate but marginal improvements. 
Clearly, the first source of problem addresses the need to develop appropriate 
marketing strategies and techniques suitable for truly innovative high 
technology products, while the second one suggests an association between the 
interface problems and the types of innovation. In addition, It indicates a link 
between the types of innovation outcome (low-risk incremental or high-risk 
radical) and the relative influence of the R&D and marketing departments. 
Finally, the third source of problem emphasizes the importance of the 
R&D/marketing interface in the formulation of firm's technological strategy. 
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Since previous research could not cope with the scope of the interface problems 
discussed above, a multi-disciplinary approach needs to be developed. In order 
to fulfil this goal, a broader background knowledge in the related areas is 
required, and is presented next. 
1.3 A BROADER REVIEW ON ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
Although not directly related to the R&D/marketing relationship, findings of 
many studies in the organizational literature have revealed important 
characteristics underlying inter-group behaviour. These findings have a great 
value to the development of the theoretical framework of the current research. 
1.3.1 Interdependence and Coordination 
Interdependence exists within organizations. Different functions depend on 
each other for information and other human and financial resources to 
accomplish their organizational tasks (Child, 1977). On the other hand, 
differences in background, education, experience, and various social 
characteristics may cause coordination problems between the different 
functions. Interfunctional interdependence is further classified into three forms: 
pooled, sequential, and reciprocal (Thompson, 1967). Thompson points out that 
all organizations have pooled interdependence, more complicated organizations 
have sequential as well as pooled, and the most complex have reciprocal, 
sequential, and pooled. 
Meanwhile, three types of coordination are identified. They are coordination by 
standardization, coordination by plan and coordination by mutual adjustment. 
Coordination by standardization involves the establishment of routines or rules 
which constrain action of each unit or position into paths consistent with those 
taken by others in the interdependent relationship. Coordination by plan 
involves the establishment of schedules for the interdependent units by which 
their actions may then be governed. Coordination by mutual adjustment 
involves the transmission of new information during the process of action. 
Thompson has observed distinct parallels between the three types of 
interdependence and the three types of coordination, and the three types of 
coordination place increasingly heavy burdens on communication and decision. 
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1.3.2 Differentiation and Integration 
While Thompson has implied the influence of external environment on the 
interfunctional relationship in terms of the types of interdependence and the 
types of coordination, Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) contingency theory 
explicitly recognizes the impact of external environment upon the degree of 
differentiation and integration of an organization. They maintain that 
organizations functioning in a dynamic and diverse environment are highly 
differentiated. Their findings indicate that the states of differentiation and 
integration are inversely related. The more differentiated an organization, the 
more difficult it is to achieve integration. 
To overcome this problem, effective organizations have integrating devices 
consistent with the diversity of the environment. They can range from an 
integrative department to an individual integrator, and from permanent cross- 
functional teams at three levels of management to temporary cross-functional 
teams, etc. 
1.3.3 Relative Influence of the Functional Departments and Organizational 
Uncertainty 
Numerous studies in the organizational literature have established an important 
link between the relative influence of the functional departments and the 
organizational contingencies. Turner and Giles (1981) explain the power in 
organization as the ability to cope with critical organizational uncertainty, 
which is defined as the contingencies that the organization faces. It may be 
rapidly changing technologies, intensive competition in the market and so on. 
They maintain that the groups that possess the most appropriate skills and the 
information to cope with the critical uncertainty come to have stronger 
influence. The theories of informal social communication also emphasize the 
importance of coping with uncertainty. Festinger (1954) demonstrates that 
uncertainty leads to increased social communication. Uncertainty then provides 
the group that can reduce it with the opportunity to obtain increased control in 
the organization. 
While most organization researchers give some degree of consideration to the 
environmental context of organization, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) take the 
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view of externally controlled organizations much more strongly. They contend 
that because resource acquisition may be problematic and uncertain, 
organizations depend on their environment. They define organizations as 
"coalitions of varying interests". They argue that the influence of different 
participants in an organization, so as to the extent their varying interests can be 
satisfied, varies depending on their ability to cope with critical contingencies. 
The frequently occurred incompatible preferences and goals among the 
participants are a major cause for inter- as well as intra-organizational conflict, 
which makes the management of organizations difficult. 
1.3.4 Summary 
Three pairs of interrelated forces are discussed in this section. They have a 
major influence upon intergroup behaviour, and thus upon the R&D/marketing 
relationship. It is suggested that both interdependence and coordination are 
needed between organizational functions. However, coordination problems may 
occur due to differences in background, education, experience and various 
social characteristics between the different functions. Moreover, there exist 
different types of interdependence as well as different types of coordination. 
Therefore, it is implied that coordination problems can also be caused by the 
mis-match between the type of coordination and the type of interdependence. In 
addition, the studies indicate that the communication need between the different 
functions may vary according to the type of interdependence or coordination. 
The need for both differentiation and integration between different functions 
within an organization is also addressed. However, this need is difficult to 
achieve especially in a dynamic and diverse environment when the organization 
is highly differentiated. 
Finally, it is found that the influence that the different functional areas can have 
upon their relationship is not constant. Instead, it varies depending on the ability 
of these areas to cope with critical contingencies. Because the preferences and 
goals between the functional areas are not always compatible, inter-functional 
conflict may occur as different functional areas fight for more control. 
Apparently, these factors have a major impact upon the efficiency of inter- 
group relationship. However, the organization theories concerning inter-group 
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relationship are incapable of dealing with the R&D/marketing relationship in 
full, since the abstraction of a variety of relationships into "inter-group" 
relationship has taken away their original context. Thus, the effectiveness of the 
R&D/mareting relationship in relation to the organization's technological 
conditions and market competitive position cannot be appropriately evaluated. 
1.4 A BROAD REVIEW ON INNOVATION STUDIES 
The growing interest in innovation has been largely triggered and stimulated by 
events in the contexts of organizations. However, the problem of innovation in 
organization studies has been theorized in a very restrictive and simplistic 
manner. The focus is upon efficiency with innovation as the deviant case (Clark 
& Staunton, 1993). Innovation studies, on the other hand, have largely 
elaborated organization theory by taking into account organization's internal 
and external technological conditions as well as firm's competitive positions 
(Fox, 1973; We & Snow, 1984; Rockart, 1979; Hitt & Ireland, 1982). 
Innovation can be viewed both as activities and process. Thus, innovation 
activities are dynamic inputs to the innovation process (Brown & Karagozoglu, 
1989). The inputs include both decision inputs and implementation inputs. The 
decision inputs are concerned with the overall company strategy and its 
technology policy, while the implementation inputs are related to an 
organization's structure, information and manpower flow and the role 
specification. 
In correspondence with Brown Karagozoglu's view, McGee and Thomas (1989) 
propose issues of "confidence" and issues of "emergence" in innovation 
process. Issues of confidence concern company's decision to commit resources 
to technological change, reflect the coherence of its strategy and its attitude to 
risk. While issues of emergence focus on the processes which shape the 
decision-making and carry technological change through to the market. It is 
apparent that the R&D/marketing interface has an important role to play at both 
levels. 
In this section, the R&D/marketing relationship is related to its technological 
context. Following an introduction of the types and stages of innovation, the 
role of the R&D/marketing interface in management of the R&D function - the 
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function that carries out technological change - is discussed. Next, the 
importance of the R&D/marketing interface at the corporate level in deciding 
company's resource commitment to technological change is explored, where the 
concept of the "core" technological competence of the firm is brought up. 
1.4.1 Types and Stages of Product Innovation 
(1) Types of Innovation 
In innovation research, effort has been made to classify various types of 
innovation. According to technological newness and market newness of an 
innovation, it may be classified as either radical or incremental (Utterback & 
Abernathy, 1975). With regard to the competitive consequences of these two 
types of innovation upon the firms, Dussauge et. al. (1992) suggest that 
incremental changes reinforce the positions of established firms while radical 
innovations force incumbents to develop new skills and capabilities. 
On the other hand, Calantone and Cooper (1981) have identified nine types of 
new product scenarios through empirical investigation, such as the "Synergistic 
Close To Home" product, the "Better Mousetrap with No Marketing" product, 
the "Synergistic Product That Was New to the Firm" type, the "Innovative 
Superior Product with No Synergy" and so on. The following six blocks of 
variables listed are the main criteria for this categorization. 
(a) the commercial entity of the new product 
(b) the nature or quality of information acquired during the new 
product success 
(c) nature of the marketplace 
(d) proficiency of process activities 
(e) the compatibility of the resource base of the firm with the 
requirements of the project 
(f) nature of the project 
Each new product type has a different combination of these variables. Although 
some of them are facing a similar external market and technological condition, 
they differ in their marketing proficiency and technological strength of the firm. 
Thus, their successful record is also different. It is observed by the author that 
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when merely considering their external technological and market condition, 
these nine new product types fall into six categories, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 The Technology-Market Dimension Matrix 
Technology 
Related to 
the firm 
Unrelated to 
the firm 
New to industry 
A B 
C D 
E F 
Existing New 
Market 
(a) Type A is the "related-technology and existing market" type of product. It 
includes the "Synergistic Close To Home" product, and so on. 
(b) Type B is the "related-technology but new-market" type of product, which 
may include the "Better Mousetrap With No Marketing" product. 
(c) Type C is the "unrelated-technology but existing market" type of product. 
The "Innovative High Technology" product is likely to belong to this category. 
(d) Type D is the "unrelated-technolgy and new-market" type of product. The 
"Me To Product With No Technical Synergy" may belong to this type. 
(e) Type E is the "new-technology but existing-market" type of product. The 
"Innovative Mousetrap That Really Wasn't Better" may belong to this type. 
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(f) Type F is the "new-technology and new-market" type of product. The 
"Synergistic Product that was New to the Firm" product and the "Innovative 
Superior product with No Synergy" type are likely to be in this category. 
Calantone and Cooper's (1981) approach offers a new way for managers to 
consider the attractiveness of new product proposals. It emphasizes the 
evaluation of the impact of a series of process activities, technological factors 
and market factors on the eventual outcome. The importance of a company's 
technical resources, including production resources, skills of engineering staff, 
experience in research and development, sufficient development funds, and 
recognition of a technical opportunity in product success is stressed. 
(2) Stages of Innovation 
Although the product planning and development varies from industry to 
industry, its activities generally follow the pattern described below (Hisrich & 
Peters, 1984). 
(a) idea stage: suggestions for new products are obtained from all 
possible sources, and their values for the achievement of 
company's long term objectives and growth are analyzed; 
(b) laboratory development stages: ideas are now developed in the 
laboratory into more elaborate product concept backed up by a 
preliminary marketing program; 
(c) product development stage: technical and commercial aspects 
of the potential new product are explored and the prototype is 
developed in the light of production problems, safety 
requirements, and costs; 
(d) test marketing: valuable data on the nature of market, the 
needed marketing strategy and product modification are provided 
to ensure a successful launch. 
Pinto and Slevin (1989) argue that the project development stages have 
important implications for prioritizing critical successful factors. They have 
identified ten critical success factors in R&D projects, such as project mission, 
top management support, project schedule, client consultation, technical tasks, 
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monitoring and feedback, personnel, and environmental events, and so on. They 
find that the relative importance of these factors changes depending on the stage 
in which the project currently resides. Thus, while client consultation and 
personnel are most important in the conceptual stage, environmental effects, 
monitoring and feedback are most crucial in the planning stage, etc. Similarly, 
Brown and Karagozoglu (1989) find that the personal values of top managers 
have a major influence on innovation in the idea generation stages. However, in 
advanced product development and market research activities, the incorporation 
of a element of flexibility into the strategy formulation becomes essential for 
encouraging R&D and marketing integration. 
1.4.2 R&D Management 
According to Dussauge et al. (1992), the first problem that technology-based 
strategies pose concerns the management of the R&D function, i. e. the function 
which develops technology. From a R&D perspective, differentiation is 
essential to fundamental innovation, since marketing often has difficulty 
sensing opportunities in the scientific and technological environment. On the 
other hand, integration with marketing is equally important to ensure a 
marketable output rather than a technological chimera. 
In this area, apart from the consideration of market and technological factors in 
project selection, the importance of an effective R&D/marketing interface in 
maintaining a crucial balance between development speed and development risk 
is also been recognized. Krusik (1988) points out that: 
"the opportunity cost of missing a fast-moving 
market window and the risk of entering a market 
with the wrong product pull managers in opposite 
directions" (pp. 46) 
Although both the novelty of the product and the speed of the product 
development are a possible source of competitive advantage for the firm, their 
relative importance to the firm varies depending on the market environment. 
When the competitive environment is changing rapidly, and product life cycles 
are being substantially shortened, the opportunity cost of missing a strategic 
window is very high. Thus, development speed becomes critical. However, 
being fast to market is no advantage if managers choose the wrong technology 
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or create a design that customers do not want. In addition, there are situations 
when markets and technologies are new and highly uncertain, yet, the 
competitive environment is relatively stable, emphasis may instead be put on 
acquiring crucial information and reducing the technical risk of the 
development rather than speeding up the development. In other words, R&D 
managers need to identify and act on the particular circumstances in which they 
find themselves. In order to achieve this, a close interface with their marketing 
counter-parts to understand the market condition and the competitive 
environment is highly desirable. 
In addition, the need for distinct managerial approaches in Research and 
Development sections is also stressed (McGee & Thomas, 1989). Since broadly 
focused, more basic research is different form narrowly focused, more 
incremental development work. There are greater technological uncertainties in 
the Research outcomes, whereas development decisions are more explicitly 
commercial and involve much shorter time scale. This implies that the 
R&D/marketing interface issue has to be examined in a greater detail, as far as 
the innovation stages are concerned. 
1.4.3 The Core Technological Competence of the Firm 
The innovation outcome of a firm, in terms of size, radicalness and direction is 
largely influenced by the firm's corporate strategy regarding the resource 
commitment to technological changes (Coomb, et. al., 1987). A firm's 
technological strategy reflects it's attitude to risk (McGee & Thomas, 1989), 
and this in turn, affects the firm's long term growth. According to Capon & 
Glazer (1987) 
"Firms that choose to approach the technological 
frontier place themselves at risk, for technology 
research, development, and exploitation are by 
definition uncertain. However, though remaining in 
familiar product-market situations reduces current 
uncertainty and may ensure current profits, the 
avoidance of technological risk today may lead to 
considerable market risk tomorrow" (pp. 3). 
The real 'paradox' of technology can thus be stated in the form of a question: 
how can the company simultaneously achieve efficiency in existing operations 
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(incremental change) as well as effective repositioning and innovation for the 
future (radical change). 
Traditionally the strategy literature treats technology as an implementation 
issue. The firm determines its strategy and, this in turn, defines how technology 
will be used (McGee & Thomas, 1989). More recently, strategic management 
researchers in areas such as corporate diversification and organization structure 
have identified important technological dimension. Meyer and Roberts (1988) 
identified three basic choices in terms of technology in planning product 
development. They are: 
(a) building a critical mass of technological skills for a closely 
related product portfolio, believing that the distinctive 
competence it achieved will become the basis of long-lasting 
competitive advantage; 
(b) targeting unrelated technologies, which results in a diverse set 
of products that does not depend on a single core technology; 
(c) creating a diverse product portfolio through acquisition, 
avoiding the long-term effort of building the required 
technological expertise internally. 
These technological choices differ in terms of their dependence on the firm's 
core technology. Meyer and Robert (1988) suggest that the first choice yields a 
distinctive core technology that becomes the foundation of the company's 
product development. They argue that without a defensible core technology, the 
technological venture typically had difficulty assuming a leadership role in its 
target markets and found itself playing catch-up with competitors. 
Pavitt (1986) also emphasizes the importance of the "core technologies" in 
successful innovation. He suggests that 
"entry and exploitation of new product markets 
based upon technological skills will create 
significant short term costs and such innovations 
are most likely to be successful when are used on 
core technologies close to the existing product 
market and technology mix of the firm" (pp. 87). 
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Therefore the most important conclusion drawn from the above analysis is that 
the firm's potential for innovation and for economic return is strongly 
conditioned by the historical trajectory of innovative activity in the past 
(McGee & Thomas, 1989). 
It is clear that a firm's decision-making on it's technological strategy is a 
constant search of a dynamic balance on a three dimension matrix, i. e. market 
risk, technological risk and firm's long term growth. However, an understanding 
of the role of the R&D/marketing interface in deciding firm's technological 
strategy at the corporate level is still very much lacking. 
1.4.4 Summary 
In this section, the role of the R&D/marketing relationship or interface has been 
investigated from a technological perspective both at the functional level - the 
R&D management and at the corporate level - the decision-making of firm's 
technological strategy. At the functional level, it is suggested that an effective 
R&D/marketing interface is important to ensure a marketable innovation output. 
It is further pointed out that an effective R&D/marketing interface is not only 
critical for a project selection but is important throughout the R&D process to 
maintain a crucial balance between development speed and development risk. 
In addition, the need for R&D managers to adopt distinct managerial 
approaches for the Research and the Development sections is proposed owing 
to the different technological uncertainties and commercial implications they 
are involved. 
Next, at the corporate level, the role of the R&D/marketing interface in deciding 
firm's technological strategy is discussed. A firm's technological strategy is 
concerned with the firm's resource commitment to technological changes, 
which has a major impact upon the firm's long term growth. Since one of the 
major considerations in deciding firm's technological strategy is the dynamic 
balance between the market risk, the technology risk and the long term business 
growth, an effective R&D/marketing interface should be incorporated into this 
decision-making process. 
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1.5 A BROAD REVIEW ON MARKETING PERSPECTIVES 
The issue of marketing's contribution in technological innovation is only 
implicitly considered in the marketing literature. Abell (1987) describes the 
firm's marketing effort, which is aimed at capturing opportunities or avoiding 
threats brought about by the advent of new technology, as meeting the changing 
needs of the customer and penetrating new potential markets so that the firm's 
sustainable competitive advantage can be built up and further maintained. 
Similarly, Rosenberg (1988) maintains that 
"the innovation emphasis is in the direction of 
proactive behaviour. An initiative posture as 
opposed to a reactive mode, demands that the firm 
cope with a high degree of environmental 
uncertainty. ... 
For such proactive firms, better and 
more timely market intelligence to integrate product 
innovation, product commercialisation and product 
diffusion is far more critical" (pp. 201) 
The importance of this focus is reinforced by findings of Cooper (1983). The 
findings indicate that a firm's new product strategy is an essential component of 
its overall planning, with significant correlations between overall performance 
and (a) extensive use of market research for new products, (b) proaction in 
identifying market needs for new products, and (c) market-derived new product 
ideas. 
However, despite the recognized importance of marketing in successful 
innovation, a field that integrates technology and marketing and accounts for 
the instrumental role of technological innovation in generating customer value 
has been far lacking. Bender (1988) argues that only first-order derivatives of 
the technological innovation literature have found their way into marketing via 
the new product development discipline and the learning curve "effect". The 
marketing literature thus addresses (a) incremental innovation only indirectly 
and (b) radical innovation not at all. 
Nevertheless, the potential of further integrating marketing and technological 
innovation has emerged with both areas moving toward a strategic orientation. 
In this section, effort is made to investigate the R&D/marketing interface in 
product innovation from a marketing perspective. First the concept of strategic 
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marketing and its recent development are introduced. Next a new area in 
marketing management, high technology marketing, is discussed. It addresses 
the marketing needs in a high technological environment which is characterized 
by the high technological uncertainty and high market uncertainty. 
1.5.1 The Strategic Marketing 
The discipline of marketing is constantly being reshaped by internal and 
external forces. The most obvious forces stem from developments in strategic 
management and planning (Day & Wensley, 1988). A prevailing debate is 
centred on the appropriateness of the traditional marketing paradigms - the 
allied notions of consumer choice and consumer satisfaction and the four P's 
(Arndt, 1979). It is argued that traditional paradigms in marketing give little 
explicit attention to competitive forces (Day & Wensley, 1988). However, the 
tentative move toward strategic orientation bears the risk of role confusion with 
strategic management, depending on the extent of shared interests between 
strategic marketing and strategic management. Wensley (1982) argues that 
many developments in strategic marketing analysis that strive to provide 
generalized diagnoses and prescriptions have deflected marketer's attention 
from the critical issue of the demand-based sources of competitive advantage. 
Day and Wensley (1988) propose a link between marketing theory and strategic 
management as follows: 
(a) product-market information is essential for corporate 
management to make many strategic judgments. 
(b) marketing activities including the identification of market 
opportunities, the analysis of new product demand and the 
development of product life cycle forecasting are key inputs into 
any attempt to achieve an effective commercial balance in the 
strategic portfolio. 
Meanwhile, the relationship between marketing and strategic management has 
been studied from a strategic planning perspective. Anderson (1982) asserts that 
the ultimate objective of the firm may be seen as an attempt to position itself for 
long run survival. This, in turn, is accomplished as each functional area 
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attempts to determine the position that will ensure a continuing supply of vital 
resources. 
Since a firm's functional areas may not be able to occupy all of the favoured 
long run positions simultaneously, strategic conflicts will arise as functional 
areas vie for financial resources necessary to occupy their optimal long-term 
positions. Corporate management as the final arbiter of these disputes may 
occasionally favour one area over another, with deleterious results. 
Against this backdrop, Anderson (1982) argues that marketing must realize that 
its role in strategic planning is not preordained, unless marketers adopt a strong 
advocacy position within the firm. On this view, strategic plans are seen as the 
outcome of a bargaining process among functional areas. Thus, from a 
constituency-based perspective, marketing's role in strategic planning reduces to 
three major activities: 
(a) long-term strategic positioning at both corporate and divisional 
levels through the identification of customers' needs over the 
firm's strategic time horizon. 
(b) the development of intermediate strategies designed to capture 
its preferred positions, which will involve attempts to gain a 
competitive advantage over firms pursuing similar positioning. 
(c) negotiation activities with top management and the other 
functional areas to implement its strategies. 
This approach suggests that the role of marketing in strategic planning must be 
that of a strong advocate for the marketing concept. This is critical since the 
other areas are likely to have biased view about marketing as merely selling 
(McNulty & Whittington, 1992). In addition, marketing's advocacy will be 
enhanced to the extent that it effectively communicates the true meaning of the 
marketing concept in terms that are comprehensible to other coalitions in the 
firm. This requires an intimate knowledge of the interests, viewpoints and 
decision processes of these groups. 
It is notable that the marketing activities suggested above remain at a normative 
level. In practice, the responsibilities of marketing vary considerably. Hooley et 
al. (1990), for example, suggests a strong association between the role of a 
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marketing department and the company's marketing approach. Specifically, the 
company's approach to marketing, whether it is a "marketing philosopher", a 
"sales supporter" or a "departmental marketer"5, is found to be associated with 
the scale of marketing's responsibilities in the organization, the closeness of its 
working relationships with other functional areas and the amount of input that 
marketing provides to the company's strategic planning. In particular, it was 
revealed that, whilst the "sales supporters" had very restricted views on 
marketing's responsibilities in the organization, the "marketing philosophers" 
demonstrated the widest responsibilities, the closest cross-functional working 
relationships and the strongest involvement in strategic planning. 
1.5.2 High Technology Marketing 
The role of marketing varies not only with the internal factors but also with the 
external factors. The complexity of marketing practice stemming from the 
uncertain nature of a high technology environment (Shanklin & Ryans, 1992) is 
increasingly recognised. The demand for strategic marketing inputs, innovative 
marketing research techniques, and the R&D/marketing integration has been the 
main theme. 
Moriaty and Kosnik (1989) define High-tech as high uncertainty about 
technology and the market. Firstly, market uncertainty refers to the ambiguity 
about the type and extent of customer needs that can be satisfied by the 
technology. According to Moriaty and Kosnik, market uncertainty exists mainly 
because of the three factors: 
(a) confronted with a radically new technology, customers may 
not understand what needs the technology can satisfy; 
(b) customer needs, once known, may be subject to unpredictable 
changes as the environment evolves; 
(c) predicting the rate of a high-tech innovation diffusion is 
difficult. 
All the preceding factors make it difficult to determine the size of the potential 
market and to detect the customer requirements on new product feature. 
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Secondly, technology uncertainty results from not knowing whether the 
technology can deliver on its promise to meet needs, once they have been 
articulated. There are five potential sources of technological uncertainty: 
(a) a lack of information about a product's functional 
performance; 
(b) a lack of established production skills and facilities for the 
new product delivery; 
(c) a lack of experience which may result in poor service; 
(d) the technology may have unanticipated side effects; 
(e) threat of technological obsolescence. 
Consequently, high-tech marketers are facing big challenge in the following 
areas: 
(a) the greater minimum acceptable knowledge base needed to 
understand the market potential and to build up credibility with 
their counterparts in R&D; 
(b) the frequent need to update their skills and knowledge with the 
rapid evolving customer preferences; 
(c) the strong need for cross-functional interaction. 
1.5.3 Marketing Research for Product Innovation 
Marketing research has been recognized as one of the important factors in 
strategic planning and product innovation. More (1984) defines market research 
as information search by managers in order to reduce situational uncertainty. 
The search activities might include an examination of market statistics, visits to 
potential customers, field tests of prototypes, test marketing, surveys and so on. 
Calantone and Benedetto (1988) emphasize the importance of relevant 
information about competitive products and strategies and about consumer 
tastes and wants in making better marketing as well as technical decisions. They 
suggest that: 
"adequate performance of market intelligence 
activities should improve performance of certain 
technical activities as well as other marketing 
activities" (pp. 204). 
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The integrating role of marketing research with new product innovation is 
defined by Rexroad (1983) as providing a link between the technology base, 
customers and competitors. Gupta (1985) contends that this integrative need is 
dependent on the degree to which the firm's strategy is proactive and the extent 
of environmental uncertainty as related to consumers and their needs, 
technological dynamics and the competition. 
More (1984) examined the relationship between the timing of market research 
and the situational uncertainty facing a particular new product innovation. The 
situational uncertainty was measured in terms of marketing task similarity, 
distribution complexity, competitive advantage, buyer risk and development 
complexity. He found that companies faced with less market task similarities 
tended to do earlier market research. Earlier market research was also noted in 
situations involving few unique product features. Earlier research also tended to 
be done in situations involving greater buyer risk. Significant differences were 
observed in the timing of market research for the different projects studied. The 
findings highlight the importance of recognizing the uniqueness of each new 
product situation and the need to carefully and explicitly plan resource 
commitments to market research. The issues of uncertainty and timing of 
marketing research are critical, especially for high technology firms, because 
market research contributes to the reduction of risk and uncertainty, 
However, despite the awareness of integrating marketing research and product 
innovation, discussion of the nature of the information has been relegated to its 
more traditional market measurement and sales estimation functions, neglecting 
its role in providing critical environmental inputs for a corporate decision on 
product innovation, in terms of users and competitors, technological dynamics 
and possible governmental intervention (Rosenberg, 1989). Moreover, the 
importance of marketing research in helping the R&D department design 
unique new product features which are at the same time valued by customers 
has been largely ignored (Bonnet, 1986). 
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1.5.4 Summary 
In this section, issues regarding marketing's role in product innovation are 
brought up. It is found that although in the marketing literature, innovation 
topics are largely ignored, several relatively new areas within the marketing 
literature have demonstrated a strong strategic or technological focus. This 
provides a great potential for an improved understanding on the 
R&D/marketing interface from a marketing perspective. These promising areas 
include (a) strategic marketing, (b) high technology marketing and (3) 
marketing research for product innovation. 
The strategic focus of marketing management, in correspondence with the 
newly identified technological dimension within strategic management 
literature, has laid an important foundation for the research into the 
R&D/marketing interface at the corporate level. In addition, from a strategic 
planning perspective, marketing's role is considered to include (a) long-term 
strategic positioning at corporate level, (b) the development of intermediate 
strategies and (c) negotiation activities with top management and the other 
functional areas to implement its strategies (Anderson, 1988). This perspective 
has an important theoretical implication upon the R&D/marketing interface 
study. It emphasizes the importance of the R&D/marketing interface in 
accomplishing marketing goals. However, it is important to note that these three 
areas of marketing's responsibility remain at a normative level. In practice, a 
considerable variation of the marketing's responsibility is found, depending on 
firms' marketing approach (Hooley, et al. 1992). The findings reveal the 
importance of relating marketing theory to marketing practice. 
In addition, a closer integration of technology and marketing is embraced in the 
area of high technology marketing. It addresses the complexity of marketing 
practice stemming from the uncertain nature of a high technology environment, 
which is characterized by high technological uncertainty and high market 
uncertainty. This highly uncertain high-tech environment has posed greater 
challenge to marketers including the need to interact with R&D and the 
difficulties involved in achieving an effective R&D/marketing integration. 
Finally the importance of marketing research in uncertainty reduction and 
product design is emphasized. However, it is revealed that marketing research 
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has been mainly conducted for marketing considerations, its role in providing 
critical environmental inputs for a corporate decision on product innovation as 
well as in helping the R&D department design superior new product feature has 
been largely neglected. 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
The literature review has been divided into two major parts. The first part 
presents an overview on previous studies, where the R&D/marketing interface 
is assessed at two levels and in two dimensions. The two levels are the 
departmental level which is not concerned with the specificity of projects 
(Ruekert and Walker, 1987) and the project team level (Souder, 1988; 
Moenaert, et al. 1992). The two dimensions include market (or strategic) 
dimension (Souder, 1988; Moenaert, et al. 1992; Shanklin and Ryans, 1988) 
and product (or technical) dimension (Bonnet, 1986). Problems have been 
reported at each level and in each dimension from different perspectives. Since 
these interface problems have exceeded the scope of the existing research in the 
separate fields, a multi-disciplinary approach needs to be developed. 
As a result, a broader literature search across the areas of organization theory, 
innovation management, strategic management and marketing is conducted. 
Three pairs of contradicting forces shaping organization are discussed. They 
include interdependence and coordination, differentiation and integration and 
relative influence of functional departments and environmental uncertainty. 
They have a major influence upon intergroup behaviour. 
Apparently, all these organizational factors have a major impact upon the 
efficiency of the inter-group relationship, and thus the efficiency of the 
R&D/marketing relationship. However, the organization theories concerning 
inter-group relationship are incapable of dealing with the R&D/marketing 
relationship in full, since the abstraction of a variety of relationships into an 
"inter-group" relationship has taken away their original context. Specifically, 
the effectiveness of the R&D/mareting relationship in relation to the 
organization's technological conditions and competitive position in the market 
cannot be appropriately evaluated. 
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As a result, next, the R&D/marketing relationship is discussed in relation to its 
technological context. The role of the R&D/marketing relationship or interface 
is investigated both at the functional level - the R&D management and at the 
corporate level - the decision-making of firm's technological strategy. Finally, 
the R&D/marketing relationship is studied from a marketing perspective. It is 
found that although the marketing literature has largely ignored the 
technological aspect, several relatively new areas within the marketing literature 
have demonstrated a strong strategic or technological focus. This provides a 
great potential for an improved understanding on the R&D/marketing interface 
from a marketing perspective. These promising areas include (a) strategic 
marketing, (b) high technology marketing and (3) marketing research for 
product innovation. 
The literature review presented in this chapter shows that the potential for 
studying the R&D/marketing interface exists at a much larger scale than has 
been embraced in the previous research. Specifically, an effective 
R&D/marketing interface is needed in the R&D management to relate 
technology to the market, in the marketing management to advocate the 
marketing concept and to implement marketing strategies and in the strategic 
management to achieve an commercial balance in the strategic portfolio. In 
other words, while providing a wider theoretical ground for the R&D/marketing 
interface study, these academic areas will also benefit from such study both 
theoretically and normatively. 
In Chapter 3, "The Theoretical Framework", the role of the R&D/marketing 
interface will be clearly defined in relation to its technological and market 
context. On the basis of this literature review and a pilot study described in the 
next chapter, "The Research Methodology", research propositions are 
developed which are mainly concerned with the relationships between the 
strategic role of the R&D/marketing interface, its organizational process and its 
technological and market environment. 
Note 
1. Domain similarity refers to the degree to which two different individuals or departments share the 
same goals, skills, or tasks. 
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2. The amount of communication reflects the frequency of contact. 
3. Communication difficulty refers to the effort required and problems involved in either getting in 
contact with or in getting ideas across to the other party. 
4. Including Mild Disharmony - lack of interaction, etc., Severe Disharmony - lack of appreciation, 
distrust, etc. and Harmony. 
5. the "marketing philosophers" clearly see marketing both as a function - with prime responsibility 
for identifying and meeting customer needs - and as a guiding philosophy for the whole organisation. 
On the other hand, the cluster of "sales supporter" has a restricted view of marketing as sales 
promotion. In addition, the cluster of "departmental marketers", despite of its strong belief that 
marketing is about identifying and meeting customer needs, it does not see marketing as a guiding 
philosophy for the whole organisation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The R&D/marketing interface in product innovation has been the key focus of 
this doctoral research, which is influenced largely by the author's personal 
interest in technology management stemming from her engineering background. 
Although the author's relative unfamiliarity with business studies field has 
brought difficulties in the process of defining more specific research objectives, 
it has certainly given her a fresh viewpoint without preordained theoretical 
perspectives or propositions which might bias and limit the findings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The much needed research inspiration at the early stage was provided by a pilot 
study in which ten British firms were involved. The development of the 
research theoretical framework presented in the next chapter has entailed a 
continuous comparison of the existing literature with findings of the pilot study 
described in 2.2. 
Having defined the specific research objectives, a case study research 
methodology was decided to be most appropriate. A explanation regarding the 
choice of such a strategy was given in 2.3. Next the pharmaceutical industry 
was selected as the research population and four pharmaceutical firms and the 
total of twelve products developed by these firms were selected as the research 
sample. Their selection followed certain criteria described in 2.4. 
Data collection was the next important step. A big effort was made to ensure the 
external validity by designing appropriate data collection methods, and multiple 
data collection methods were used. The triangulation made possible by the 
multiple data collection methods provided stronger substantiation of constructs 
and propositions. This is presented in 2.5. 
Finally in 2.6, methods of data analysis including both within-case analysis and 
cross-case analysis were explained. Emphasis of the data analysis was placed on 
preventing the drawing of premature and even false conclusions as a result of 
information-processing biases. A general analytical strategy was applied which 
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relied on the theoretical propositions developed in the theoretical framework. 
These propositions were concerned with the interrelationships between the 
strategic constructs, the organizational constructs and the env ronmental 
constructs. No special methods were used to measure the organizational and the 
strategic constructs, and the original qualitative data regarding these constructs 
were merely summarized by using tables in each innovation case study. 
However, the measurement of the environmental constructs was more 
complicated since several facets were included in one construct. In order to 
compare the environmental constructs across different cases, a simple 
management science model - checklists model - that was often used in R&D 
project selection decision-making was applied to measure the environmental 
constructs. The suitability of the checklists model in the current research was 
carefully assessed, where the reasons for using this model were provided. 
2.2 THE PILOT STUDY 
2.2.1 The Objectives of the Pilot Study 
The large scale literature review described in Chapter 1 was conducted at the 
beginning of this research. The review formed a critical foundation for the 
development of the research theoretical framework in Chapter 3. For instance, 
in the review, various dimensions in the R&D/marketing interface were 
identified and the critical environmental and organizational influences upon the 
interface were discussed. However, in order to ensure that the research design 
was not only academically rigorous but also empirically viable and practically 
relevant, a pilot study was carried out. The main objectives of the pilot study 
were: 
(a) to decide the more specific research objectives; 
(b) to collect the opinions of practitioners concerning 
the important factors underlying the R&D/marketing interface; 
(c) to decide the population of the doctoral research. 
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2.2.2 The Processes of the Pilot study 
(1) The Sample Selection 
The emphasis of the current research on high technology industry sectors has 
been underlined in the literature review. According to Traynor (1989), high- 
tech industry sectors can be defined in terms of their R&D expenditure (see 
Table 2.1). 
TABLE 2.1 TOP TEN HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES BASED ON R&D 
EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF SALES 
Guided missiles and spacecraft (64%) 
Communication equipment and electronic components 
Aircraft and parts 
Office computing and accounting machines 
Ordinance and accessories 
Drugs and medicines (16%) 
Industrial inorganic chemicals 
Professional and scientific instruments 
Engines and turbines and parts 
Plastic materials and synthetic resins, rubber, and 
fibbers (%6) 
----------------------------------------------------- - 
Note: Ranked from highest to lowest. Source: K, Traynor 
(1989) 
In the pilot study, the main criteria for the sample selection were firms within 
the high-tech sector that carried out technological innovations. As a result, ten 
firms were randomly selected from various industries within the high-tech 
sector, and included automation, electronics, communication equipments, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Data was collected both from published 
materials and through a total of ten interviews with members of the companies. 
People interviewed included a Business Strategy Manager of a chemical 
company, a Vice President of a pharmaceutical company, a Divisional Director 
of a pharmaceutical company, a R&D Manager of a pharmaceutical company, a 
Technical Manager of a chemical company, a Product Manager of a 
Telecommunication company, a Managing Director of a machine tools 
company, a Marketing Manager of a automation company, a Research 
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Associate in a biotechnology company and an engineer in a Computer Graphics 
company (see Appendix 1). 
(2) The Interviews 
The interviews were carried out over a period of three months, commencing 
February, 1990. Access to industry was achieved via a variety of sources. For 
example, the interviews with managers in several pharmaceutical firms were 
arranged by the supervisor. In addition, the author was able to talk to a number 
of managers who were attending her Chinese language course at the Warwick 
University. Also, interviews with a marketing manager in a automation 
company were carried out while the author was conducting a three months 
marketing research project for the company. 
The interviews were primarily exploratory. Therefore, no standardized 
questionnaires were used at this stage. Instead, the interviewees were 
encouraged to talk about anything which they believed to be relevant to the 
R&D/marketing interface issue. For instance, the first question that was usually 
posed was "when I mention the term - the R&D/marketing interface, what 
would come to your mind? ". Some of the interviews were also tape recorded 
with the interviewee's permission. By means of these free style interviews, the 
author obtained valuable first hand information, which was summarized in 
2.2.3. Moreover, the confirmation that the R&D/marketing interface issue was a 
major concern to the practitioners (hence they were willing to discuss it) was 
very important and encouraging. Since getting effective access to industry is 
always a cornerstone in an empirically-based research. 
2.2.3 The Outcome of the Pilot Study 
The data from the pilot study confirmed the findings from the literature review 
that the R&D/marketing interface activity was carried out for distinct purposes, 
and there existed a variation regarding the effectiveness of the interface in 
product innovation. Furthermore, it was suggested that this variation was 
possibly related to the stage of product innovation. Dr France, Manager of the 
Pharmaceutical Development department II, SmithKline Beecham, stated that 
41 
"Similar to other departments within R&D, my 
department, the Pharmaceutical Development De t. 
11, has responsibilities in relation to the stages of 
the drug development process. We organize clinical 
trials on patients after the new compound's safety 
profile has been established" (face-to face 
interview, 4th March, 1990). 
In addition, the link between the variation of the R&D/marketing interface and 
the type of innovation project was also strongly implied in the study. Dr Li, 
Research Associate of Biosym Technologies, recalled 
"We do have effective communication with them 
(marketing people) sometimes, especially when a 
new product idea was generated by them. However, 
in other instances, we tend to work alone in the 
laboratoryfor those highly innovative projects" 
(face-to-face interview, 7th April, 1990). 
Next, the data of the pilot study provided positive evidence of the increased 
importance of strategic marketing in product innovation. The trend towards 
internationalization is suggested to be an important attribut. 
Moreover, with regard to the research population, data was collected and was 
compared with the literature review. It was found that although it was 
theoretically sound to select samples from different industries for the research, 
it would pose great difficulties to attempt to define measurements for a large 
group of research variables covering a variety of industries. Therefore, the 
possibility of selecting a particular industry as the research population was 
considered. This consideration was then carefully evaluated, when deciding and 
validating the research methodology and research population, in the following 
sections. 
2.3 CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1 Specific Research Objectives 
The Literature review revealed that the synthetic process of the R&D/marketing 
interface is concerned with the pursuit of competitive advantage by 
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incorporating negotiated exchange with internal coalitions. This was reinforced 
by the preliminary findings from the pilot study. Therefore the specific research 
objectives were defined as below. 
(a) to investigate empirically the role of the R&D/marketing 
interface in product innovation; and 
(b) to offer theoretical explanations of the tendencies and 
variations of the R&D/marketing interface in relation to the 
market, technological and organisational environment as observed 
in the investigation. 
Clearly, the nature of the first objective is either descriptive or exploratory and 
the second objective is explanatory. 
2.3.2 Case Study Strategy 
The translation of concepts into operational measurements is a critical step. 
There are also different research strategies for collecting and analysing 
empirical evidence. For instance, the survey strategy, the case study strategy, 
and the experimental strategy. Each has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
According to Yin (1984), what distinguishes the strategies are three conditions: 
(a) the type of research question posed. 
(b) the extent of control an investigator has over actual 
behavioural events, and 
(c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical 
events. 
The case study strategy has a distinct advantage in a situation where a "how" or 
"why" question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which 
the investigator has little or no control. It has strength in dealing with a full 
variety of evidence, such as archives, interviews, questionnaires, and 
observations. It is a research methodology which focuses on understanding the 
dynamic present within single settings (Eisenhardt, 1989). It can employ an 
embedded design, that is, multiple levels of analysis within a single study (Yin, 
1984). 
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Case study research strategy was therefore determined to be most appropriate 
for our research, which was conducted at two levels of analysis: firm and 
product. The case studies in the current research were used to provide a 
description of the R&D/marketing interface process and to generate further 
explanations or theories regarding this process. 
2.4 THE RESEARCH POPULATION AND RESEARCH SAMPLE 
2.4.1 The Research Population - the UK Pharmaceutical Industry 
The definition of the research population was the next important step following 
the selection of the research methodology. It specifies the set of entities from 
which the research sample is to be drawn as well as controls extraneous 
variation (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In the current research it was decided that the U. K. pharmaceutical firms 
participating in drug innovation form the research population, and from which 
the research sample was to be drawn. The criteria of choosing this industry are 
listed in Table 2.2. 
44 
TABLE 2.2 THE CHOICE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
CRITERIA DESCRIPTION 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Industry (1) High complexity of drug research and 
Characteristics environment; 
(high-tech) 
(2) High competitiveness on the basis of 
innovative drugs. 
(3) High R&D expenditure. 
(4) High percentage of labour being 
employed in the R&D function. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
2. Industry (1) High risk in the R&D investment. 
Characteristics 
(peculiarity) (2) Effectiveness of product 
differentiation as an entry barrier. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
3. Outstanding (1) Six of the top twenty world's 
Performance best-selling drugs in 1991 were 
(esp. innovative developed by UK companies. 
firms) (2) Four of the world's twenty biggest 
pharmaceutical companies are British 
(3) UK Pharmaceuticals produced a trade 
surplus of 1.2 billion in 1991. 
In the past twenty-five years, the 
UK pharmaceutical industry has out 
performed London stock market by 
over 400%. 
The world-wide ethical pharmaceutical market is approximately £ 100 billion a 
year, which is further divided into six major therapeutic sub-markets. These are 
Cardiovascular, Central Nervous System, Respiratory, Antibiotics/Antiviral, 
Anti-ulcerants, Anticancer. The U. K. pharmaceutical industry was chosen for 
investigation because of its high technological characteristics, its high risk in 
R&D investment, and its outstanding performance over the last ten years, 
especially within innovative firms. Freeman (1968) argues that the 
pharmaceutical industry is entitled to more sympathetic understanding of its 
problems and achievements, and especially of its innovation. An account of the 
methods of R&D project selection and management in some of the leading 
innovative firms would be instructive both outside and inside the industry. 
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The U. K. pharmaceutical industry is a highly competitive industry comprising 
many firms, some successful, some not so. It is an industry in which firms 
compete with each other not so much on the basis of price but on the basis of 
new products. The environmental uncertainty is high. Since a new drug takes 
approximately twelve years to reach the market, prediction of the future 
technological and market trends is difficult but critical. Understanding the 
dynamic pattern of the strategic interactions and the industrial environment calls 
for a multi-disciplinary approach, the advantage of which has been stated by 
Porter (1983): 
(a) it is built around a careful re-creation of competitive moves 
and other events in the sequence in which they occurred; 
(b) it is broad and quite detailed in its coverage of firm behaviour 
and industry events; and 
(c) it emphasizes the uncertainties present in predicting the future 
that bear on the decisions facing firms. 
It is important to note that as a result of this population selection, findings from 
the current research will not be generated directly to other industries. 
Nevertheless, the design of the research theoretical framework presented in 
Chapter 3 is not constrained to a particular industry, in terms of the research 
questions posed and the research constructs defined. Therefore with certain 
adjustments on the measurement of some constructs, the framework should be 
applicable to other industries. 
2.4.2 The Research samples - the Four Pharmaceutical Firms and the 
Twelve Products 
In the case studies research, samples are selected for theoretical rather than 
statistical reasons. They may be chosen to replicate previous cases, extend 
emergent theory, or to fill theoretical categories and provide examples of polar 
types (Eisenhardt, 1989). Pettigrew (1988) notes that given the limited number 
of cases which can usually be studied, it makes sense to choose cases of 
extreme situations and polar types in which the process of interest is 
transparently observable. Based on these principles, four pharmaceutical firms 
and the total of twelve drug innovation projects are selected. Although the four 
firms are regarded as successful innovators in the pharmaceutical industry, they 
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have also suffered product failures. Among the twelve new drug projects 
studied in this research (three from each firm), three were unsuccessful. These 
firms are Glaxo, SmithKline Beecham, ICI Pharmaceuticals and Wellcome. 
These products were developed and launched during different time periods over 
the past two decades. The criteria for choosing these product samples and their 
brand names are listed in Table 2.3. It is necessary to note that in order to avoid 
bias in data collection, decisions on product selection were made independently 
according to these criteria and the companies did not exert strong influence 
during this process. 
Table 2.3 The Selection of the Products 
Company Brand Name Criteria 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Glaxo Zantac 1. The strategic importance of the 
Imigran products to the companies. 
Serevent 
2. The novelty of the product 
features at the time. 
SmithKline Tagamet 3. The commercial performance of 
Beecham Augmentin the products. 
Eminase 
4. The availability of data on 
each product. 
ICI Tenormin 
Diprivan 
Zoladex - 
Wellcome Zovirax 
Retrovir 
Lamictal 
2.5 DATA COLLECTION 
2.5.1 Reliability of the Data 
Research which involves the illustration of historical events has to be handled 
carefully to ensure its reliability. Some researchers have challenged the 
reliability of a person's memory of past events. However, it is important to 
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distinguish between "any past event" and "an important historic event". A 
person may not remember what he was doing at 11 am. Wednesday the 24th of 
June, 1976, for example. However, he will certainly recall his wedding day. 
This kind of memory would be further enhanced if he was repeatedly asked to 
recall them. The events that we asked our interviewees were similar to the 
latter. In order to ensure reliability of the data, we applied multiple data 
collection methods. They include: 
(a) Archives, 
(b) statistic data from industry reports and other sources, 
(c) stock broker reports, 
(d) Interviews: personal face-to-face , telephone follow-up, 
double-checking, interviewing people who have already left the 
companies, and 
(e) small scale questionnaire survey regarding the relative value 
of the facets of a research constructs and the suitability of some of 
the data analysis measures. 
(e) participating in company meetings and industry project 
management meetings. 
Every interview was carefully prepared by studying background information 
relating to the company. Most of the companies provided detailed materials 
about the company and the products beforehand to avoid an unproductive 
interview. Furthermore, with the aid of these materials, we could monitor the 
interview and help the interviewees recall past events. By exerting control in 
this way we intended to extract reliable information. 
In addition, a doctoral seminar on advanced methodology in technology 
management was held by the European Institute of Advanced Studies in 
Management (EIASM) in May, 1992. Valuable suggestions from a panel 
including several professors provided additional help in ensuring the validity 
and reliability of this research. 
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2.5.2 Data Collection 
(1) Technical Information 
The relatively well-defined research questions at this stage enabled us to "go 
into organizations with a well-defined focus - to collect specific kinds of data 
systematically" (Mintzberg, 1979). 
Before starting the detailed research for the main study it was necessary for the 
author to become familiar with the technical aspects of the products. This was 
done firstly by scanning the technical literature on the chemistry and 
pharmacology technologies. This literature was obtained from the companies 
involved, from periodicals and from the Association of British Pharmaceutical 
Industry (abpi). Secondly, the author attended the 1990 Annual Meeting of 
Pharmaceutical Industry R&D Management. Representatives from 
approximately fifty major UK pharmaceutical companies were discussing at the 
meeting issues regarding new product development and project management. 
(2) Archives 
Empirical data on the firms were collected in the period between January, 1991 
and July, 1992. It is a particular feature of this industry that firms are extremely 
secretive and unwilling to disclose data on their activities in case it is of benefit 
to their competitors. 
The author obtained data from secondary sources such as stockbrokers, 
Datastream, and published materials through BPO (Business Periodical On-line 
search), etc. Some reports were published by stockbrokers and specialized 
research companies. Most of these reports were intended for the clients of those 
companies and were often for restricted distribution. In addition, the author was 
provided by managers of the companies a number of important documents 
which were highly valuable to the research. In order to maintain required 
confidentiality, in the case studies they were briefly referred as company 
sources, e. g. "Glaxo sources" etc. The author would, therefore, like to express 
her particular thanks for the way in which this information was made available 
for the purpose of this academic enquiry. 
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(3) Interviews 
The author has been very fortunate in being able to interview a large number of 
managers in the firms. Some of them were approached several times. On 
average, nine people were interviewed in each firm, including both face-to-face 
and telephone interviews. The names of the interviewers and the date of these 
interviews are listed in the Appendix 2. Senior Vice President, Directors of 
Strategic Product Development, Directors of Strategic Marketing, Directors of 
Product Planning, Product Managers, and R&D Managers were all consulted. A 
research outline and the covering area of interview together with a covering 
letter from the Business School were given to each interviewee several days 
before the interview (see Appendices 3 and 4). Since without a research focus, 
it is easy to become overwhelmed by the volume of data. 
In addition, a large proportion of these interviews was tape-recorded with the 
permission of the interviewees, and transcripts were generated for some of the 
interviews. Interviews were free and unstructured and took the form of 
discussions rather than questions and answers. Most of the critical data on the 
pharmaceutical firms' R&D/marketing interface were attained through private 
reports and interviews. The case study reports were sent back to the 
interviewees for final comments and error correction. The author is greatly 
indebted to all the people she interviewed. They made possible an in-depth 
study of what had already been termed a secretive industry. 
2.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
2.6.1 The Relationship Between the Theoretical Framework and the Data 
Analysis 
Data analysis is the heart of the case studies, but it is both the most difficult and 
the least codified part of the process (Yin, 1984). Since published studies 
generally describe research sites and data collection methods, but give little 
space to discussion of analysis, a huge chasm often separates data from 
conclusions (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In this research, both within-case analysis and cross-case analysis were carried 
out by applying a general analytical strategy, which relied on the theoretical 
propositions presented in the theoretical framework. This guided the case study 
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analysis with a theoretical orientation and helped focus attention on certain data 
while ignoring other data. However, although early development of the research 
propositions is helpful, it is equally important to recognize that they are 
tentative. Therefore in order to avoid unnecessary data elimination at the early 
stage of the research, the propositions were developed in such a way that they 
remained at a relatively general and abstract level to provide the opportunity for 
the further elaboration at the cross-case analysis where a final verification 
process was carried out. 
Whilst the emphasis was on the cross-case analysis, the within-case analysis 
was critical in helping us cope with the enormous volume of data. A total of 
four within-case analyses was presented, each formed a separate chapter and 
involved detailed case study write-ups of three specific products from one firm. 
In addition, each product case study write-up was organised under the three 
research constructs defined in the theoretical framework, i. e. the environmental 
construct, the strategic constructs and the organisational constructs. An 
assessment and a preliminary discussion were provided at the end of each 
product case study. At the end of each chapter a final analysis was conducted, 
which related the results of the three product case studies within a firm to the 
research propositions. The idea was to become intimately familiar with each 
case, while avoiding drawing pre-mature conclusions. 
In the cross-case analysis, results from each of the four within-case studies were 
compared and further analysed. It aimed to reflect some theoretically significant 
propositions generated in the theoretical framework. The important 
characteristic of the cross-case analysis is that the final explanation is a result of 
a series of iterations derived from the individual cases. 
2.6.2 The Adoption of Checklist Models for Assessing the Environmental 
Constructs 
(1) The purpose of adopting checklist models 
When assessing the constructs at the end of each drug innovation case study, no 
special assessment methods were used for the organizational and the strategic 
constructs. The original qualitative information regarding these constructs are 
merely summarized by using several tables. 
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However, the measurement of the environmental constructs was more 
complicated since several facets were included in one construct. In order to 
explicitly compare between different constructs and across cases, we need 
measures for scaling various facets that provide a construct conveying a 
qualitative impression of the whole. 
For this purpose, checklist models are considered. In these models, values are 
given to each facet, which are then added to obtain a total score, as in the 
example shown in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 An Example of Checklist model 
Construct 
Facet 1 Facet 2 Facet 3 Facet 4 Total Score 
1 2 0 0 3 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Note: each facet is assigned three different values: 
0,1 and 2. 
It is to be noted that checklist models are widely used for evaluating innovation 
projects at the early exploratory stage (see Figure 2.2), which is also the stage 
where the assessment of the environmental constructs of this research is based. 
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Figure 2.2 A Project Selection and Evaluation System 
QS/NI Process 
I Consensus Set of Goals ----------- 
project Type or 
Exploratory 
Life Cycle stage: 
Project 
NI Process With: 
Applied 
Project 
QS/NI Process 
followed by: 
Q-Sorting 
Checklist Models 
Profile Models 
Index Models 
Scoring Models 
Risk Analysis Models 
Frontier Models 
I Development Project 
NI Process With: 
Portfolio Models 
Decision Theory Models 
Problem or 
Screening 
Decision Type: 
NI Process with: 
Prioritizing Resource 
Allocation 
Q-Sorting 
Checklist Models 
Profile Models 
Index Models 
Risk Analysis Models 
Frontier Models 
NI Process with: 
Q-Sorting 
Index Models 
Scoring Models. 
Risk Analysis Models 
Decision Theory Models 
Portfolio Models 
Source: Souder, 1978. pp. 36. 
(2) The advantages and limitations of using checklist models 
NI Process with: 
Portfolio Models 
In the current research checklist models are favoured for several reasons. First, 
the results of checklist modelling are clearly displayed in such a way that the 
projects can be readily compared and checked against each criterion (Souder, 
1978). Second, checklist models help to systematize and standardize judgement 
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across different cases. Finally, the models introduce objectivity to a qualitative 
data analysis without changing its qualitative nature. Thus the total score of a 
construct only summarizes the value of each facet, rather than replacing it. As a 
result, both the individual value of each facet and the final scores of a construct 
are displayed clearly in the resulting table. 
However, checklist models should be used carefully to avoid unnecessary data 
elimination and bias. Since checklist modelling applies an equal weighting 
system, it is extremely important to include information on both individual 
facets and the summary of their combined effect upon the construct. In addition, 
checklist models are only suitable for analyzing information at a very early 
stage of a project; as the project progresses, a scoring model which assigns 
various weighting to each facet will be more effective in processing and 
analyzing available information. 
Finally, the assessment of the environmental constructs in the twelve innovation 
cases was send to the managers of the companies. Their judgements and 
opinions regarding the suitability of the equal weighting system of the 
checklists models were also invited (see Appendix 5). Positive responses were 
obtained. For example, Dr Towler, the Director of the Product Planning 
department in Glaxo Group Research commented that 
V believe this is a feasible way of evaluating a research pro 'ect. 
The factors that we consider when assessing the market and 
technological risk of a project are similar to what you have used, 
despite the fact that we do not have such illustrative and explicit 
measure" (telephone interview, 20th January, 1993). 
The detailed application of the checklists models in assessing the environmental 
constructs in the pharmaceutical industry is presented in the next chapter, "The 
Research Theoretical framework". 
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CHAPTER 3 THE RESEARCH THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The research theoretical framework in this chapter is mainly derived from the 
literature review in Chapter 1. However, the pilot study described in Chapter 2 
"The Research Methodology", has also provided useful input. Findings such as 
the role variation of the R&D/marketing interface according to the customer 
and R&D sophistication or the driving force of innovation (Souder, 1988; 
Shanklin & Ryan 1984) suggest that the R&D/marketing interface problems are 
linked to both internal and external environment of the firm. The theoretical 
framework is therefore developed to provide a higher level explanation of why 
these tendencies and variations regarding the R&D/marketing interface are 
observed. 
On the basis of the literature review, the role of the R&D/marketing interface is 
defined as the pursuit of competitive advantage by incorporating negotiated 
exchange between the two parties. A multi-disciplinary approach that combines 
both organizational and strategic aspects of the R&D/marketing interface is thus 
required. 
Having defined the specific research questions in 3.2, three groups of 
potentially important constructs from the literature are identified in 3.3. They 
are organizational constructs, strategic constructs and environmental constructs. 
This priori specification of constructs permits a more accurate and explicit 
measurement being carried out. In this section six major types of innovation 
projects are also categorized. Next, in 3.4, research propositions regarding the 
relationships between the constructs are developed. Finally, in Section 3.5, 
measurements for the environmental constructs and the innovation performance 
are developed in relation to the pharmaceutical industry. Since several facets are 
included in one environmental construct, checklist models are used to combine 
the numerical values of various facets in one measure. In the current research, 
each facet is assigned three different numerical values, i. e. 0,1 and 2. The 
reasons for adopting the checklist models have been given in the previous 
methodology chapter. 
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It is noted that since the development of the theoretical framework is not 
constrained to the pharmaceutical industry. it should be applicable to other 
industries once the measurement of some constructs is adjusted. 
3.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The specific research objectives have been defined in Chapter 2, "Research 
Methodology", as follows. 
(a) to investigate empirically the role of the R&D/marketing 
interface in product innovation; and 
(b) to offer theoretical explanations of the tendencies and 
variations of the R&D/marketing interface in relation to the 
market, technological and organizational environment as observed 
in the investigation. 
On the basis of the research objectives, three research questions are specified. 
They are: 
Q I: What is the role of the R&D/marketing interface in product innovation? 
Q2: Do the changing technological and market conditions affect the interface 
role and how? 
Q3: How and to what extent does the negotiated exchange process between 
R&D and marketing affect the fulfilment of the interface role? 
These three questions, in the order introduced above, deal with the strategic, 
environmental and organizational aspects of the R&D/marketing interface 
respectively. 
3.3 RESEARCH CONSTRUCTS 
According to the research objectives and questions, three groups of constructs 
are defined as organizational, strategic and environmental. The identification of 
these three groups of constructs that are important for the current research is 
achieved through the extensive literature review presented in Chapter 1. The 
organizational constructs are identified mainly on the basis of the organizational 
literature, while the identification of the strategic constructs has received 
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important input from both the marketing literature and the innovation literature. 
The environmental constructs are also identified from the innovation literature. 
Meanwhile, the development of the appropriate measurements for the 
environmental constructs is accomplished by referring to the operations 
research and decision theory literature regarding model building. The meaning 
of these constructs is developed in more detail in this section, while the 
measurement of these constructs is presented in section 3.5. 
3.3.1 Organizational Constructs 
The organizational constructs are particularly concerned with the organizational 
aspect of the R&D/marketing interface, i. e. the negotiated exchange process 
with internal coalitions. On the basis of the literature review and the pilot study, 
four important organizational constructs are defined. 
(1) Types of the R&D/Marketing Coordination Mechanisms 
Three types of coordination have been identified in the organizational literature. 
They are coordination by standardization, coordination by plan and 
coordination by mutual adjustment (Thompson, 1967). In addition, there are 
different integrating devices ranging from integrative departments to an 
individual integrator, and from permanent cross-functional teams at three levels 
of management to temporary cross-functional teams (Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967). In this research, the coordination mechanisms and integrating devices in 
the R&D/marketing interface and the fit of these mechanisms and devices 
within the diversity of the environment are investigated. 
(2) R&D/Marketing Communication Flows 
Several studies in the organizational literature have identified the 
communication between R&D and marketing as a major indicators of the 
R&D/marketing integration (Ruekert & Walker, 1987). Adopting Ruekert and 
Walker's definition, the R&D/marketing communication flows include: 
(a) the amount of communication, which reflects the frequency of 
contact, and 
57 
(b) communication difficulty, which refers to the effort required 
and problems involved in either getting in contact with or in 
getting ideas across to the other party. 
(3) R&D/Marketing Conflict 
In the literature (Souder, 1988; Gupta, 1985), conflict between R&D and 
marketing was frequently reported. The type of conflict varies from mild 
disharmony to mutual distrust. Although all the conflict has a negative effect 
upon the R&D/marketing cooperation, the severity of such effect may vary with 
the types of conflict. Therefore, in the present work the R&D/marketing conflict 
is measured both in terms of the frequency and the type of conflict. 
(4) Relative Influence of the R&D and Marketing (RIRM) 
Various authors in the organizational literature (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; 
Turner & Giles, 1981; Festinger, 1954) have- stressed the relationship between 
the relative influence of the functional departments and environmental 
uncertainty. They maintain that the groups that possess the most appropriate 
skills and the information to cope with the critical uncertainty come to have 
stronger influence. 
In addition, it is found in both the literature (Souder, 1988; Moenaert, 1992) and 
the pilot study that the R&D/marketing interface problems resulting from one 
party dominance seem to be strongly associated with the types and the stages of 
innovation. However, the weakness of the existing studies is the lack of 
understanding of the interface for each of the innovation cycle stages (Moenert, 
1992). 
In order to investigate the relationship between the R&D/marketing interface 
activity and the stages of innovation, the relative influence of R&D and 
marketing in relation to these stages is defined as an important measurement for 
the organizational construct. 
Two distinctions are made in the present work. One is between a "market- 
initiated" and a "market-driven" project, another is between a "research- 
initiated" and "a research-driven" project. The term "market-initiated" or 
"research-initiated" is only concerned with the source of the new idea. 
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However, the term "market-driven" or "research-driven" is related to the driving 
force of a innovation project. "Marketing-driven" refers to a process where 
marketing has a strong influence. Similarly, "research-driven" refers to a 
process which is dominated by research considerations. However, it is 
important to note that a project is not necessarily driven by only one force 
during the entire product development process. 
3.3.2 Strategic Constructs 
The strategic constructs are specifically related to the strategic role that the 
R&D/marketing interface plays in product innovation, i. e. the pursuit of 
competitive advantage. In the marketing literature two dimensions and two 
levels of the interface, i. e. the product dimension and the market dimension, and 
the corporate level and the project level, have been assessed. In addition, the 
importance of marketing research in assisting both strategic and technical 
decision-making during the innovation process is emphasized (More, 1984; 
Rosenberg, 1989). Meanwhile, in both the innovation literature and the strategic 
management literature, a technological dimension at corporate level is identified 
(Meyer & Robert, 1988; Pavitt, 1986). The presence of these dimensions of the 
R&D/marketing interface is reinforced by the results of the pilot study. Thus, 
on the basis of both the literature review and the pilot study, the strategic role of 
the R&D/marketing interface is defined to cover five dimensions. 
(1) The Corporate Strategic Dimension 
The interface provides vital input for the formulation of business strategy with 
respect to the identification of market opportunities over the firm's strategic 
time horizon; 
(2) The Corporate Technical Dimension 
The interface provides critical input for the formulation of firm's technology 
strategies with respect to the evaluation of external technological trend and 
internal technological competence; 
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(3) The Product Strategic Dimension 
The interface is responsible for deciding a price strategy, product positioning 
strategy or promotional strategy for a specific product; 
(4) The Product Technical Dimension 
The interface is concerned with the maximization of the design characteristics 
of the product that are valued by customers; 
(5) The Operational Dimension 
The interface is concerned with the application of appropriate marketing 
research, such as an examination of market statistics, visits to potential 
customers, field tests of prototypes and test marketing, to provide required 
information for either strategic or technical purposes. 
These five dimensions are illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 Five Dimensions of the R&D/Marketing Interface 
Corporate 
Strategic 
Operational 
Technical 
Product 
CSD PSD 
OD 
CTD PTD 
3.3.3 Environmental Constructs 
In the literature review, both the technological environment and market 
environment facing product innovation are discussed. Six blocks of variables 
are suggested to be the major determinant of new product outcomes (Calantone 
& Cooper, 1981). They include (a) the commercial entity of the new product, 
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(b) the nature or quality of information acquired, (c) nature of the marketplace, 
(d) proficiency of process activities, (e) the compatibility of the resource base of 
the firm and (f) nature of the project. It is apparent that the first three blocks are 
concerned with either firm's marketing proficiency or the market condition, 
while the remaining three blocks are related to either firm's technological 
strength or the technological environment. 
In addition, Cooper (1978) emphasizes that the primary criteria against which a 
research program must be judged should include (a) impact, (b) feasibility with 
respect to technological risk, technical competence, and management 
effectiveness and (c) research merit such as research opportunity and technical 
strength. Similarly, Moenaert (1992) proposes a crucial link between the task 
uncertainty of a project and the market and technological environment. Based 
on these theoretical and empirical studies, three environmental constructs and a 
series of facets for these constructs are identified. These constructs and their 
facets are 
(1) Marketing Uncertainty: Market Newness, Market Size, Customer Need 
Awareness and Market Competitiveness; 
(2) Technological Uncertainty: Nature of Project, Technological Newness and 
Product Complexity; and 
(3) Internal Marketing and Technological Strength: Marketing Experience 
and Expertise, Research Experience and Expertise, Development Experience 
and Expertise and Company Reputation. 
The facets of each of the three environmental constructs are defined in more 
detail when they are adjusted to the situation in the pharmaceutical industry in 
section 3.5. 
3.3.4 Types of Innovative Project 
On the basis of Calantone and Cooper's (1981) product classification described 
in the literature review, in the current research, the twelve drug innovation 
projects are categorized into six major types according to their closeness to the 
firm's existing market and technology and their newness to the industry. This is 
specially useful when comparisons are made and characteristics are discussed 
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between different drug innovation cases in the cross-case analysis in Chapter 9. 
The six major types of innovative projects are 
(a) the "related-technology and existing-market" type of product; 
(b) the "related-technology but new-market" type of product; 
(c) the "unrelated-technology but existing-market" type of 
product; 
(d) the "unrelated-technolgy and new-market" type of product; 
(e) the "new-technology but existing-market" type of product; 
(f) the "new-technology and new-market" type of product. 
Clearly, the types of innovation project are associated with the three 
environmental constructs identified in this section. For instance a "related- 
technology and existing-market" type of project has lower market and 
technological uncertainty and higher internal expertise compared with the other 
three types of project. Meanwhile an "unrelated-technology and new-market" 
type of project is different from a "new-technology and new-market" type of 
project in that the former generally involves higher market competitiveness 
while the latter involves higher technological uncertainty. 
3.4 RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
Having defined the research constructs, three propositions are offered relating 
to the three questions specified in 3.3. i. e. 
Q I: What is the role of the R&D/marketing interface in product innovation? 
Q2: Do the changing technological and market conditions affect the interface 
role and How? 
Q3: How and to what extent does the negotiated exchange process between 
R&D and marketing affect the fulfilment of the interface role? 
Proposition 1 (addresses Q1): the R&D/marketing interface plays important role 
in one or more of the five dimensions, during one or more of the five stages of 
product innovation. 
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Proposition 2 (addresses Q2): the changing technological and market conditions 
that are specified in the environmental constructs affect the interface role both 
in terms of the interface needs and the interfacing difficulties. 
Proposition 3 (addresses Q3): the extent to which the interface role is fulfilled 
depends on the appropriateness of the coordination mechanism, the 
effectiveness of communication, the relative influence of R&D and marketing 
and the type of interface conflict. 
3.5 MEASUREMENT OF THE RESEARCH CONSTRUCTS IN 
RELATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
While the organizational and strategic constructs defined in Section 3.4 remain 
consistent across industries, the environmental constructs need to be adjusted to 
reflect the circumstances in the pharmaceutical industry. Moreover the 
measurement of the environmental constructs is more complicated since several 
facets are included in one construct. Because of the need to compare the total 
score of an environmental construct between different cases, checklist models 
have been adopted to combine the numerical values of the many facets of a 
construct in one measure. The reasons have been provided in the methodology 
chapter. 
In this section, each facet is assigned three different numerical values, i. e. 0,1 
and 2. A score of 0 and a score of 2 represent the two ends of a spectrum, such 
as high and low, big and small, and so on. While the score of 1 characterizes a 
moderate degree, such as medium, average and so on. This procedure follows 
an accepted methodology of item scaling, assigning numerical values to an 
object in such a way as to measure its properties (Guilford, 1954). It is 
necessary to note that the numerical values of a facet need not to be formulated 
in the zero-one-two fashion as used here. Various distributions over the 
performance space have been used in the literature (Baker & Moore, 1969). 
However, approaches using too many scores were found to introduce an 
unwarranted overspecification, as well as lead to unjustifiable complexities. 
Two or three different degrees of conformance were considered to be 
reasonable (Souder, 1972). 
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3.5.1 Adjustment of the Environmental Constructs to the Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
(1) Market Uncertainty 
Four facets have been defined in the market uncertainty construct. These are (a) 
Market Newness, (b) Market Competitiveness, (c) Customer Need Awareness 
and (d) Market Size. The description of these facets in relation to the 
pharmaceutical industry and their scaling are presented below. 
(a) Market Size, the estimated size of the target market of the 
drug. Situation 1 (Si): big. Situation 2 (S2): medium. Situation 3 
(S3): small. 
(b) Market Newness, the newness of the drug's target market. 
Situation 1 (S 1): the market is new to both the company and the 
customers. Situation 2 (S2): the market is new to the company, 
although established to the customers. Situation 3 (S3): the market 
is established to both the company and the customers. 
(c) Consumer Attitude and Customer Need Awareness, the 
consumers' attitude toward the new drug and their need awareness 
in the drug's target market. Situation 1 (S 1): high. Situation 2 
(S2): average. Situation 3 (S3): low. 
(d) Market Competitiveness, the intensity of the competition in 
the drug's target market. Situation 1 (Si): high. Situation 2 (S2): 
average. Situation 3 (S3): low. 
(2) Technological Uncertainty 
The technological uncertainty constructs refer to the Nature of Project, 
Technology newness and Product complexity. In the pharmaceutical industry, 
the nature of a new drug project is largely determined by the nature of the 
disease that the drug is aimed, specifically, the cause of the disease. Since it 
determines the level of new knowledge required for achieving the project goal. 
Meanwhile, the newness of technology is associated with the mode of action of 
the drug. A novel mode of action requires exploration of new scientific 
approaches and knowledge. Finally, the product complexity is reflected by the 
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severity of the side effects of the drug. Thus, the three facets of the 
technological uncertainty construct and their scaling are defined as follows. 
(a) Cause of Disease, the cause of the disease that a drug is being 
developed to treat. Situation 1 (Si): clear. Situation 2 (S2): partly 
known. Situation 3 (S3): not clear. 
(b) Mode of action, the mode of action of the drug being 
developed, in terms of the drug's chemical structure and 
mechanism. Situation 1 (S 1): new. Situation 2 (S2): partly new. 
Situation 3 (S3): minor improvement. 
(c) Side Effect, the side effect of the drug that is shown after 
launch. Situation 1 (Si): high. Situation 2 (S2): average. Situation 
3 (S3): low. 
(3) Internal Marketing and Technological Strength 
The internal marketing and technological strength constructs consist of four 
facets. These are (a) Marketing Experience, (b) Research Experience, (c) 
Development Experience and (d) Company Reputation. According to the 
circumstances in the pharmaceutical industry, the four facets and their scaling 
are further defined as below. 
(a) Marketing Experience, the marketing experience and expertise 
and of the company in the target market of the new drug. 
Situation 1 (S 1): experienced. Situation 2 (S2): some experience. 
Situation 3 (S3): inexperienced. 
(b) Company Reputation, the reputation of the company in the 
drug's targeted therapeutic market. Situation 1 (S 1): good. 
Situation 2 (S2): average. Situation 3 (S3): not established. 
(c) Research Experience, the research experience and expertise of 
the company in the research area that the drug is being developed. 
Situation 1 (S 1): experienced. Situation 2 (S2): some experience. 
Situation 3 (S3): inexperienced. 
(d) Development Experience, the development experience and 
expertise in both clinical trials and registration of the new drug. 
Situation 1 (Si): experienced. Situation 2 (S2): some experience. 
Situation 3 (S3): inexperienced. 
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3.5.2 Measurement of the Environmental Constructs Using Checklist 
Models 
As noted earlier, checklist models have been used in the current research to 
combine the numerical values of the many facets of a environmental construct 
in one measure. Each facet is given three different degrees of numerical values: 
0,1,2. The scores of the facets of a construct are then added to obtain a total 
score for the construct. This total score can be further divided by a possible 
score to obtain a relative score. The possible score for both market uncertainty 
construct and internal technological and marketing strength is 8 (four facets, 
each has a maximum value of 2), and for technological construct is 6 (three 
facets, each has a maximum value of 2). The measurement of the three 
environmental constructs is illustrated in Tables 3.1 to 3.3. 
Table 3.1 Measurement of the Market U ncertainty Using 
Checklist s Method 
--------- ------------ 
Market 
---------------- 
Uncertainty 
------------------ 
--------- 
Market 
------------ 
Market 
---------------- 
Customer 
------------------ 
Market 
Size Newness Need Awareness Competitiveness 
Si 
--------- 
S2 S3 
------------ 
Si S2 S3 
---------------- 
Sl S2 S3 
------------------ 
Sl S2 S3 
--------- 
012 
--------- 
------------ 
210 
------------ 
---------------- 
012 
---------------- 
------------------ 
012 
------------------ 
Table 3.2 Mea surement of th e Technol ogica l Uncertainty 
Using Checkli sts Method 
------------- 
--------- - - 
-------------- 
Technological 
-------------- 
-------------- 
Uncertainty 
-------------- 
-------------- 
-------------- - - 
Cause of Dise ase Mode of 
------------ 
Action Side Effect 
Si 
------------- 
S2 S3 
- - 
Si S2 
------ 
--------- 
S3 
----- 
S1 
-------------- 
S2 S3 
------------- 
012 
------------- 
----- --- 
21 
-------------- 
--------- 
0 
--------- 
----- 
2 
----- 
-------------- 
10 
-------------- 
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Table 3.3 Measurement of Internal Technological and 
Marketing Strength Using Checklists Method 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Marketing 
Experience 
Sl S2 S3 
012 
Company 
Reputation 
S1 S2 S3 
012 
Research 
Experience 
S1 S2 S3 
012 
Development 
Experience 
Sl S2 S3 
012 
3.5.3 Measurement of The Drug Innovation Performance 
To evaluate performance systematically, managers need to decide what to 
measure. Cordero (1990) proposes that performance should be measured both in 
terms of the resources and outputs. Outputs should be measured to determine 
whether they help accomplish objectives (effectiveness); resources should be 
measured to determine whether minimum amounts are used in the production of 
these outputs (efficiency). Measures to evaluate the innovation performance 
which are relevant to the project level are summarized as follows. 
(a) Business Opportunity - the monetary value of the total market 
created by technical outputs. It is useful for comparing the market 
potential of different technical outputs. 
(b) Research Intensity - percent of sales allocated to the research 
and development of a particular innovation project. 
(c) Time Span of Technological Innovation - the time it takes 
between the conception of an innovation and its introduction into 
marketplace. 
(d) Innovation Output weighted by its importance 
(e) Percentage of new product sales 
In the pharmaceutical industry, the average return on investment is 
approximately 6.1% (Joglekar and Paterson, 1986). However, less than one in 
five new drugs attain this average return during a 15 years sales period. Since at 
the time a firm decides to invest in R&D for an NCE, it cannot know how 
successful the NCE will be, it is assumed that each marketable NCE incurs the 
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average R&D cost or research intensity, which is approximately £80 - 100 
million. Because each marketable NCE incurs the average R&D cost or 
research intensity, the absolute as well as the percentage of sales of a 
marketable NCE reached during a certain period of time become the important 
indicators for the NCE's commercial success. 
Therefore, in the current research, three measures are used to evaluate the 
performance of drug innovation. They are: 
(a) Sales of the new drug - the absolute and/or the percentage of 
the new drug sales will be measured to evaluate the commercial 
return of the drug innovation; 0 
(b) Development Speed (DS), which is used to measure both the 
time resources needed to obtain marketable outputs and the firm's 
ability in fast development. 
(c) Innovative Level of the drug innovation, which is used to 
measure both the technical resources needed to obtain marketable 
outputs and the firm's ability in producing innovation output of 
high importance. The innovative level of a new drug is shown in 
Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 The Innovative Levels of the New Pharmaceutical 
Products 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Levels Description 
Me-Too Drugs that offer no benefits over existing 
drugs and have no therapeutic advances 
(have an identical mechanism of action). 
Innovative Drugs that have significant advantages 
over existing therapies, and in some cases 
High will be so novel as to be the first in 
their respective classes. They are further 
divided into four groups: 
1. biotechnology-derived products. 
2. new classes of drugs, 
3. novel agents in established classes, 
4. early entrants in a new class, 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Medical Marketing & Media, August 1991. 
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3.6 SUMMARY 
The research framework presented in this chapter is attempted to offer a higher 
level explanation of the tendencies and variations regarding the R&D/marketing 
interface by applying an inter-disciplinary approach. It is developed on the basis 
of the literature review and the pilot study. 
The research is based on the premise that the objective of the R&D/marketing 
interface management is the pursuit of competitive advantage by incorporating 
negotiated exchange process between these two coalitions. Three questions are 
specified in this chapter which deal with the strategic aspect, environmental 
aspect and organisational aspect of the R&D/marketing interface respectively. 
By addressing these questions, the research will investigate the relationships 
between the organizational, strategic, and environmental constructs of the 
R&D/marketing interface in product innovation. 
The identification of these three groups of constructs is achieved through the 
extensive literature review presented in Chapter 1 and the pilot study discussed 
in Chapter 2. The organizational constructs are particularly concerned with the 
organizational aspect of the R&D/marketing interface - the negotiated exchange 
process with internal coalitions. They are defined as: 
(a) Types of the R&D/Marketing Coordination Mechanisms 
(b) R&D/Marketing Communication Flows, i. e. the amount of 
communication and communication difficulty. 
(c) R&D/Marketing Conflict which refers to the frequency and 
the degree of conflict between these two parties. 
(d) Relative Influence of the R&D/Marketing Interface 
The strategic constructs are specifically related to the strategic role of the 
R&D/marketing interface in product innovation - the pursuit of competitive 
advantage. They are defined as: 
(a) the Corporate Strategic Dimension (CSD) 
(b) the Corporate Technical Dimension (CTD) 
(c) the Product Strategic Dimension (PSD) 
(d) the Product Technical Dimension (PTD) 
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(e) the Operational Dimension (OD) 
The environmental constructs are designed to reflect both external market and 
technological uncertainties facing product innovation and internal marketing 
and technological strength. They are: 
(a) Market Uncertainty: Market Newness, Market 
Competitiveness, Market Size and Customer Need Awareness. 
(b) Technological Uncertainty: Nature of Project, Product 
Complexity and Technology Newness. 
(c) Internal Marketing and Technological Strength: Marketing 
Experience, Research Experience, Development Experience and 
Company Reputation. 
The innovation projects are categorized into six major types on the basis of the 
literature. The six major types of innovative projects are (a) the "related- 
technology and existing market" type of product, (b) the "related-technology 
but new-market" type of product, (c) the "unrelated-technology but existing 
market" type of product, (d) Type D is the "unrelated-technolgy and new- 
market" type of product, (e) the "new-technology but existing-market" type of 
product and (f) the "new-technology and new-market" type of product. 
Next, the environmental constructs are adjusted to reflect the circumstances in 
the pharmaceutical industry. The measurement of the environmental constructs 
is more complicated since several facets are included in one construct. Checklist 
models are adopted to combine the numerical values of the many facets of a 
construct in one measure. The reasons for using these models have been 
provided in the methodology chapter. Each facet is assigned three different 
degree of numerical values, i. e. 0,1 and 2. In addition, three measures to 
evaluate drug innovation performance are derived from the literature with some 
adjustments to the circumstances in the pharmaceutical industry. They include 
the absolute and/or the percentage of the new drug sales, the development speed 
and the innovative level of the drug innovation. 
The research proposes that the R&D/marketing interface plays an important role 
in one or more of the five dimensions during one or more of the five stages of 
product innovation. Moreover, the interface needs and difficulties in these 
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dimensions are postulated to be directly related to the changing technological 
and market conditions of the organization. The research also hypothesizes that 
the extent to which the interface roles are fulfilled depends on effectiveness of 
the negotiated process with internal coalitions. These propositions will be tested 
against case evidence provided in twelve drug innovation cases, which have 
taken place in four pharmaceutical firms. This verification process is presented 
in both the within-case analysis conducted in Chapter 4-7, and in the cross-case 
analysis in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The pharmaceutical industry has been involved in a rapidly changing 
environment, which has had a profound effect upon its organization and product 
line. Starting from the 80s, many new product possibilities emerge as a result of 
research in such areas as molecular biology, brain chemistry and immunology. 
On the other hand, the business environment is dominated by regulation and 
legislation designed to benefit various segments of society, which leads to more 
generic prescribing, increased substitution, more price control, and escalated 
R&D cost (Faust, 1984). In the market place, consumer attitudes towards 
medication are also changing. Consequently, the success of each firm depends 
on the capability of the firm to respond to this challenging environment. 
The pharmaceutical industry is a high technology industrial sector. It also has 
several unique characteristics in terms of customers, products, regulation and 
R&D, which are not shared with other industries. The most distinct feature of 
this industry is the co-existence of two layers of customers. They are doctors 
and patients. The situation is unique because 
(a) these two groups of customers do not belong to same 
economic unit; 
(b) doctors who are the decision makers do not consume the 
products; 
(c) neither the doctors nor the patients pay for the cost. Instead, it 
is paid by the National Health Service (NHS). 
Moreover, in the pharmaceutical industry, drug innovation is a highly ethical 
issue since human health and safety are concerned. As a result, government 
regulation regarding the safety and efficacy of a pharmaceutical product is 
strongly enforced upon the companies, which touches on all elements of the 
marketing mix, pricing, advertising, distribution, and new product development. 
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Drug innovation is a major competitive weapon in the pharmaceutical market. 
Despite of the huge R&D cost (estimated at £ 100 million per drug) and the 
extremely high risk in drug R&D, pharmaceutical companies continue to invest 
heavily in R&D. It is notable that in the past decade the "blockbusters" have 
accounted for an increasing proportion of the market, which implies that 
companies are relying on "blockbusters" even more than before. For instance, in 
1985, the world's best-selling drug, Tagamet, achieved sales of £450 million. 
However, five years later in 1990, the world's best-selling product, Zantac, 
generated revenues approaching £1,600 million, which were three times 
Tagamet's 1985 total. Consequently, as big-selling drugs become bigger, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to achieve comparable size from sales in one 
market and international marketing scale becomes critical. 
Traditionally, in the pharmaceutical industry, discoveries of new innovative 
drugs were the major drive for the fast growth of the industry. As a result, R&D 
as the source of such new products, overshadowed all other departments in the 
company including the marketing department (Corstjens, 1991). However the 
situation is changing with the rapidly changing environment, more sophisticated 
marketing techniques are applied and closer interaction between the R&D and 
the marketing departments of a firm is emphasized. 
This chapter is intended to provide necessary background information for the 
case studies presented from the next chapter, "The Glaxo Case". In 4.2 
knowledges regarding the pharmaceutical industry regulation and patent law are 
introduced. Next, the market and competitive situation of the industry is 
described in 4.3. In 4.4 issues regarding pharmaceutical technologies and 
innovation are raised. Next In 4.5 the status of the R&D/marketing interface in 
the pharmaceutical industry is discussed. Finally the performance of the U. K. 
pharmaceutical industry is evaluated in 4.6. 
4.2 GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND PATENT LAW 
4.2.1 Government Regulation 
In the pharmaceutical industry, governments all over the world have a dual role 
to play: to provide the incentives to encourage Research and Development 
activity in order to discover new therapeutic advances for the benefit of the 
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mankind, yet at the same time to reduce the cost of drugs to health authorities 
and to control the level of profitability in the industry. 
In order to fulfil government requirements, pharmaceutical companies have to 
submit extensive clinical and toxicological data to government bodies, first 
before a compound is allowed to be progressed to the human testing stage, and 
then before a drug is allowed to be launched on the market. Safety and efficacy 
of the drug are the two main criteria for the approval of the drug. The drug 
approval process has become more rigourous and more time consuming. As a 
result, the development part of the R&D has become more expensive over the 
last two decades. In 1970 approximately 50% of total R&D resources were 
spent on development, however, by 1990 this figure had risen to more than 70% 
(Bantling & Hadamik, 1982). 
The heterogeneity of the approval procedure of governments across the world 
leads to rather difficult situations for the drug companies. One of the most 
ambitious targets of big multinational pharmaceutical companies like Glaxo, 
SmithKline Beecham, etc. is to gain simultaneous approval for its important 
new products in all the world's major countries. This requires high level of 
coordination amongst all the functions within the company. 
The price of prescription drugs is controlled by government in most developed 
countries. In the UK, the government does not set prices for individual drugs, 
instead, it controls the total return on capital employed on the company's 
product line. In 1983, the industry's target rate of return was reduced from 25% 
to 17%. Nevertheless, price controls tend to affect old drugs rather than new 
drugs. Therefore new and more expensive drugs are frequently launched to 
replace the less profitable old drugs. 
4.2.2 Patent Law 
The fundamental consideration for the establishment of a patent system was the 
recognition of the economic value of ideas (Jucker, 1990). In the last two 
decades, the tendency has clearly been towards increasing the strength of patent 
protection. The major development has been the bringing into force of the 
European Patent Convention. It provides for a term of patent protection of 
twenty years from the first application date. Patent and drug research are closely 
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related in such way that patents provide protection and incentive for the drug 
research. Patents also have an influence on the structure of drug prices, however 
this influence does not necessarily result in higher drug prices (Jucker, 1990). 
Rather, the cost of research and development is the major source of the drug 
price. Figure 4.1 shows the cost structure of the drug innovators and that of the 
drug imitators. 
Figure 4.1 The Comparison of Cost Structure Between Drug 
Innovators and Drua Imitators 
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The extremely long duration of drug research and development (approximately 
10-12 years) on the one hand, and the need for early patenting on the other, 
which is derived from the very nature of the drug research, indicate that the 
effective life of drug patents is in fact quite short in comparison with other 
technical areas. Once a drug is off patent, it faces intense competition from 
generics, which are much cheaper than the original brand, as they do not have 
heavy R&D investment burden. 
There has been a major threat to a significant number of the best-selling drugs 
in the form of patent expirations. According to BZW Research (Medical 
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Marketing & Media, August, 1991), 22 of the top-50 products of 1989 will lose 
their patent protection in the U. S and other major markets in five years time and 
they could be vulnerable to generic competition. These drugs include Zantac 
(Glaxo), Capoten (Bristol-Meyers Squibb), Tagamet (SmithKline Beecham), 
Tenormin (ICI), Voltaren (Ciba-Geigy), Adalat (Bayer) and Ventolin (Glaxo). 
Government regulation and patent law also have important implications for the 
scope of pharmaceutical marketing actions. Regulatory affairs become another 
important aspect of the marketing activity in product innovation apart from the 
strategic aspect and technical aspect of the activity. Advertising of prescription 
drugs to the general public is prohibited for ethical reasons and market testing is 
very difficult and restricted since human beings are involved. In particular, a 
market testing or clinical trial testing for a new drug targeting at a complex or 
life threatening disease has to be carried out in combination with a existing drug 
to ensure that the quality of the treatment on a patient is not affected by such 
testing. This regulation has a profound impact upon drug research and 
marketing. On one hand, it provides any drug that enters market first with a 
significant competitive advantage of being the first-line treatment. On the other 
hand, it becomes an effective barrier to competitive entry. 
4.3 MARKET STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 
4.3.1 Market Structure 
The pharmaceutical market is divided into ethical pharmaceuticals and over- 
the-counter medicines. In the ethical pharmaceuticals market, there are two 
types of product, patent-protected brands and generics. The former compete 
mostly on non-price benefits, such as therapeutic value, and the latter are 
generally driven by price competition. As generic products do not have large 
scale R&D activity, our research will focus on the patent-protected brand 
market. 
As noted earlier, the sales of prescription drugs is not based on the choice of 
consumers but rather on that of doctors. Because the decision on a purchase is 
primarily influenced by the drug's effectiveness in treating the disease rather 
than the drug's price, the prescription market has relatively low price sensitivity. 
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Inertia exists in prescribers' behaviour, resisting a switch away from trusted 
brands. Thus, company reputation in a market segment or a therapeutic area is 
an effective marketing tool in the pharmaceutical market. 
According to Smith (1988) the consumer behaviour in the pharmaceutical 
market is distinct at different stages of product life cycle. At the introduction 
stage, the market for a new product will be comprised of a small percentage of 
the medical population that is normally the first to try new drugs, and who is 
influential with their colleagues. The introduction of a new product can be 
relatively smooth, if success has been achieved by any previous efforts in this 
product class. However, for a new product that is a radical departure from 
traditional therapy, enormous education effort is required to familiarize the 
general public, as well as the doctors with the new product concept. Marketing 
costs will reflect the special nature of promotion to stimulate primary demand. 
A new product is at its highest price upon its introduction. This reflects both the 
lack of direct competition and the uncertain sales future. Even at this highest 
price, in the face of high production and marketing costs and with the build up 
of past research and development costs, management may plan on operating at a 
loss on the product during the introductory stage. 
Once the product has survived successfully the introduction stage, it will get 
wider acceptance. In the meantime, the number of competitors will begin to 
increase. The price of the product will tend to go down because of the increased 
sales and increased competitors. The promotion activities are no longer towards 
the benefits of the product class, but the advantage of the product itself, in 
comparison with competitors' products. 
During the maturity stage competition reaches its peak. The total sales of the 
product class, which have been rising through the early stages, continue to 
increase, but at a decreasing rate. Price competition is intensified. 
Saturation marks the point at which the drug product has been tried and used for 
all feasible indications. The number of competitors stabilizes. The decline of a 
product class is mostly related to the effectiveness of the product as compared 
to other means of therapy - result from new product development. 
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4.3.2 Competition 
The pharmaceutical industry is a highly profitable and thus attractive industry 
for potential newcomers. However there exist substantial barriers to entry. 
Corstjens (1991) concludes three potential entry barriers: patents, Research and 
Development (R&D) investments, marketing investments and company 
reputation. In addition, it is important to note that product differentiation is 
another effective entry barrier. In 1984, there were 2,100 branded products 
which in turn generated 3,900 formulations in the UK (Prentis & Walker, 
1988). Product reformulations in the pharmaceutical industry, such as new 
dosage form or new delivery system, involve the genuine solution of difficult 
scientific or technical problems. It therefore acts as an effective entry barrier to 
competitors. 
The degree of concentration in the drug industry can be studied at three 
different levels: the total world pharmaceutical market, the therapeutic areas, 
and the product. The degrees of concentration at these three level are 
significantly different. Overall, the industry remains very fragmented. For 
example, in 1990-91, the top three companies, Merck, Glaxo, and SmithKline 
Beecham, together controlled only about 9% of the total market (abpi 
estimation). However, the characterization of the industry as being fragmented 
is somewhat deceptive, when one turns to the second level, that of therapeutic 
area. For instance, the top three manufacturers of cardiovascular drugs, Merck, 
Bristol-Meyer Squibb and ICI controlled about 40% of the therapeutic market 
(abpi estimation). At the level of individual products, the degree of 
concentration becomes very high. For example, Glaxo's anti-ulcer drug, Zantac, 
accounts for 50% of the total anti-peptic ulcer market. This can lead to very 
skewed sales concentration within companies, with large percentages of their 
total sales resulting from only one or a few brands. Zantac, launched in 1981, 
with the sales figure of £1,600 million in 1991, is responsible for more than half 
of the company's total sales (Glaxo sources). 
A number of mergers is currently reshaping the internal rivalry among 
pharmaceutical companies. In 1989, SmithKline, an American company forged 
a merger with Beecham, a UK based company. The newly merged 
pharmaceutical giant, with sales of £3 billion became the world's third biggest 
pharmaceutical company in 1990. Other mergers were between Squibb and 
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Bristol-Myers, Merril Dow and Marion Laboratories, and Rhone-Poulenc and 
Rorer. The major reason for this merger drive seems to be the creation of a 
critical mass to cope with escalated R&D investment under intensified world- 
wide competition and stringent government regulation. 
4.4 PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION AND RISK AND RETURN IN 
PHARMACEUTICAL R&D 
4.4.1 Pharmaceutical Technology 
Technology plays a crucial role in the industry growth and market evolution. A 
wide range of effective new medicines becomes available as a result of 
scientific discoveries at different times in history. In the past fifty years, the 
pace of scientific advance in drug development has increased, 95% of the 
medicines available today was unknown in 1950. Most innovations have been 
made in the laboratories of pharmaceutical companies (Jucker, 1990). The 
levels of innovation and the diffusion rate of innovation are increasing. It is 
reported by the Medical Marketing & Media (August, 1991) that the more 
recent the introduction of innovation, the more rapid has been the rise to 
prominence. The five new entrants to the world's top 50 in 1986 took an 
average 4.8 years from first marketing to attain top-50 status, in 1990, the 
average time was just 2.7 years. Comparing each new entrant to the world's top- 
50 drugs between 1981 and 1985 with that during a similar period between 
1985 and 1990, increased levels of innovation in the latter period can be found. 
Whilst only one of the nine new entrants to the top-50 drugs in 1985 had a high 
innovative level (Glaxo's Zantac, second entrant to a new class), all the eleven 
new entrants to the top-50 drugs in 1990 were innovative (first drug in the class, 
new agent in an established class, and so on). 
Pharmaceutical research and development are crucial in this new-product race 
by discovering or applying scientific approaches to develop new substances. 
Scatter-gun approach is a traditional approach in the pharmaceutical research. It 
starts from new synthetic variations on familiar chemical compounds and to 
investigate their effects. This approach is very cost inefficient due to its trial- 
and-error nature (Corstjens, 1991). More recently a rational approach is applied. 
It starts off with a hypothesis about the etymology of the targeted disease. Via a 
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receptor or an enzyme, one tries to develop chemical substances that can 
selectively modify the targeted disease (Johnson, 1987). 
In addition, instead of testing in animals, receptor technology is invented to 
screen compounds in test tube. It allows researchers to determine quickly 
whether a compound is active in the human body and where it acts by using cell 
membrane receptors isolated from organs (Siegelman, 1989). 
The most recent development is the application of biotechnology in drug 
research. Biotechnology refers to techniques for manipulating micro-orgnisms 
for human benefit. This knowledge of the genetic code has allowed the 
determination of the composition and structure of proteins. Since proteins 
perform most of the necessary functions in any living cell, understanding them 
has been the key to unlocking a whole host of information about living 
processes. 
Meanwhile, techniques to develop new drug delivery systems are explored. 
They allow a drug to be taken more conveniently or more effectively, which 
can be used to stretch out the patent lives of current drugs. For instance, a new 
system to deliver a biotechnology drug orally, which has not been possible 
because biotechnology drugs break down in the digestive system, will be the 
big medical breakthrough. 
4.4.2 Pharmaceutical Innovation and Risk and Return in Pharmaceutical 
R&D 
"Pharmaceutical innovation refers to the testing of 
new chemical entities (NCEs) in man, which 
produce a therapeutic advance for the patients". 
(Prentis & Walker, 1988; Eisman & Wardell, 1981). 
Drug innovation is a highly complex, multi-disciplinary affair, which involves 
basic research, pre-clinical trials, clinical trials, drug registration and marketing. 
The entire process from discovery research, clinical testing, regulatory work, to 
the launch of the new drug takes about ten to twelve years. In modern 
pharmaceutical companies, these interlinked key activities are all planned, co- 
ordinated and managed through multi-disciplinary development teams. Each 
firm has its own way of describing and naming the various activities in the 
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research and development process. However, the time-scale involved in the 
development of an active substance from its first preparation in the laboratory 
to its launch in any pharmaceutical firm can be described in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2 The Time-Scale of New Drug Research and 
Development 
approx. 1-2 years and 
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Trials I Trials II 
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Clinical H Clinical H Clinical 
Trials III Trials II Trials I 
Source: D. Bartling and H. Hadamik (1982), "Development of a Drug" 
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The decision of a pharmaceutical company to evaluate a NCE in man for the 
first time represents a major commitment. It requires a considerable financial 
investment that has to be met from the income of products already marketed. 
Innovation and the financial returns from its success in the pharmaceutical 
industry are therefore closely related. 
There have been frequent criticisms about the high return on equity enjoyed by 
pharmaceutical firms, which is believed to result from the high profitable 
pharmaceutical R&D. However, Joglekar and Paterson (1986) argue that those 
criticisms fail to consider other characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry, 
such as the riskiness of the investment in pharmaceutical R&D. Using a 
hypothetical example, Brozen (1977) made a convincing case why surviving 
and successful pharmaceutical firms will have a higher rate of return than 
surviving and successful firms in other industries. 
Joglekar and Paterson's (1986) research assesses the profitability and risks of a 
1976 decision to invest in NCE-related R&D. They conclude that on average, 
investment in pharmaceutical R&D for NCEs pays - at least more than does an 
investment in bonds. However, this is true only in the aggregate and over the 
long term. The odds of attaining the average NCE's return of 6.1 % are less than 
one in five during a 15 year sales period. 
Yet, this estimated IRR is large enough to explain current levels of investment 
in pharmaceutical R&D. Confident company executives with a successful track 
record may be justified in expecting to do better than average, and may also 
have adequate surplus from past success to continue such investment. A better 
than average return may also be achieved by targeting a firm's R&D at 
therapeutic classes affecting large segments of the population. On the other 
hand, for a new or small pharmaceutical firm, the situation could be 
problematic. Such a firm may not have the resources to introduce as many as 
three to six NCEs until one of them produces above average returns; and the 
firm may not be able to wait for 15 to 30 years for the payback of its 
investment. 
For any pharmaceutical firm, apart from high technical risks involved in drug 
R&D, several other risk factors affect its return on R&D as well. They are (a) 
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foreign market, (b) government policy, and (c) generic replacement when NCE 
patents expire. 
4.5 THE R&D/MARKETING INTERFACE IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
"There are obvious conceptual differences between 
R&D and marketing groups, the most apparent of 
which is the constant conflict between the long- and 
short-term demands for the firm's resources. 
Marketing wants bottom line performance and 
output today, while the goals of research are often focused on the future" (Faust, 1984, pp. 63). 
According to Costjens (1991), the link between R&D and marketing is 
particularly difficult in the pharmaceutical industry for three fundamental 
reasons. 
(a) The still predominant trial and error nature of basic research. 
(b) Market testing involves ethical responsibility. 
(c) The relative dominance of R&D over marketing. 
In the pharmaceutical industry marketing has been traditionally involved in two 
aspects of the research and development process. First, it is involved in defining 
the nature of the clinical studies in order to create a differential advantage for 
the new product. Second, it suggests directions for R&D efforts to defend 
existing products by broadening claims, discovering evidence for new 
indications and creating new dosage forms and formulations (Corstjens, 1991). 
It is reported by a vice president of a large drug company that marketing people 
are very good at estimating market potential for therapeutic areas in which the 
market is reasonably well established. However, they are less able to deal with 
markets for which no effective therapy exists. The key problem seems to be in 
the area of providing market and marketing inputs for truly new product areas. 
The currently available new product forecasting approaches are predominantly 
developed for products in established markets (Corstjens, 1991). 
Nevertheless, marketing techniques have become more and more formalized 
and sophisticated over the past decade. Medical Marketing & Media 
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(September, 1989) reported a "remarkable proliferation" of the marketing 
alternatives including single-sponsored publications, computer programs, 
telemarketing and teleconferences, seminars and symposia, prescription pads 
and patient files, poster services and references. Those alternatives may be used 
to achieve different goals. According to Mr. Robert J. Botto, President of Botto 
& Messinger Inc., 
"From a marketing standpoint, some are more 
strategic in nature, while others compete with 
traditional media for exposure. There is a difference 
between what you want to achieve with a 
symposium or seminar and what you want to 
achieve with advertising on a prescription pad or a 
patient file. " (Medical Marketing & Media, 
September, 1989). 
With the increased strategic importance of the marketing department in 
pharmaceutical firms, efforts have been made by top management, the R&D 
department and the marketing department towards a more effective 
R&D/marketing interface in drug innovation. Marketing people for example, try 
to solve the problem of frequently changing requirements in the market place 
by distinguishing essential requirements from would-be-nice requirements, and 
the research people will then try to meet those requirements according to their 
priorities (Glaxo sources). 
4.6 THE U. K PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
The U. K. is the second most prominent nation after the U. S. in the discovery of 
successful drugs. The U. K. has gone from strength to strength over the period 
1985 to 1990, increasing its best selling brands from nine to thirteen (see Table 
4.1). 
84 
Table 4. 1 ToD 50 Br anded Pr oducts Worldwid e By C ountry Of 
-------- 
Origin 
----------- -------- ------ --- 
Country 
------- 
1985 
----------- 
1986 
-------- 
1987 
------ 
------ 
1988 
-- 
------ 
1989 
-------- 
1990 
U. S. 23 23 23 
------- 
19 
------ 
18 
-------- 
19 
U. R. 9 9 10 10 12 13 
Germany 5 5 4 5 5 5 
Japan 5 5 5 6 6 4 
Switzerland 6 5 5 4 4 4 
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 2 
France 1 1 1 2 2 1 
Italy 0 1 1 2 2 1 
Norway 0 0 0 1 1 1 
------- 
Source: 
-------------------- 
BZW Research. Medic 
--------------- 
al Marketing & 
------ 
Media, 
-------- 
Aug. 
1991. 
The number of best-sellers produced by a company may reflect its marketing 
proficiency, its R&D capability or a combination of the two. Ultimately, it 
reflects the competitiveness of companies (Pass, 1991). Table 1 shows that 
Merck and Glaxo's ability to translate research into revenues has been 
significantly greater than that of other companies. Of the sixteen companies that 
have originated or marketed more than one 1990 top-50 branded drugs, four are 
British companies. They are Glaxo, SmithKline Beecham, ICI, and Wellcome 
(see Table 4.2). The R&D/marketing interface in drug innovation within these 
four leading British companies will be studied in chapters 4-7. 
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Table 4.2 Companies that have originated or marketed more 
than one 1990 tote-50 branded drugs 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Company No. of Top-50 Drugs No. of Top-50 Drugs 
Originated Marketed 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Merck 
Glaxo 
Bayer 
SmithKline Beecham 
Eli Lilly 
ICI 
Yamanouchi 
Bristol-Meyers 
Hoechst 
Sandoz 
Sankyo 
Wellcome 
Astra 
Marion Merrell 
Pfizer 
Ciba-Geigy 
Squibb 
Dow 
5 6 
5 4 
3 2 
3 3 
2 3 
2 2 
2 1 
2 2 
2 2 
2 2 
1 1 
2 2 
2 1 
1 2 
1 2 
1 3 
Source: BZW Research, Medical Marketing & Media, August 
1991. 
Britain's reputation as a world leader in the pharmaceuticals industry has been 
confirmed in a recent investigation by The Sunday Times. Six of the twenty 
best-selling drugs in the world are now British-made and four of the world's 
twenty biggest pharmaceutical companies are British. (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). 
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Table 4.3 1990 World's Best-Selling Drugs 
Drug Purpose Maker Sales, Em 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
1 Zantac Peptic ulcer 
2 Adalat-Procardia Angina 
3 Rentec Hypertension 
4 Capoten Hypertension 
85 0 
5 Kefral-Ceclor Antibiotic 
6 Tenormin Hypertension 
7 Tagamet Peptic ulcer 
8 Voltaren Arthritis 
9 Cardizern-Herbesser Angina 
10 Ventolin Asthma 
11 Naprosyn Arthritis 
12 Gaster-Pepcid Peptic ulcer 
13 Mevacor Cholesterol 
14 Augmentin Anti-biotic 
15 Isoptin-Calan Angina 
16 Rocephin Antibiotic 
17 Prozac Antidepressant 
18 Zovirax Antiviral 
19 Feldene Arthritis 
20 Ciprobay Antibacterial 
Glaxo 1,600 
Bayer-Pfizer 950 
Merck 870 
Bristol-Meyers Squibb 
Lilly-Schinogi 650 
ICI 640 
SmithKline Beecham 630 
Ciba-Geigy 630 
Marion 590 
Glaxo 510 
Syntex 460 
Yamanouchi 440 
Merck 430 
SmithKline beecham 410 
BASF 410 
Roche 400 
Lilly 400 
Wellcome 380 
Pfizer 370 
Bayer 360 
Source: The Sunday Times, 5 January 1992. 
Ta ble 4.4 Tote Drug Compani es in 1991 
--------------------------------------- 
Company Nationality Sales 
--------------------------------------- 
----------- 
fbn Market 
----------- 
-------- 
Share % 
-------- 
1 Merck American 3.5 4.2 
2 Glaxo British 3.0 3.6 
3 Bristol-Meyers Squibb . American 2.9 3.4 4 Ciba-Geigy Swiss 2.3 2.8 
5 SmithKline Beecham British 2.3 2.7 
5 Hoechst Germany 2.3 2.7 
7 Lilly American 2.0 2.4 
8 American Home Products American 2.0 2.3 
8 Roche Swiss 2.0 2.3 
10 Johnson & Johnson American 1.9 2.3 
11 Pfizer American 1.8 2.2 
12 Bayer American 1.8 2.1 
12 Sandoz Swiss 1.8 2.1 
14 Rhone-Poulenc French 1.7 2.1 
15 Upjohn American 1.4 1.6 
16 B Ingelheim Germany 1.3 1.6 
16 Marion-M Dow American 1.3 1.6 
18 Schering-Plough American 1.3 1.5 
18 ICI British 1.3 1.5 
20 Wellcome British 1.2 1.3 
Source: Sunday Times, 5 January 1992. 
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The Pharmaceutical industry has emerged as one of the few industries in which 
Britain is a genuine leader. Pharmaceuticals produced a trade surplus of £ 1.1 
billion in 1990 and this climbed to £1.2 billion in 1991 (abpi estimation). Glaxo 
is now Britain's biggest company in terms of market capitalization, bigger even 
than BT. Glaxo is now valued at £25.6 billion while BT trails at £20.5 billion. 
In the past twenty-five years, the UK pharmaceutical industry has out- 
performed the London stock market by over 400%. The real boom years were 
the 1980s, which saw the value of the health and household sector increase 
tenfold, against a mere doubling for the stock market as a whole. 
The success of British companies overseas, particularly in America, has ensured 
their place in the world drugs league despite the modest size of their domestic 
market. Glaxo, for example, earns more than 50% of its profits in America. 
Analysts agree on several reasons why the pharmaceutical industry has 
succeeded where other British have failed. They include 
(a) a strong scientific tradition, which provides a ready supply of 
high-quality researchers; 
(b) a system of fixing prices with government, which guarantees 
returns on investment; and 
(c) strong management, which has effectively exploited these 
advantages. 
Having achieved an outstanding performance in 1980s, the UK pharmaceutical 
industry is now facing a big question - can the British drug companies keep it 
up, can their stunning performance continue in the 1990s, with so many 
companies in competition? The key is the continuing development of innovative 
products. 
The four leading UK pharmaceutical firms, Glaxo, SmithKline Beecham, ICI 
Pharmaceuticals and Wellcome are studied in the current research. The case 
studies of a total of twelve drug innovations are carried out starting from the 
next chapter. The dynamic pattern of these drug innovations over a period of 
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time can be used as a case history. It illustrates the ways in which research 
people and commercial people of the companies have cooperated in coming up 
with innovative drugs that are critical for firms' long term growth. 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES 
The study described in this thesis is based upon four pharmaceutical companies 
and three drug innovation cases within each company. These companies are 
Glaxo, SmithKline Beecham, ICI Pharmaceuticals and Wellcome plc, and these 
drugs are Zantac (anti-ulcer), Imigran (anti-migraine), Serevent (anti- 
asthmatic), Tagamet (anti-ulcer), Augmentin (antibiotic), Eminase 
(cardiovascular), Tenorurin (cardiovascular), Diprivan (anaesthetic), Zoladex 
(anti-cancer), Zovirax (antiviral), Retrovir (antiviral) and Lamictal (anti- 
epileptic). The criteria for choosing the four companies and the total of twelve 
drugs have been described in Chapter 2, "The Research Methodology". The 
within-case analyses are presented in Chapters 5-8 respectively. Each chapter 
involves detailed case study write-ups of three drug innovation projects from 
one company. Apparently, the emphasis of the present work is on the cross-case 
analysis in Chapter 9, where the richest information has been processed through 
the previous within-case analyses. Nonetheless, the within-case analyses 
themselves are critical in providing a mechanism for coping with the large data 
volume. In addition, this process enables us to become intimately familiar with 
each case as a stand-alone entity and allows the unique patterns of each case to 
emerge before generalising across cases. 
In the within-case analysis, a general analytical strategy was applied which 
relies on the theoretical propositions presented in Chapter 3, the theoretical 
framework. This provides the case study analysis with a theoretical orientation. 
The within-case analysis is in fact organized under the three constructs which 
have been defined in Chapter 3: the environmental constructs, the strategic 
constructs and the organizational constructs. When assessing these constructs at 
the end of each drug innovation case study, no special assessment methods are 
used for the organizational and the strategic constructs. Instead, the original 
qualitative information regarding these two groups of constructs are merely 
summarized by using several tables. However, the assessment of the 
environmental constructs is more complicated since several facets are included 
in each construct. In order to compare the environmental constructs across 
different cases, checklist models are adopted. The reasons for adopting this 
model have been provided in Chapter 2, "The Research Methodology" 
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In each of the within-case analysis chapter, a preliminary discussion is provided 
following each drug case study, and a final analysis is presented at the end of 
the chapter. However, it should be noted that due to the nature of the 
information provided at this stage, only tentative suggestions are given. These 
suggestions will be reviewed and compared as more information is presented 
and analysed later in the cross-case analysis in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE GLAXO CASE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Glaxo was formed in Wellington, New Zealand in 1873 by Joseph Nathan, a 
British emigrant. The trade name Glaxo was registered in 1906 for the 
company's product - infant's milk. In the 1950s, after absorbing Allen & 
Hanburys, Glaxo made the central decision to become a science-based 
pharmaceutical concern. The major activities became the development of 
antibiotics, steroids and respiratory medicines, all of which sold mainly in 
Britain. In the late 1960s, the group moved into fundamental research. In the 
following two decades a number of important drugs were discovered (see Table 
5.1). 
Table 5.1 Princ ipal Gl axo Dis coveries 1964-1990 
------ 
Brand 
------ 
--------- 
name 
--------- 
------- 
Generic 
------- 
------- 
name 
------- 
----------------------------- 
Type First launch 
----------------------------- 
Ceporin 
Vintolin 
Becotide 
Beconase 
Trandate 
Zinacef 
Zantac 
Fortum 
Cephaloridine 
Salbutamol 
Beclomethasone 
Beclomethasone 
Labetalol 
Cefuroxime 
Ranitidine 
Ceftazidime 
Injectable antibiotic 1964 
Anti-asthmatic 1969 
Anti-asthmatic 1972 
Anti-rhinitic 1975 
Anti-hypertensive 1977 
Injectable antibiotic 1978 
Anti-ulcerant 1981 
Injectable antibiotic 1983 
Source: March 1987, Accountancy. 
Since 1980, the company has decided to concentrate on ethical pharmaceuticals, 
and it R&D structure has been internationalised. The organizational structure of 
Glaxo has reflected this corporate strategy (see Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 Glaxo Business Structure 
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Major research facilities have been opened in many countries such as the United 
States, Japan and Italy. The company's R&D activities are carried out within 
Glaxo Group Research Limited (GGR). They are managed through the five 
therapeutic groups, namely anti-ulcer, respiratory, antibiotic, cardiovascular and 
dermatological. Table 5.2 summarises the resources devoted to R&D activities 
in drug innovation process in Glaxo. 
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Table 5.2 R&D Activities, Manpower and Spending in 
Rifferent Stages of R&D Process 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Stages Discovery Exploratory & Full Marketed Product 
Research Development Development 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Acti- Scientists 
vities from varies 
disciplines 
endeavour 
to discover 
new chemical 
entities. 
No. of 1800 
people 
% of 30 
spending 
Pre-clinical and 
clinical trials with 
healthy volunteers 
and patients to test 
the safety and 
efficacy of the NCE; 
data collection for 
drug registration 
purposes. 
2820 
40 30 
Glaxo's marketing activity has been carried out by one international marketing 
organization and a large number of local marketing groups. As well as 
coordinating Glaxo's local groups throughout the world, the international 
marketing organization cooperates closely with R&D within each therapeutic 
groups (see Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2 The Structure of Marketing Development Division 
International 
Marketing Director 
Licensing Therapeutic 
Marketing 
Groups 
Business 
strategy 
Development and 
management of 
the existing 
products through 
line extension, 
new formulation, 
and indications. 
800 
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Having sustained the fastest growth rate among the world's pharmaceutical 
companies for ten years (see Table 5.3), Glaxo has become the world's second 
largest pharmaceutical company. Its R&D productivity is also the highest of 
such companies (see Appendix 6). 
Table 5.3 Statistical Review of Glaxo Holding vlc 
------------------------------------------------ 
Years to 30th June 1990 (£m) 1980 (£m) 
Turnover 2,854 434 
Profit before taxation 1,140 66 
R&D expenditure 399 32 
Number of Group employees 31,327 29,187 
Glaxo sources 
The anti-ulcer drug, Zantac, developed by Glaxo and launched in 1981, has 
been critical to the company's success over the last decade. Zantac remains by 
far the world's best-selling prescription medicine. Sales of Zantac account for 
50% of Glaxo's total sales. However, as demand for Zantac has already peaked, 
new products are needed. Glaxo has committed a five-year R&D budget of 2.5 
billion pounds for new drug development. Glaxo's announced goal is to have 
one major new drug and three or four line extensions approved each year. 
In this chapter, three products which have been developed during the past 
twenty years - Zantac, Serevent and Imigran - are studied. Table 5.4 and Table 
5.5 are the time scales and descriptions of these three products. 
Table 5.4 Product Development Time Scales 
Drug 
Serevent Development 
1984 
Imigran Development 
1984 
Zantac Development Launch 
1976 1981 
Launch Post market 
1990 (PED: 2009) 
Launch Post market 
1991 (PED: 2010) 
Post market 
(PED: 2002) 
----------------------------------------------------- Year 
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 
95 
Table 5.5 Product Descrivtions 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Drug Description Innovation 
Level 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Zantac a anti-ulcer drug launched Moderate/High 
(ranitidine) in 1981, remains by far the Second entrant 
world's best-selling drug. into new class 
its Sales account for about 
half of Glaxo's total sales. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Imigran A novel 5HT1A agonist for Very High. 
(sumatriptan) the treatment of migraine. New class of 
it has a novel mode of drug. 
action, launched in 1991. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Serevent a asthmatic treatment, an High. Novel 
(salmeterol) improved bronchodilator agent in 
and possibly an anti-infla- established 
mmatory agent, launched class. 
in the UK in Dec. 1990. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
5.2 THE R&D/MARKETING INTERFACE IN DEVELOPING ZANTAC 
5.2.1 Environmental Constructs 
(1) Market Uncertainty 
(i) Market Size (MS) and Market Newness (MN) 
The size of the world's market for peptic ulcer treatment was estimated at £1 
billion a year in 1981 - the year when Zantac was introduced. The market was 
relatively new, yet growing. However, Zantac was not the first product in its 
class - the so called H2 antagonist. Doctors had gained some experience since 
the successful launch of SmithKline's Tagamet - the first H2 antagonist - five 
years previously. 
(ii) Customer Need Awareness (CNA) and Market Competitiveness (MC) 
The fierce competitive situation of Zantac was highlighted by the existence of a 
dominant competitive drug - Tagamet, marketed by SmithKline, a multinational 
pharmaceutical giant. 
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However, although Tagamet represented a significant therapeutic advance, it 
showed certain side effects and poor interaction with other drugs. Hence, the 
need for a better drug was perceptible. The competitive opportunity for Glaxo 
depended largely on the degree to which the current customers were satisfied by 
Tagamet and the degree to which Glaxo was able to convince the customers 
about the superiority of Zantac to Tagamet in meeting customer needs. In 1986, 
Glaxo succeeded in overtaking SmithKline when Zantac became the world best- 
selling drug. This position has been maintained to the present day. However, 
Zantac is facing possible generic competition when its patent expires in 1995. 
(2) Technological Uncertainty 
(i) Cause of Disease (CD) 
Precisely what causes peptic ulcer is still wrapped in mystery. It is however 
found- that peptic ulcers occur only in the presence of gastric acid in the 
stomach. Before Zantac, SmithKline had discovered that histamine, a chemical 
substance which was known to be involved in the acid secretion in stomach, has 
two receptors, only the second of which, the H2-receptor, is responsible for acid 
secretion. 
(ii) Mode of Action (MA) 
Zantac was the second H2-antagonist after SmithKline's Tagamet. Both drugs 
block off the action of H2 receptors. However, Glaxo's scientists were able to 
modify the structure of the drug in such a way that the new compound shown 
longer duration of action and selectivity of actionl. 
(iii) Side Effect (SE) 
A major advantage of Zantac over its rivals is its safety profile. The drug has 
very low side effect and is safe to be taken with most other drugs. 
(3) Internal Marketing Expertise and Technological Strength 
(i) Marketing Experience (ME) and Company Reputation (CR) 
Glaxo was not a well-known company in the world anti-ulcer market. The 
company's major markets were antibiotic and anti-asthmatic in the U. K. (see 
Table 1). However, the corporate management was determined to expand 
internationally prior to Zantac's development. Following this aim, in the 1970s, 
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the company established a marketing force in the U. S., which later provided a 
important base for Zantac launch. 
(ii) Research Experience (RE) and Development Experience (DE) 
Glaxo had no development experience in anti-ulcer drugs before Zantac. 
Nevertheless, the research team had substantial past experience in related areas. 
5.2.2 Strategic Constructs 
(1) The Corporate Strategic Dimension of the Interface (CSD) 
Glaxo's corporate management was not involved in the Zantac project before 
the exploratory development stage. After the drug's potency was realised, it was 
given the highest priority through the full development stage, i. e. fast-tracked. 
Since then, most of the strategic decisions such as the organization of clinical 
trials and price policy was made at the corporate level with both R&D and 
marketing directors involved. Dr Richards, Medical Director of Glaxo Group 
Research recalled, 
"We decided to carry out clinical trials on an 
international scale fr the first time. This decision 
was conditioned by marketing as well as clinical 
considerations. In the past, we had not been very 
good at generating clinical information as a spring 
board for the marketing department. The 
cooperation between us were essential for the 
successful implementation of this decision" (Glaxo 
Sources). 
In addition to the cross-functional cooperation, top management's determination 
and risk-taking style had a significant impact upon the drug's success. A press 
comment noted that: 
Glaxo had the nerve to launch Zantac into the US 
market at a 40 per cent premium to its established 
competitor, SmithKline's Tagamet, betting on 
market acceptance, and it won" (14 July 1991, The 
Independent). 
(2) The Corporate Technical Dimension of the Interface (CTD) 
The evaluation of external technological trends and internal technological 
competence was mainly carried out by the R&D department. A search for an 
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anti-ulcer compound in Glaxo R&D was already initiated before SmithKline's 
discovery of Tagamet. After the discovery was published, Glaxo's research 
team adapted quickly to this emerging opportunities. Having monitored closely 
the progress of Tagamet development by attending seminars and meetings 
regarding the drug, the research team switched its goal to finding an improved 
H2-antagonist, instead of a completely new agent. 
(3) The Operational Dimension (OD) 
Marketing research was carried out mainly for strategic purposes, including the 
investigation into the level of customer satisfaction with Tagamet and the 
preparation for promotional materials. According to Mr Railton, marketing 
manager for Zantac, 
"We had no big difficulty in obtaining market data 
we wanted because the market was not completely 
new, Tagamet had been in the market for 
sometime". (24th June, 1991, telephone interview). 
(4) The Product Strategic Dimension (PSD) 
Despite the fact that most of the strategic decisions were made at the corporate 
level, the interface at the project level contributed to the transfer of the drug's 
technical advantage into the competitive advantage in the market place. A 
marketing effort was made to convince ulcer patients of the importance of such 
technical advantages as lower side effect and less dosage in their treatment, 
especially in preventing future attacks. The idea was that because Zantac was 
safe and convenient, a maintenance dose should be taken regularly to avoid 
another attack. Through this strategy, the company expanded its market share in 
the anti-ulcer market substantially. It was noted that: 
"The sales force touted Zantac's advantages as a 
drug that could be taken half as frequently as 
Tagamet without the side effects. Beginning in 1983, 
the company blitzed hospitals, clinics, and most 
important, the family physicians who were 
Tagamet's biggest fans, with a whirlwind of 
seminars and advertising. " (Fortune, Nov. 6,1989). 
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(4) The Product Technical Dimension (PTD) 
The interface in this dimension contributed to the development of the twice 
daily dosage of Zantac, which proved to be critical for the product success. 
However, because the priority of the project was speed, product feature 
decisions such as the colour of the drug were oriented to time-saving, rather 
than marketing. As Dr Padfield, the former Pharmacy Director, explained, 
"We wanted to avoid any registration problems as a 
result of the colour we chose. We went for white to 
play safe. lt was a purely pragmatic decision to get 
us to market as soon as possible" (Glaxo sources). 
5.2.3 Organizational Constructs 
(1) The Interface Coordination Mechanism (ICM) 
The coordination mechanism of Glaxo was relatively poor before the Zantac 
project. Zantac catalysed changes within the company. According to Mr Taylor, 
the former Group Chief Executive, 
"We were capable of creating excellent drugs, but 
were patchy at turning research ideas into 
successful products. Zantac, therefore, would not 
have been so successful without changes taking 
place within the organization prior to its launch" 
(Glaxo sources). 
The Zantac programme required each centre of activity to discover and 
anticipate the needs of the others. It drew out new skills and mechanisms in 
coordinating between the company's geographic parts and its functional parts. 
Zantac was developed and brought to market through a worldwide and 
simultaneous coordination mechanism, rather than locally and sequentially as 
had always been the case in the past. At the top level the R&D/marketing 
interface was mainly coordinated through Committees, and at the product level 
a cross-functional project team was formed. 
(2) The Interface Communication Flows (ICF) and Interface Conflict (IC) 
The communication between R&D and marketing in Zantac development was 
effective. Dr Padfield acknowledged the importance of liaison in Zantac 
success, 
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"We had frequent contact with clinical development 
people, marketing people and so on, which was 
important. For example, we had to talk constantly 
with the marketing people to discover what they 
wanted in terms of presentation, dosage forms and likely shelf lives" (Glaxo sources). 
According to Dr Towler, the Group Director of Development Planning, 
'We maintained good communication from very 
senior level to very low level by means of video 
conferences, project meetings, and so on. In fact, 
one of the important factors for Glaxo's success is 
communication" (face-to-face interview, 6th March, 
1991). 
However, dis-appreciation of each other's contribution to Zantac success was 
observed between these two departments. Dr Hoston, the research manager, for 
example, commented that: 
"Zantac has succeeded because it is a good product 
itself, marketing for Zantac was not good, and the 
promotional materials were poorly produced" 
(telephone interview, 7th March, 1991). 
Chris Piggin, the Clinical Trials Planner recalled that: 
"Our impression about marketing is that they tend 
to change their mind more often in terms of the 
product 
features. 
They have relatively short time 
horizon, which was mainly concerned with the 
present market. This sometimes caused problems for 
us, in terms of the organization of the clinical trials" 
(telephone interview, 17th July, 1991). 
Conversely, marketing people believed that they have made significant 
contribution to the drug's success in the market. According to Mr White, a 
former product manager of Glaxo (who has now left the company), 
"The twice daily dosage and less side effects of 
Zantac would not mean much to the anti-ulcer 
market because peptic ulcer is not a condition for 
which patient needs to have treatment regularly. He 
would only take the drug when he needed. Glaxo's 
marketing was extremely clever in convincing the 
customers and in expanding the market" (telephone 
interview, 3rd August, 1991). 
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(3) Relative Influence of R&D and Marketing (RIRM) 
The project was initiated by the research. At the early research and exploratory 
development stages, the research team had a dominant influence on the project. 
However, after the drug's potency was discovered, the project became a 
corporate concern. The main goal was to find an improved anti-ulcer drug to 
compete with Tagamet. The project was therefore strongly competition oriented 
and the corporate management provided the major driving force. 
Nevertheless, there was still some degree of power shifting between the R&D 
and marketing departments at the full development stage. For instance, in the 
coordination of worldwide clinical trials, the emphasis was on the scope and the 
speed, thus a close cooperation rather than one party dominance was called out. 
On the other hand, although the interface was also close in the pre-launch stage, 
since the objective was to transfer the drug's technical advantage into a 
competitive advantage in the market, the marketing department played a leading 
role. 
5.2.4 The Innovation Performance 
On the basis of the theoretical framework, the innovation performance was 
evaluated by measuring the Development Speed of the drug innovation (DS), 
the Innovative Level of the new drug (IL) and the absolute and/or the 
percentage of the new drug Sales. 
(1) Development Speed (DS) 
The development speed of Zantac was extremely fast. The whole process from 
the first synthesis to the market launch of Zantac only took five years and four 
months, compared with the industry average of eight years. This fast 
development speed indicates that the company has saved the critical time 
resources needed to develop a marketable product. It also proved the company's 
ability in fast-tracking strategically important drug innovations. 
The motive for speed was competition. The key to this speed was world-wide 
simultaneity and telescoping successive phases. Dr Brittain, the then research 
director recalls that: 
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"In the development process, success was assumed 
and plans were drawn up. Tests were undertaken 
almost simultaneously rather than sequentially. Had 
we done our tests strictly one after the other we 
could have lost a year or more in development time" 
(Glaxo Sources). 
(2) Innovative Level (IL) 
Zantac was the second entrant to a new class. Its innovation level was scored 
moderate/high. However, although not highly innovative, the drug was 
perceived by the customers as being superior to competing products in meeting 
their needs. 
(3) Sales Revenue (SR) 
Zantac achieved a high sales revenue. Launched in 1981, by 1986 it captured 
half of the £2.1 billion peptic ulcer market. In 1990, it generated £ 1,600 million 
sales, which was nearly half of the company's total sales and more than twice of 
the sales of Tagamet. 
5.2.5 Summary 
Qualitative measures are used for the environmental, Strategic, and 
organisational constructs. In particular, the environmental constructs are 
measured using the checklists method described in Chapter 3, the theoretical 
framework. The assessment of all the constructs is presented in Tables 5.6 to 
5.9. Following the assessment, a preliminary discussion of the case will be 
presented. The results of this chapter will then be analysed and compared with 
other drug innovation cases in the cross-case analysis presented in Chapter 9. 
(1) Assessment 
Table 5.6 Assessment of the Environmental Constructs in 
the Zantac Proiect 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Market Technological Internal Marketing & 
Uncertainty Uncertainty Technological expertise 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
MS MN CNA MC Score CD MA SE Score ME CR RE DE Score 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
01124110210102 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
103 
Table 5.7 Assessment of the Strategic Constructs in the 
R&D/Marketing Interface in the Zantac Protect 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
CSD 
was present and 
effective, and 
top management 
commitment was 
most critical. 
PSD 
was highly 
effective in 
utilizing 
technical 
merits for 
competitive 
purpose. 
OD 
was highly 
effective in 
collecting 
appropriate 
market 
information. 
PTD 
was effective 
in deciding 
dosage and 
formulation. 
Table 5.8 Assessment of the Organizational Constructs in 
the Zantac Proiect 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
ICM 
Product Develop- 
ment Committee 
Corporate 
level and Cross- 
functional team 
at lower level. 
ICF 
Frequent 
and 
effective. 
IC 
Lack of appre- 
ciations of 
each other's 
work. 
RIRM 
Research driven 
at early stage; 
a closer link 
at clinical 
trials stage; 
and marketing 
played a key 
role at pre- 
launch stage. 
Table 5.9 Assessment of the Innovation Performance 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
DT DS Innovative Superiority Sales, £bn 
(yrs) Level 5th yr 15th yr 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
5.4 very moderate/high superior in 1 1.6 
fast second entrant meeting 
in a new class customer needs 
(2) Preliminary Discussion 
Zantac was not first to the market, however the company had never launched an 
anti-ulcer drug before and the technology used to develop it was also new to the 
firm. Therefore the Zantac project was an "unrelated-technology and new- 
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market" type of project. The market and technological conditions for the Zantac 
project are shown in Table 5.6. While the market uncertainty for the project was 
relatively high, scoring 4 out of 8, the technological uncertainty was low, and 
was only scored at 2 out of 6. Moreover, the company's internal technological 
and marketing expertise were not strong in Zantac project (2 out of 8). 
The R&D/marketing interface was present in all dimensions except for the 
CTD, where the firm's R&D department, especially the research team, played a 
leading role. The interface was relatively close in some of the dimensions such 
as the PSD and OD. Moreover, the R&D/marketing interface was well 
coordinated at both corporate level and project level. The cross-functional 
communication was frequent and effective, which was largely attributable to 
top management's commitment to the project. The performance of the drug 
development was outstanding, both in terms of the development speed and the 
sales. 
This case tends to suggest that the relatively high marketing uncertainty (which 
mainly resulted from competition rather than new market situation) and the lack 
of internal expertise may be compensated by the presence of a strong 
R&D/marketing interface in all dimensions. This would confirm the important 
role of the R&D/marketing interface in product innovation. 
In addition, the case evidence tentatively suggests that an effective 
R&D/marketing interface depends on effective communication, and that the 
commitment of top management to the project is conducive to effective 
communication. Meanwhile, the power shifting between the R&D and 
marketing departments during the drug development process seems to be 
associated with changing external and internal environment. In particular, the 
department that possesses the most appropriate skills and the information (i. e. 
internal strength) to cope with critical uncertainty (i. e. technological and/or 
market uncertainty) comes to have stronger influence. 
On the other hand, the lack of appreciation between R&D and marketing does 
not seem to have a significant effect upon the effectiveness of the interface. 
This implies that the state of lack of appreciation at the interface may be 
categorised as mild disharmony. 
105 
5.3. R&D/MARKETING INTERFACE IN DEVELOPING IMIGRAN 
5.3.1 Environmental Constructs 
(1) Market Uncertainty 
a. Market Size (MS) and Market Newness (MN) 
Glaxo's Marketing research showed that there were 35 million migraine 
sufferers world-wide. However, there was no adequate therapy for migraine 
patients before Imigran. 
b. Customer Need Awareness (CNA) and Market Competitiveness (MC) 
Customer need awareness was relatively low in the migraine market. Instead of 
calling a doctor, most sufferers just took aspirin and went to bed. 
Imigran was the first entrant to a new market, in which as indicated above, there 
was no direct competition. The major objective of the company was to stimulate 
primary demand in the market. 
(2) Technological Uncertainty 
(i) Cause of Disease (CD) and Mode of Action (MA) 
The cause of migraine was little known. The Imigran research programme was 
based on the assumption that migraine is caused by the dilation of blood vessels 
in the brain. 
By applying a tissue-oriented research approach, the Glaxo team discovered a 
family of receptors which was believed to be involved in migraine. The Imigran 
project involved high technological uncertainty. A press comment noted that: 
"Glaxo is now taking major risks. Taking its 
promising new anti-migraine drug, though some 
analysts think the drug could become a $1 billion 
seller, nobody knows for certain. It is possible that 
the attacks are caused not by the dilation of blood 
vessels, but by the erroneous activation of pain 
pathways in the nervous system. If so, then 
sumatriptan may not turn out to be the 
breakthrough that Glaxo clearly believes it is" (The 
Economist, Nov. 17,1990). 
106 
(ii) Side Effect (SE) 
Imigran had some adverse effects. It could cause symptoms associated with 
heart disease. Therefore patients with a heart condition were advised to use 
Imigran only under medical supervision. 
(3) Internal Technological and Marketing Strength 
(i) Marketing Expertise (ME) and Company Reputation (CR) 
Imigran was the company's first product in the cardiovascular market. However, 
attempts were made from the early stages of the development to make the drug 
known to the market. In addition, although not specifically related to the 
cardiovascular market, the company had a good reputation as a successful 
innovator. 
(ii) Research Experience (RE) and Development Experience (DE) 
As noted earlier, the Glaxo research team applied the tissue-oriented research 
approach in the Imigran programme. This approach had been applied in many 
other drug innovation projects in the past twenty years, including Ventolin, an 
anti-asthmatic treatment, and Zofran, an anti-emetic in cancer therapy. On the 
other hand, the development activities of anti-migrine drugs such as the clinical 
trials organisation and the drug registration were a new experience to the 
company. 
5.3.2 Strategic Constructs 
(1) Corporate Strategic Dimension of the Interface (CSD) 
The need to develop an anti-migraine drug was realized at the corporate level 
two years before Imigran was first discovered in the research laboratory. 
According to Mr Satterthwaite, the Marketing Manager for Imigran, 
"The company had recognised that a strong 
presence in the cardiovascular market was 
strategically important. However, because migraine 
is such a poorly understood disease, long-term 
fundamental research was needed before this goal 
could become realistic" (telephone interview, 24th 
June, 1991). 
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The drug was given high priority by the company at full development stage. 
Since then the interface between R&D and marketing was close in the 
identification of potential customers and the coordination of simultaneous 
worldwide approval. 
(2) Corporate Technical Dimension of the Interface (CTD) 
Imigran research and development involved the discovery of new scientific 
knowledge beyond the company's existing technologies. The balance between 
the commercial attractiveness and the risk of such a move toward a unfamiliar 
area was carefully assessed at the corporate level, where both R&D and 
marketing inputs were received. Dr Towler explained, 
"In science-driven projects such as the Imigran 
project, both marketing and R&D were finding their 
way forward. A lot of new research needed to be 
done, and there are some unexpected distractions. 
However, this type of projects was necessary for the 
company 's long-term growth, especially for a 
research-based firm like us. Of course, decisions 
concerning this type of project need to be very 
carefully evaluated at the top level, and that was 
what we did in Imigran project" (face-to-face 
interview, 4th July, 1991). 
(3) Operational Dimension of the Interface 
Marketing research was carried out to identify the drug's potential market. 
However, because the anti-migraine market was new and consumers attitudes 
towards medication varied considerably, the company's marketing department 
encountered great difficulties in collecting the required information. According 
to Mr. Satterthwaite, 
"When a market is new, we need to look beyond the 
current market. Take Imig ran as a example, we did 
extensive market research. We segmented the 
market into different groups according to the 
attitude of the patients towards medication and so 
on. We decided that this is a very potential market. " 
(telephone interview, 24th June, 1991) 
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(4) Product Strategic Dimension of the Interface (PSD) 
In this dimension R&D and marketing cooperated in establishing the customer 
link and in implementing the customer education programme. According to Mr 
Owen, Director of Business Strategy, 
"The marketing people were responsible for 
communicating the product information to the 
market. They kept the customers informed of the development progress so that the customers would be ready to use the drug as soon as it was launched" 
(face-to face interview, 23rd May, 1991). 
Meanwhile, the education programme emphasised the significant benefit that 
Imigran could offer to the patients. Marketing and R&D interacted with each 
other making sure that the right data were generated from the clinical trials, and 
were carefully used in developing promotional materials. 
(5) Product Technical Dimension of the Interface 
There was no close R&D/marketing interface in this dimension, and most of the 
decisions was made on the basis of R&D considerations. 
5.3.3 Organizational Constructs 
(1) Interface Coordination Mechanism (ICM) 
The cross-functional coordination mechanism operated in the Imigran project 
had been established and further developed since the company's anti-ulcer drug, 
Zantac, was brought to market in the 1980s. For instance, at the corporate level, 
there are Research Management Committees (RMC) to maintain a high level of 
co-ordination between the five therapeutic research areas in which Glaxo is 
involved. The meetings are research-driven. On the other hand, there are 
Product Development Committees (PDC) where commercial balance is 
maintained through the presence of Commercial Director, Marketing Director 
and Research Director. At the project level, the R&D/marketing interface is 
coordinated through project teams. 
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(2) Interface Communication Flows (ICF) and Interface Conflict (IC) 
Despite the fact that the communication between R&D and marketing in 
Imigran development was relatively effective, conflict occurred during the 
development process. Mr Satterthewaite recalled: 
"Imigran was a science-driven project, and our 
close coop eration began fairly late. Also we had a 
few problems. The research people were not always 
happy with what we provided for them. But they did 
not seem to understand that in a new market, many 
things had to start from scratch, not just the 
research but the marketing as well" (telephone 
interview, 24th June, 1991) 
(4) Relative Influence of R&D and Marketing (RIRM) 
Imigran was initiated by the research department, and remained research-driven 
during the development programme. The R&D department had a relatively 
strong influence on the project until the pre-launch stage when the customer 
education programme was launched. At this stage, marketing started to exert a 
stronger influence. 
5.3.4 The Innovation Performance 
(1) Development Speed (DS) 
The Imigran development programme took six and half years, which is shorter 
than the industry average of eight years. Although there was a strong motive for 
speed, the goal for a world-wide simultaneous approval was not realized. 
(2) Innovative level (IL) 
Imigran was the first entrant to a new class. The innovative level was very high. 
(3) Sales 
The sales of Imigran were high. Only one year after its launch, in 1992, it 
generated £400 million in sales, which was approximately twelve per cent of 
the company's total sales. 
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5.3.5 Summary 
Using the same measures as indicated in Section 5.2, the assessment of the 
environmental, strategic and organisational constructs is presented in Tables 
5.10 to 5.13. Finally a preliminary discussion is provided in this Section. 
(1) Assessment 
Table 5.10 Assessment of the Environmental Constructs in 
the Imiaran Protect 
Market Technological Internal Marketing & 
Uncertainty Uncertainty Technological expertise 
MS MN CNA MC Score CD MA SE Score ME CR RE DE Score 
02204221501102 
Table 5.11 Ass essment of the Strategic Constru cts in the 
R&D/marketing interface in t he Imiaran Project 
-- ------- -------------- 
CSD 
-------------- 
CTD 
------------------ 
PSD 
- - 
OD 
----- -------------- 
early, its 
-------------- 
effective in 
----------------- 
highly effective 
-------- 
was present, 
effectiveness assessing the in customer but not very 
was increased new product education and effective. 
at full opportunity. communication. 
development 
stage. 
Table 5.12 Assessment of the Organizational Constructs in 
Imiaran Protect 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
ICM ICF IC RIRM 
Research Relatively 
Committee effective 
and 
Development 
Committee, 
project team at 
a lower level. 
Lack of credibility 
of marketing 
information and 
lack of mutual 
understanding. 
Research remained 
dominant until 
full development 
and marketing 
started to exert 
strong influence. 
ill 
ale 5.13 Assessment of the Innovation Performance 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
DT DS Innovative Superiority Sales, £bn 
(yrs) Level the 1st yr 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
6.5 relatively very high, 
fast new class 
of drug 
unique and effective 0.4 
(2) Preliminary Discussion 
Imigran was the first effective pharmaceutical treatment for migraine patients 
and it involved the discovery of new scientific knowledge. Thus it belonged to 
the "new-market and new-technology" type of project. The environmental 
conditions for the Imigran project are shown in Table 5.10. While the market 
uncertainty for the project was moderate (4 out of 8), the technological 
uncertainty was very high (5 out of 6). Moreover, the company's internal 
technological and marketing expertise were not strong in Imigran project (2 out 
of 8). 
The R&D/marketing interface was present in all dimensions except for the 
PTD, where most of the decisions was made on the basis of the R&D 
considerations. There existed an R&D dominance at the early stage of the 
innovation process. However, the interface became closer at the later stage of 
the innovation process, especially in the CSD and PSD. The communication 
was frequent, and the innovation performance was satisfactory. 
This case tentatively suggests that, when a drug innovation involves new market 
and new technology, the interface in the CTD is more critical. Moreover, the 
case evidence seems to suggest that an R&D dominance situation is associated 
with high technological uncertainty. This, together with the power shifting from 
R&D to marketing department at the later stage of the innovation process, 
seems to confirm the theory that the department that possesses the most 
appropriate skills and the information to cope with critical uncertainty comes to 
have stronger influence. 
In addition, the type of interface conflict, which was found to be the lack of 
credibility of marketing information by R&D and the lack of mutual 
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understanding, seems to be specifically related to the new-market and new- 
technology situation. Furthermore, the conflict seems to have a negative effect 
upon the effectiveness of the interface, especially the PTD. 
5.4 R&D/MARKETING INTERFACE IN DEVELOPING SEREVENT 
5.4.1 Environmental Constructs 
(1) Market Uncertainty 
(i) Market Size (MS) and Market Newness (MN) 
In 1987, when the development of Serevent began, the world market for asthma 
treatment was well established. There were 400 million prescriptions in this 
market each year, which was 30 per cent larger than anti-ulcer market (Glaxo 
source). 
(ii) Customer Need Awareness (CNA) and Market Competitiveness (MC) 
Doctors in the anti-asthamatic market were highly experienced and 
knowledgeable. They understood the current market situation and the limitation 
of the existing treatments. According to Dr Smith, a general practitioner: 
"Asthma treatment has changed so much since 
Ventolin was invented, Most asthmatics are now 
well controlled during the day. The drugs available 
to treat them are safer and highly effective. 
However, asthma remains a problem in many 
patients; there has not been an effective inhaled 
drug which also has an action that keeps the lung's 
airways open all night (Glaxo sources)" 
Although there were a few asthma treatments in the market, there had been no 
major new drugs for nearly twenty years. Glaxo had been a dominant 
competitor in this market since the launch of the first effective asthma 
treatment, Ventolin, in 1969. The Serevent project was started at the time when 
the patent for Ventolin was about to expire. The major consideration of the 
company was to avoid Serevent competing with its other asthmatic treatments 
including Ventolin and the inhaled steroids. 
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(2) Technological Uncertainty 
(i) Cause of Disease (CD) and Mode of Action (MA) 
The cause of asthma is relatively well known. Asthma arises from two 
processes in the lungs: inflammation leading to thickening of the airways and 
spasm of the smooth muscles causing the airways to narrow. The important fact 
is that the underlying inflammation is asymptomatic. Thus, even when the 
narrowing is reversed by bronchodilators, the inflammation can continue and 
worsen without the patient being aware that he or she is ill. Before Serevent, all 
the anti-asthma drugs were bronchodilators which only release the narrowing 
while leaving the inflammation untreated. 
The original target of the research and development programme was to find an 
improved bronchodilator with longer duration of action compared with its 
earlier product, Ventolin. However, after the drug's additional anti- 
inflammatory properties were discovered at the full development stage, the goal 
was re-adjusted to combining bronchodilator with an anti-inflammatory action, 
which would make a most important advance in asthma treatment. Although the 
original target had been fulfilled, more clinical testing continued to accomplish 
the newly adjusted goal. 
(ii) Side Effect (SE) 
Serevent was a relatively safe drug with low side effect. 
(3) Internal Technological and Marketing strength 
(i) Marketing Experience (ME) and Company Reputation (CR) 
Glaxo was well-known in the anti-asthmatic market owing to the success of its 
previous anti-asthma drug, Ventolin. The drug had been the major treatment for 
asthma patient since it was launched twenty years previously. Mr Railton, the 
Marketing Manager for Serevent, explained, 
"Glaxo is already very experienced in the asthma 
market, is well-known by the opinion leaders, and in 
a strong position to take advantage of its 
opportunities" (telephone interview, 24th June, 
1991). 
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(ii) Research Experience (RE) and Development Experience (DE) 
Anti-asthma was a traditional and strong therapeutic area within Glaxo (see 
Table 1), and the research approach of Serevent was similar to that of Ventolin 
and Imigran. In addition, the company had developed considerable expertise in 
clinical trials organization and drug registration in this area since the 1960s. 
Nonetheless, the Serevent project presented new challenge. According to Dr 
Coleman, a member of the Serevent research team, 
"As many of the techniques for studying 
bronchodilators were applicable only to drugs with 
a short duration of action, new test systems, which 
were more robust, were developed" (telephone 
interview, 24th June, 1991). 
5.4.2 Strategic Constructs 
(1) The Corporate Strategic Dimension of the Interface (CSD) 
The market opportunities for Serevent were clearly identified at the corporate 
level with both R&D and marketing involved. Serevent was considered as 
strategically important for Glaxo, since it would defend the company's 
dominant position in the anti-asthmatic market after the patent for the 
company's earlier asthma drug, Ventolin, expired. 
(2) The Corporate Technical Dimension 
As noted earlier, Glaxo had very strong technological expertise in the anti- 
asthmatic therapeutic area. The Serevent project was in an existing market and 
applied new but related technology. The company's researchers were aware of 
the external technological trends in asthma treatment. Professor Clark, Dean of 
the National Heart and Lung Institute in London also commented that 
"The chest physicians are concerned that if 
bronchodilator drugs are given alone, then the 
continuing underlying inflammation can become 
critical. Serevent is being introduced at a time when 
long-term bronchodilator treatment is being 
criticised. I am pleased that the Glaxo team had 
recognized this, and was pursuing the correct policy 
(Glaxo sources). 
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(3) The Product Strategic Dimension 
In Serevent development, the multi-disciplinary project team, consisting of 
representatives from Clinical Research, International Medical Affairs and 
International Marketing, worked closely together. It had assumed major 
responsibilities in making such strategic decisions as the organization of the 
clinical trials and the formulation of promotion strategies. For instance, the 
Glaxo International Marketing Department held a series meetings for its local 
marketing groups in conjunction with the R&D department, emphasising the 
new drug's efficacy and the complementary relationship between serevent and 
inhaled steroid. 
(4) The Operational Dimension 
Since the asthma market was well established, a considerable amount of market 
data was available for detailed marketing research, such as doctors' prescribing 
habits, patient grouping and so on, to support strategic decision-making. 
(5) The Product Technical Dimension 
The interface was close and effective in deciding the presentation of the drug, 
including dosage form, colour and shapes of the drug. According to Dr Pilgrim, 
the Marketing Manager for Serevent, 
In deciding the packaging, the dosage form and the 
shapes of the drug, we have provided R&D with 
important market information, in terms of customers 
tastes and preferences. For example, we introduced 
a new-style packaging for Serevent, i. e. the four- 
place Diskhaler, to match what is regarded as a 
revolutionary new product (see Appendix 4)" 
(telephone interview, 26th June, 1991). 
5.4.3 Organizational Constructs 
(1) The Interface Coordination Mechanism (ICM) 
Similar to the Imigran project, the interface in the Serevent project was 
coordinated by the Research Management Committees (RMC) and the Product 
Development Committees (PDC) at the corporate level. Meanwhile, at the 
project level, the R&D/marketing interface was coordinated through a multi- 
disciplinary project team. 
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(2) The Interface Communication Flows (ICF) and Interface Conflict (IC) 
The communication was effective especially within the project team. Dr 
Palmer, the Project Team Leader, recalled, 
"In the past four years Serevent has been a major 
part of my life. I am proud of the team-work and our 
good communication that allowed the product to go 
through its development phase to British 
registration in four years" (Glaxo sources). 
The interface in the Serevent project was relatively smooth, no major conflict 
was reported. According to Dr Palmer, 
"Progress has not been without its hiccoughs. For 
example, we had disagreement with marketing on 
the interpretation of the clinical data, but the team's 
problem-solving skills smoothed out the path 
considerably" (Glaxo sources). 
(3) Relative Influence of R&D and Marketing (RIRM) 
Although the need for an improved anti-asthmatic treatment had been 
recognized as being strategically important for the company for sometime, the 
Serevent project was initiated by research. Mr Railton, explained, 
"The limitation of existing therapy in the market 
was long recognized and improvement was needed. 
However, it was the research people who came up 
with new ideas of solving the scientific problem in 
this therapeutic area, which opened the possibility 
for such new product" (telephone interview, 24th 
June, 1991). 
Nonetheless, once the underlying scientific principle had been established, the 
market became the main driving force of the project. The marketing department 
exerted a strong influence from the early stage of the innovation process. 
5.4.4 The Innovation Performance 
(1) Development Speed (DS) 
The development of Serevent took six years, which is shorter that the industry is 
average of eight years. Although the speed was not considered very fast as far 
as the whole process was concerned, the worldwide drug registration for 
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Serevent was carried out effectively and rapidly. Dr Tyrrell, the Head of the 
Regulatory Affairs Respiratory Group, recalled: 
"We ensured that the 87 volumes of data were 
despatched speedily to regulatory staff at operating 
companies so that they were ready for rapid 
submission of their local applications. It was a 
remarkable achievement for copies of the IRD 
(International Registration Dossier) to be 
despatched from GGR (Glaxo Group Research) 
within seven working days of its being signed off at 
senior level" (Glaxo sources). 
(2) Innovative Level (IL) 
Serevent was a novel agent in established class, its innovative level was high. It 
also had unique features for the customers, and met their needs better than the 
existing products. 
(3) Sales Revenue (SR) 
Serevent was launched in 1991, sales in the first year were over £300 million, 
which was 10 per cent of the company's total sales. This indicated the drug's 
great potential in generating further sales revenue. 
5.4.5 Summary 
The same measures indicated in the previous sections are used for the 
environmental, strategic and organisational constructs. Following the 
assessment of these constructs, a preliminary discussion is provided at the end 
of this section. The results of this chapter will be further analysed and compared 
with other drug innovation cases in the cross-case analysis presented in Chapter 
9. 
(1) Assessment 
Table 5.14 Assessment of the Environmental Constructs in 
the Serevent Project 
Market Technological Internal Technological 
Uncertainty Uncertainty & Marketing Expertise 
MS MN CNA MC Score CD MA SE Score ME CR RE DE Score 
00011020222127 
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Table 5.15 Assessment of the Strategic Constructs of the 
R&D/Marketing Interface in the Serevent Project 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
CSD PSD OD PTD 
effective, 
but decisions 
were 
decentralized 
to the project 
team. 
highly effective, 
responsible for 
many decision- 
making and 
implementation. 
close and 
highly 
effective. 
close and 
highly 
effective. 
Table 5.16 Assessment of the Organizational Constructs in 
Serevent Development 
ICM ICF IC RIRM 
Research 
Committee 
and 
Development 
Committee, 
project 
team at 
lower level. 
Frequent and 
effective, 
esp. within 
project team; 
strong team- 
work. 
The interface 
was relatively 
smooth, no 
major conflict 
reported. 
Except for the 
research stage 
where R&D had a 
major influence, 
the whole process 
was market driven 
Table 5.17 Assessment of the Innovation Pe rformance 
---- ------ 
DT 
------------------ 
DS Innovative 
------------------ 
Product 
------------ 
Sales, £bn 
(yrs) 
------ 
Level 
------------------ 
Superiority 
------------------ 
the ist yr 
---------------- 
6 fast high, novel 
agent in 
established 
class. 
(2) Preliminary Discussion 
unique features for 0.3 
the customer, meeting 
the customers' needs 
better than competing 
products. 
Unlike Zantac or Imigran, Serevent was developed within the company's 
technological base, and it was launched in the company's existing market. The 
company had successfully developed an anti-asthmatic drug before. Therefore 
the Serevent project is a "related-technology and existing market" type of 
project. The market and technological conditions for the Serevent project are 
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shown in Table 5.14. Both the market uncertainty and the technological 
uncertainty were low for this project. 
In spite of the drug's novel mode of action, because of its similarity to the firm's 
existing products, the technological uncertainty was only scored at 2 out of 6, 
the same level as the Zantac project (discussed in Section 5.2). The marketing 
uncertainty of the project was even lower, scoring 1 out of 8. Meanwhile, the 
company's internal technological and marketing expertise were very strong in 
the Serevent project (7 out 8). 
The R&D/marketing interface started early in the Serevent project, and it was 
most effective in the PSD, OD and PTD. However, the interface was not 
specifically important in the CTD. This may be because the research team 
possessed extensive skills and information in the company's established area, 
thus little uncertainty was involved. In addition, although there existed a small 
degree of power shifting between R&D and marketing, the innovation process 
was mainly market-driven with the marketing department exerting a stronger 
influence. The cross-functional communication was frequent, and no major 
conflict was reported. 
On the whole, the performance of the drug development was satisfactory, in 
terms of the innovative level, the speed of the worldwide approval and the sales. 
According to Calantone and Cooper (1981) the success rate for such projects is 
very high. The chance to succeed for Serevent was even greater because of the 
lack of direct competition, which is usually associated with a well established 
market. 
This case seems to suggest that the overall R&D/marketing interface tends to be 
more smooth and effective in a "close-to-home" project. This may be because 
both marketing and R&D are more sure about what information and services 
they can provide for each other and how to obtain them. The case evidence also 
indicates that in a "close-to-home" project, the interface tends to start early, and 
is likely to be market-driven. Finally, the case appears to indicate that in a 
"close-to-home" project, the project team has greater responsibility for the 
decision-making as well as the implementation of the drug innovation. 
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5.6 FINAL ANALYSIS 
Glaxo is the world's second biggest pharmaceutical company, and has been fast 
growing since 1980. It has the highest R&D productivity of any pharmaceutical 
company in the world and the highest R&D expenditure of any company in the 
UK. Concentration rather than diversification, is the company's corporate 
strategy. The result of this concentration strategy is a highly effective 
communication within the organization and a strong corporate commitment to 
drug innovation. 
Despite the fact that all the three drug innovation projects analysed here were 
successful, they belonged to three different types of project, i. e. the "unrelated- 
technology and new-market" type, the "new-market and new-technology" type 
and the "related-technology and existing-market" type. In addition, they also 
had different driving forces, which were corporate management, research and 
marketing respectively. 
However, beyond the recognition that drug innovation can be successful 
regardless of their types and driving forces, the case studies have further 
revealed a relationship between the role of the R&D/marketing interface and the 
changing market and technological environment. 
In this section, an effort is made to relate the findings of this chapter to the three 
research propositions defined in Chapter 3, the theoretical framework. These 
are concerned with the relationships between the strategic constructs, the 
environmental constructs and the organisational constructs. 
Proposition 1 postulates the existence of the R&D/marketing interface in one or 
more of the five dimensions. The three case studies have supported this 
proposition, in all the three drug innovation projects, the interface was present 
in four dimensions. However, the results revealed that the interface in the CTD 
was still lacking. 
Furthermore, the research proposition 1 postulates a direct relationship between 
the environmental constructs and the strategic constructs of the R&D/marketing 
interface. The case studies have also provided positive evidence for this 
proposition. For instance, the case study results indicate that, in a project that 
involves very high technological uncertainty, the interface tends to start later in 
the process. Moreover, whilst the interface in the CTD tends to be critical in 
such a project, the interface in the PTD seems to be minimum. This confirms 
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both the important role of the interface in the exploitation of the firm's 
technological competence, and the weakness of the interface in providing a 
design link in a new- or unrelated-technology and new-market situation. 
On the other hand, The case study reveals a strong interface in most dimensions 
and an early starting time in a "related-technology and existing market" type of 
project, where the environmental uncertainty especially the market uncertainty 
was low. However, the interface in such a project does not seem to be important 
in the CTD, and this would suggest that the interface need for exploiting the 
firm's core technological competence is relatively low in a "close-to-home" 
situation. The case study also reveals the greater responsibility of the project 
team and the presence of strong team-work in such a project. 
In addition, The case studies' results have revealed a link between some of the 
environmental constructs and some of the organizational constructs. In 
particular, an R&D dominant or research-driven situation tends to be associated 
with high technological uncertainty. This, together with the power shifting 
between R&D and marketing during the innovation process, would confirm the 
theory that the department that possesses the most appropriate skills and 
information to cope with critical uncertainty comes to have stronger influence. 
In addition, the lack of credibility of marketing information as perceived by 
R&D and their lack of mutual understanding are found to be specifically related 
to the new-market and new- or unrelated-technology situation, and they seem to 
have a negative effect upon the interface effectiveness, especially the PTD. 
However, while both the relative influence of R&D and marketing and the 
interface conflict tend to be affected by the environmental constructs, the 
communication between R&D and marketing seems to be more affected by the 
corporate management commitment regardless of the types of innovation. 
Specifically, the R&D/marketing interface in a project receiving a strong 
corporate management commitment tends to be strong due to effective 
communication. Moreover, the relatively lack of internal technological and 
marketing expertise seems to be compensated to a certain extent by this strong 
interface. This would confirm the importance of the R&D/marketing interface 
in drug innovation as well as the commitment of corporate management in 
encouraging effective communication. 
122 
These findings arise from three case studies associated with Glaxo plc. They 
will be compared with findings from other case studies in the following 
chapters, and further analysed in Chapter 9, the cross-case analysis. 
Note 
1. A chemical substance called imidazole is a major structure of Tagamet. However, Glaxo believed 
that imidazole was not an essential component for H2-antagonists, and it was replaced with a furan 
ring. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE SMITHKLINE BEECHAM PHARMACEUTICALS 
CASE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
SmithKline Beecham is a newly merged British company, which is formed 
from a American company, SmithKline and a British company, Beecham. 
Unlike Glaxo, SmithKline Beecham is highly diversified. Its organizational 
structure is shown in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1 The Company Structure of SmithKline Beecham 
SmithKline Beecham 
Corporate 
Finance 
Pharmaceuticals 
R&D U. K. U. S. 
Europe 
Japan and E. 
Corporate Corporate 
Development Personnel 
Consumer 
Brands 
U. K. U. S. 
Europe 
Asia Latin America 
Canada 
R&D 
Animal Clinical 
Health Laboratories 
U. S. North America 
Europe 
The company consists of four businesses - ethical pharmaceuticals, consumer 
brands, clinical laboratory, and animal health. The division that this case study 
is concerned is the ethical pharmaceuticals division. It is a major division, 
accounting for 50% of the company's total turnover. The division of consumer 
brands is the second largest business segment making up 32% of sales. The 
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company believes that its non-pharmaceutical businesses provide extra earnings 
stability and cash for research. 
SmithKline was established in 1830, while its U. K. subsidiary dates from 1897. 
By the early 1960s, the U. K. subsidiary was the third largest supplier to the 
National Health Service. Its business was based on three main groups of drugs - 
amphetamines, psychotropics and haematinics. However, in the 1970s, the 
company's key products, such as amphetamines, were overtaken by newer 
introductions from other companies, particularly by Hoffmann La Roche's 
Librium and Valium. SmithKline's market share was declining. 
SmithKline's wonder drug, Tagamet, launched in 1976, was developed at a time 
when the company needed to come up with replacements for its earlier 
successes. It was a significant scientific breakthrough, the first effective peptic 
ulcer treatment. Five years after the launch, it generated over $800 million per 
year in sales, overtaking Valium as the world's largest pharmaceutical. A press 
comment noted: 
"While not a rival to Merck in size, SmithKline with 
Tagamet was out of the minors and into the 
pharmaceutical major leagues. " (Financial World, 
March 7,1989). 
However, since than, SmithKline had not been successful in coming up with 
new drugs. Despite $330 million a year R&D investment, it had remained 
dependent on Tagamet. The company's R&D productivity in the 1980s was the 
lowest among the top ten pharmaceutical companies (see Appendix 6). 
The other company, Beecham, was founded in the early 1850s. During the first 
century of its existence, it had a mixture of over-the-counter medicine, health 
drinks, and toiletries businesses. In 1957, Beecham developed the first 
semisynthetic antibiotics. Over the next two decades, Beecham developed 
several new forms of penicillin. Beecham's largest drug, Amoxil, launched in 
1972, is still generating £200 million in sales annually. The company's newer 
product, Augmentin, is the first penicillin to overcome the problem of bacterial 
resistance. Nevertheless, despite its success in the antibiotics area, the 
company's business was too narrow, thus needed to expand. 
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The merger of the two pharmaceutical companies took place in July 1989. With 
the merger, the two companies leapt into the rank of the top five world drug 
companies. (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 The New Lineup of Drug Giants 
---------------------------------------- 
Company 
Merck 
Bristol-Meyers Squibb 
Glaxo 
Ciba-Geigy 
SmithKline Beecham 
Source: James Capel & Co. 
5.6 
4.7 
4.4 
4.0 
3.7 
In this chapter, three products which have been developed during the past 
twenty years - Tagamet, Augmentin and Eminase - are studied. All the three 
drugs were developed and launched before the merger took place, while 
Tagamet was SmithKline's product and Augmentin and Eminase were 
Beecham's products. Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2 are the time scales and 
descriptions of the three products. 
Ficrure 6.2 Product Development Time Scales 
Eminase Development Launch Post market 
1983 1989 (PED1: 2009) 
Augmentin Development Launch Post market 
1976 1981 (PED: 2002) 
Tagamet Development Launch Post market 
1970 1976 (PED: 1994) 
-------------------------------------------------- Year 
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 
1989 sales ($bn) 
126 
Table 6.2 Product Descriptions 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Drug Description Innovation 
Level 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Tagamet The first effective anti-ulcer Very high. 
drug. The best-selling drug for First drug in 
five years before Glaxo's Zantac class. 
took over. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Augmentin An improved antibiotic drug, Moderate/High. 
tackling the resistance problem Novel agent in 
found in using penicillin. established 
class. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Eminase An injectable heart-attack High. 
treatment. It failed to show its Early entrant 
advantages over the rivals, and in a new class 
sales were low. 
6.2 R&D/MARKETING INTERFACE IN DEVELOPING TAGAMET 
6.2.1 Environmental Constructs 
(1) Market Uncertainty 
(i) Market Size (MS) and Market Newness (MN) 
Before Tagamet, there was no effective treatment for peptic ulcers. Surgery was 
often needed for persistent ulcer patients. The market was very new and was 
predicted to have a big potential owing to a large number of ulcer sufferers. 
60 Customer Need Awareness (CNA) and Market Competitiveness (MC) 
There was no direct competition when Tagamet was being developed, the major 
objective of the company was to stimulate primary demand in the market. 
Meanwhile, although there was a perceived customer need for an effective anti- 
ulcer drug, this need was poorly defined and customers were generally cautious 
about such a treatment. According to Mr. Brimlecombe, the then Product 
Manager in SmithKline's Italian company, 
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"Patients' attitude was rather conservative in terms 
of the safety of the drug. people were quite prepared 
to take a risk on surgery, but with drugs, they 
expected 100% certainty" (SmithKline Sources). 
(2) Technological Uncertainty 
(i) Cause of Disease (CD) and Mode of Action (MA) 
The cause of the disease was not clear. Histamine was known to be involved in 
the normal secretion of acid into the stomach. However, exactly how histamine 
worked on the acid production was not known. 
By adopting the principle of "beta-blockers", SmithKline discovered the link 
between histamine and acid secretion - the H2 receptor. This led to the 
development of the first H2 antagonist, Tagamet. 
(ii) Side Effect (SE) 
The main drawback of the drug was its poor interaction with several other 
drugs. However, little could be done by the company to overcome this 
disadvantage, because such an attempt would affect the drug's basic chemical 
structure. According to Dr. Leonard, Pharmaceutical Development Manager for 
Tagamet, 
"the side effects of Tagamet could not be modified 
without changing the molecule of the compound, 
that is to say, you need to find another compound" 
(face-to-face interview, 18th May, 1991). 
(3) Internal Technological and Marketing Strength 
(i) Marketing Experience (ME) and Company Reputation (CR) 
Despite the fact that the company had no previous marketing in the anti-ulcer 
market, it had achieved high customer awareness for the new drug by openly 
publicising the drug's progress from the early stage of the development. As a 
result, when the drug was ready for launch, most medical professionals 
worldwide knew about the drug. 
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(ii) Research Experience (RE) and Development Experience (DE) 
The company had no previous experience in anti-ulcer drug development. 
However, the research approach was derived from the discovery of beta- 
blockers, where all the three key researchers in the Tagamet programme had 
participated prior to joining SmithKline. 
6.2.2 Strategic Constructs 
(1) The Corporate Strategic Dimension of the Interface (CSD) 
Tagamet was developed in the company's U. K subsidiary. Corporate 
management located in the US had limited involvement and the interface 
between the local R&D group and the central marketing was minimal. 
(2) The Corporate Technical Dimension of the Interface (CTD) 
Similarly, there was no R&D/marketing interface in this dimension. However, 
unlike some of the science-driven projects where R&D was the sole initiator, 
the Tagamet project was partly initiated by the corporate management through 
its strong support for a novel approach and the recruitment of the key 
researchers into the company. 
Since the Tagamet project involved the discovery of new scientific knowledge 
beyond the company's existing technologies, such corporate initiatives proved 
to be vital. According to Dr Sime, Director, Strategic Product Development 
Division, 
"The top management decided to let Dr Paget and 
later Dr Black try this new approach, which had 
been rejected by ICI as being too speculative. This 
decision proved to be critical in Tagamet's success. 
Dr Black later received a Nobel Award for his work 
regarding this project" (face-to-face interview, 18th 
May, 1991). 
(3) Product Strategic Dimension of the Interface (PSD) 
The interface between the local R&D group and the local marketing department 
was close, especially at the later stage of full development in determining 
promotional strategies. Technical data were used to convince the customers 
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about the efficacy of the new drug and its significant advantage over the 
surgery. According to Dr Leonard, 
"We conducted all the works here in the UK, it was 
an exciting experience for everyone involved, not just our department but the commercial department 
as well" (face-to-face interview, 18th May, 1991). 
(4) Operational Dimension of the Interface (OD) 
Some qualitative marketing research was carried out to identify the market 
potential and consumer attitude. However, little quantitative data were obtained 
such as the number of prescriptions for peptic ulcers, doctors' prescribing habits 
and so on. 
(5) Product Technical Dimension of the Interface (PTD) 
There was not close interaction between R&D and marketing in this dimension, 
most of the decisions, such as the design of an anti-moisture package for the 
drug, were made on the basis of R&D considerations. 
6.2.3 Organizational Constructs 
(1) Interface Coordination Mechanism (ICM) 
SmithKline was a highly centralized company. The UK research laboratory 
which developed Tagamet was the only non-US laboratory doing fundamental 
research. The organizational structure was bureaucratic, which imposed an extra 
layer of management between the UK subsidiary and its headquarters. In 
addition, when Tagamet was being developed, the company did not have a 
project team structure at the time, and the interaction was on an ad-hoc basis. 
Nevertheless, the local (UK) marketing department had a close relationship 
with R&D, since their offices were in the same building. 
(2) Interface Communication Flows (ICF) and Interface Conflict (IC) 
As noted earlier, communication was relatively effective within the UK 
subsidiary. Nevertheless, marketing's role was mainly seen by R&D as sales 
promotion. Thus they had no initiative to interact with marketing on technical 
issues. According to Dr Leonard, 
130 
"Tagamet was a significant scientific breakthrough, 
marketing had an important role to play, such as the 
generation of promotional materials, but that was 
only after the technical problems had been solved by us" (face-to face interview, 18th May, 1991). 
(3) Relative Influence of R&D and Marketing (RIRM) 
The project was research-driven until the pre-launch stage when marketing 
started to exert some influence. Moreover, the R&D department also carried out 
some marketing activities, such as the organization of seminars and symposia 
for medical professionals. According to Dr Sime, 
"The research laboratory in the UK was very active, 
they set up a series of symposia at the 300-odd 
postgraduate centres in the UK where doctors 
normally update their knowledge - and this was 
even before the company was certain it had a 
product to sell. One of the important point which 
they had to get over was that Tagamet was not just 
another antacid, but really represented an 
important pharmacological breakthrough" (face-to- 
face interview, 18th May, 1991). 
6.2.4 The Innovation Performance 
(1) Development Speed (DS) 
The Tagamet project was accomplished relatively fast, it took six and half 
years, compared with the industry's average of eight years. 
(2) Innovative level (IL) 
Tagamet was the first entrant to a new market and a new class of drug. The 
innovative level was very high. However, although it was perceived by the 
customers as an effective ulcer treatment, customers were concerned with the 
drug's side effects. 
(3) Sales Revenue (SR) 
Tagamet achieved a high sales revenue during the first several years. In 1981, 
just five years after launch, it generated £800 million in sales and became the 
world's best-selling drug. However, since then, sales of Tagamet began to 
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decline. In 1991, it generated merely £630 million, comparing with its rival - 
Zantac's sales of £1,600 million. 
6.2.5 Summary 
Qualitative measures, such as the checklists method, are used to assess the 
research constructs in this chapter. The results are presented in Tables 6.3 to 
6.6, they will be further analysed with other case studies results in Chapter 9, 
the cross-case analysis. 
(1) Assessment 
Table 6.3 Assessment of the Environmental Constructs in 
the TaQamet Project 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Market Technological Internal Marketing & 
Uncertainty Uncertainty Technological Expertise 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
MS MN CNA MC Score CD MA SE Score ME CR RE DE Score 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
02103221501102 
Table 6.4 Assessment o f the Strat egic Constructs of the 
R&D/Marke 
--------- 
ting Interfac 
------------- 
e in the Ta 
----------- 
Qamet 
----- 
Project 
-------------------- 
CTD 
was minimal, 
but corporate 
initiative was 
present. 
OD 
limited to 
qualitative 
methods, and 
mainly for 
the purpose of 
identifying 
market potential. 
PSD 
effective in 
generating 
promotional 
materials. 
PTD 
only a weak 
presence. 
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Table 6.5 Assessment of the Organisational Constructs in 
the Taaamet Proiect 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
ICM ICF IC RIRM 
Disciplinary 
structure and 
no project 
team, 
informal 
at ad hoc 
basis. 
In-frequent R&D had a 
between the restricted 
subsidiary view on the 
and the role of 
headquarters; marketing. 
but frequent 
within 
the subsidiary. 
Research driven 
during most of the 
innovation process 
process, and 
marketing started 
Table 6.6 Assessment of the 
--------------------------- 
DT DS Innovative 
(yrs) Level 
--------------------------- 
6.5 relatively very high, 
fast first 
entrant in 
a new Glas 
--------------------------- 
to have a 
stronger 
influence at 
pre-launch stage. 
Innovation Performance 
------------------------------ 
Superiority Sales, £bn 
5th year 15th year 
------------------------------- 
it was the 0.8 0.63 
only effective 
ulcer treatment, 
s but was held back 
by its relatively 
high side effect. 
------------------------------- 
(2) Preliminary Discussion 
Tagamet was the first effective pharmaceutical treatment for ulcer patient and 
its development involved discovery of important principle of drug treatments. 
Thus it belonged to a "new-technology and new-market" type of project. The 
market and technological conditions for the Tagamet project are shown in Table 
6.3. While the market uncertainty for the project was moderately high, scoring 4 
out of 8, the technological uncertainty was very high, and was scored 5 out of 6. 
In addition, the company's internal technological and marketing expertise were 
not strong in the Tagamet project (2 out of 8). All these are very similar to the 
Imigran project discussed in previous chapter, the Glaxo Case. 
The R&D/marketing interface presented in two out of five dimensions. They 
are the PSD and OD. The interface in both the CSD and the CTD did not exist, 
mainly because of the geographic distance between the central marketing (US) 
and the local (UK) R&D. However, the ability and initiative of the corporate 
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management in identifying the scientific and technological opportunities were 
critical for the project. R&D dominated during most of the innovation process, 
and the marketing only began to have a stronger influence at the pre-launch 
stage. The R&D/marketing interface also started late. The communication was 
relatively frequent between the local marketing and R&D, and the drug 
innovation performance was satisfactory during the first five years, both in 
terms of the innovative level and the sales revenue. 
Unlike the Imigran project, this case did not demonstrate a strong interface in 
the CTD. Instead, the corporate management played a critical role in this 
dimension. On the other hand, similar to the Imigran project, the case evidence 
seems to suggest the association between an R&D dominance and high 
technological uncertainty. 
In addition, the interface conflict was found to be the lack of credibility of 
marketing information perceived by R&D. It seemed to be caused by both the 
poor marketing research techniques and the R&D's restricted view about the 
role of marketing. Furthermore, the conflict seemed to have a negative effect 
upon the effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface, especially the PTD. 
6.3 R&D/MARKETING INTERFACE IN DEVELOPING AUGMENTIN 
6.3.1 Environmental Constructs 
(1) Market Uncertainty 
(i) Market Size (MS) and Market Newness (MN) 
Augmentin was developed to eliminate the resistance problem found in using 
penicillin. It was targeted at the well established antibiotic market, the total 
sales was £600 million in 1981 when the drug was launched. 
(ii) Customer Need Awareness (CNA) and Market Competitiveness (MC) 
Since penicillin was first used, it had caused the problem of bacterial resistance 
in some patients. Doctors were concerned with this problem, and would 
welcome a solution. 
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Meanwhile, Beecham had been a market leader in the antibiotic market with its 
world number one antibiotic - Amoxil. The competitive pressure was mainly 
within the company to prevent the new drug attacking its own best product. 
According to Dr Sime, 
"Beecham already had the world's number one 
antibiotic - Amoxil. Everything Beecham did to develop Augmentin attacked its own number one drug 
. 
How could you make Augmentin grow without killing Amoxil was a big marketing problem" (face- 
to-face interview, 18th May, 1991). 
This strategy was later changed when more competing product were launched 
in the market. 
(2) Technological Uncertainty 
(i) Cause of Disease (CD) and Mode of Action (MA) 
The cause of infection being bacterial was well known. However, penicillin, the 
effective antibiotic, was found ineffective in some patients because their body 
generated a resistance to the drug. The cause of this resistance problem was not 
clear. 
Beecham's R&D discovered that the cause of the resistance problem is the 
secretion of bacterial called beta lactamese in penicillin. Therefore Augmentin 
was developed with a novel mode of action - the combination of a beta 
lactamese inhibitor with an antibiotic product - so as to loose the full activity of 
the antibiotic against a wide spectrum of bacterial. 
(ii) Side Effect (SE) 
Augmentin was a safe drug with low side effects. 
(3) Internal Technological and Marketing Strength 
(i) Marketing Expertise (ME) and Company Reputation (CR) 
As noted earlier, Beecham was a well-known market leader in the antibiotic 
market. The company's marketing expertise had been established through the 
development and launch of its successful penicillin products. 
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(ii) Research Experience (RE) and Development Experience (DEO 
One of Beecham's great scientific advances was 6ADA, which enabled the 
company to make a number of semisynthetic penicillins. It had developed 
scientific expertise in this area for more than ten years. Augmentin was the next 
generation in this area. 
6.3.2 Strategic Constructs 
(1) The Strategic Dimension of the Interface (CSD & PSD) 
The corporate management of the company was highly involved in the 
Augmentin project in order to ensure that its best product - Amoxil would not 
be affected by the launch of the new drug, and most of the strategic decisions 
concerning the new product were made at the presence of the corporate 
management. For instance, distinct competitive strategies were designed for 
Augmentin during different stages of the product life cycle, where both 
marketing and R&D input had been received. According to Miss Clancy, the 
Director of Strategic Product Development for anti-infective product, 
" The corporate interface was critical throughout 
the development in designing competitive strategies 
for the new product. For example, prior to launch, 
two separate marketing groups were formed for 
Augmentin and Amoxil. The Augmentin group 
focused on complicated infections, attempting to 
build up the sales of Augmentin without attacking 
Amoxil. More importantly, this interface did not 
stop after the launch, it is a continuing process" 
(face-to face interview, 18th May, 1991). 
(2) The Corporate Technical Dimension of the Interface (CTD) 
The R&D/marketing interface also played a important role in evaluating the 
implication of the technical decision of the new drug on the firm's long term 
competitive position. After the cause of the resistance problem was discovered, 
the research team decided to develop a drug by combining a beta lactamese 
inhibitor with an existing antibiotic product of the company. However, 
difficulties raised in deciding whether or not to use its best product - Amoxil. 
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R&D and marketing and the corporate management cooperated closely. 
Detailed laboratory works as well as extensive marketing research were carried 
out before the decision of using Amoxil was made. This provided the company 
with a genuine scientific ground as well as sound marketing knowledge to 
achieve a technical/marketing synergy for the new product. 
(3) The Operational Dimension of the Interface (OD) 
Antibiotic market was well established with a considerable amount of data 
available. This enabled the company to conduct extensive marketing research 
for both strategic and technical purposes. According to Dr Sime, 
"Because the resistance problem did not occur in 
every patient, marketing research was an important 
means of finding out the conditions and areas where 
the resistance was likely to occur in order to assess 
the benefit of the new product. In addition, R&D 
was requested by marketing to undertake in-depth 
research on Augmentin relating to food, speed of 
reaction and side effect profile of Augmentin, with 
the aim of creating the new product image distinct 
from Amoxil" (face-to-face interview, 18th May, 
1991). 
(4) The Product Technical Dimension of the Interface (PTD) 
Augmentin had technical problems regarding its stability. Thus, certain dosage 
forms requested by marketing, such as capsule and muscular injection, were not 
achieved in the laboratory due to technical restrictions regarding the volume 
and the moisture sensitivity2. 
6.3.3 Organizational Constructs 
(1) The Interface Coordination Mechanism (ICM) 
Beecham had a central marketing department. the interface between it and the 
R&D department in the Augmentin project was coordinated by the top 
management. There was no formal coordination mechanism at the corporate 
level. At a lower level, the R&D/marketing interface was coordinated through 
the project team. 
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(2) Interface Communication Flow (ICF) and Interface Conflict (IC) 
The communication between R&D and marketing was frequent but not always 
smooth. Miss Corkill, the former Marketing Manager who has left the 
company, recalled, 
"We saw each other every day, there was no 
communication barrier between us. However, we had a few problems. For example, the way they 
organised the trials made it difficult for some of the 
emer in market condition to be considered into the 
drugs formulation" (face-to-face interview, 14th 
March, 1991). 
On the other hand, R&D felt that marketing was inconsistent in their 
requirement, which caused disturbance to their work. Because some stability 
tests required a long period to complete under certain dosage forms. 
(3) Relative Influence of R&D and Marketing (RIRM) 
Although the need to tackle the resistance problem existed since penicillin was 
discovered, the project was initiated by the research people after they 
discovered by accident the cause of the problem. Nonetheless, once the 
underlying scientific principle had been established, the mainly driving force of 
the project became the market with a strong involvement of the corporate 
management. 
R&D and marketing worked closely from the very early stage. At the 
exploratory development stage, the focus was to evaluate the long run 
competitive impact of the new drug; at the pre-launch stage, the focus was to 
differentiate the new product and to define the target market. During this 
process, cooperation rather than one party dominance was called out. However, 
R&D had a stronger influence at the drug design stage due to the technical 
complexity of the drug, marketing's role was very limited. 
The interface remained very close after the launch. The emphasis was on 
sustaining and developing the drug's competitive advantage as the competitive 
direction changed. 
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6.3.4 Innovation Performance 
(1) development Speed 
The development speed of Augmentin was relatively fast. The project took five 
years, compared with the industry's average of eight years. 
(2) Innovative Level (IL) 
Augmentin was a novel agent in an established class. The innovative level was 
scored moderate/high. The drug had a differential advantage in meeting specific 
customer needs. 
(3) Sales 
Sales of Augmentin were relatively high and sustaining. Launched in 1981, it 
generated sales of £300 million and £410 million in 1986 and in 1990 
respectively. 
6.3.5 Summary 
the same measures as in the previous chapter are applied to assess the research 
constructs in this chapter. The results are shown in Tables 6.7 to 6.10, they will 
be used in the cross-case analysis in Chapter 9. 
(1) Assessment 
Table 6.7 Assessment of the Environmental Constructs in 
the Aucrmentin Proiect 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Market Technological Internal Marketing & 
Uncertainty Uncertainty Technological Expertise 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
MS MN CNA MC Score CD MA SE Score ME CR RE DE Score 
1001a11oa2212 
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Table 6.8 Assessment of the Strategic Constructs of the 
R&D/Marketing Interface in the Aucimentin Project 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
CSD & PSD CTD OD PTD 
highly effective, 
responsible for 
making most of 
the decisions, 
top management 
was highly 
involved. 
highly effective, 
esp. in evaluating 
the competitive 
impact of the 
technical 
decisions. 
close and 
effective, 
mainly for 
strategic 
purposes. 
present 
but not 
very 
effective 
Table 6.9 Assessment of the Organizational Constructs in 
the Auamentin Proiect 
ICM ICF IC RIRM 
informal frequent 
contact at 
corporate 
level and a 
project team 
at lower level. 
dissatisfaction 
with each other's 
time scale. 
close link 
during most 
of the process 
except for 
drug design 
where R&D 
dominated. 
Table 6.10 Assessment of the Innovation Performance 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
DT DS Innovative Superiority sales, £bn 
(yrs) Level 5th yr 10th yr 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
5 fast moderate/high 
novel agent in 
established 
class. 
(2) Preliminary Discussion 
advantageous, 0.3 0.41 
meeting customers' 
better than competing 
products. 
Augmentin was not first to the market and its development was within the firm's 
technological base. The company had successfully developed several antibiotic 
drugs before. Therefore the Augmentin was a "related-technology and existing 
market" type of project. it bears considerable similarities to the Serevent project 
discussed in Chapter 5, the Glaxo Case. Firstly, they all had low technological 
and market uncertainties. For instance, the technological uncertainty in the 
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Augmentin project was only scored at 2 out of 6, and the market uncertainty 
was even lower, scoring 2 out of 8. 
Secondly, the closeness of both projects to their firms' existing products and 
markets was reflected by the high level of the internal technological and 
marketing expertise that both projects had been provided, which was scored at 7 
out of 8. Apparently, both the Serevent and the Augmentin projects represented 
a "close-to-home" type of project. Thirdly, the R&D/marketing interface in both 
projects started early in the process. 
However, there are also distinct differences between these two projects. Whilst 
in the Serevent project, the interface was most effective in the PSD, PTD and 
OD, the interface in the Augmentin project was most effective in the CSD, CTD 
and OD. This reveals a clear emphasis on project teamwork in one hand, and on 
strong corporate involvement on the other. This result implies that effective 
interface between R&D and marketing may be achieved through differnet 
combinations of effective interface dimensions. 
In addition, although there existed a small degree of power shifting between 
R&D and marketing, neither party had a dominant influence. The 
communication was frequent, but a feeling of frustration on their working 
relationship was recalled by both parties, mainly at the later drug design stage. 
On the whole, the performance of the drug development was satisfactory, in 
terms of the innovative level, the development speed and the sales revenue the 
drug achieved. 
This case confirms the finding in the Serevent project that the overall 
R&D/marketing interface tends to be more effective in a close-to-home project. 
However, it failed to confirm that the interface was more smooth as well. 
Nevertheless, it is noted that the conflict mainly occurred at the technical level 
and at the later stage. This implies that not only the technological uncertainty 
perceived at the planning stage of the project, but also the contiguous technical 
problems occurred at the later stage of the project can have an major impact 
upon the R&D/marketing interface. 
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6.4 R&D/MARKETING INTERFACE IN DEVELOPING EMINASE 
6.4.1 Environmental Constructs 
(1) Market Uncertainty 
(i) Market Size (MS) and Market Newness (MN) 
Cardiovascular drugs are the largest therapeutic category in the pharmaceutical 
market. In 1989 when Eminase was launched, it accounted for 14.7% of the 
£100 billion total pharmaceutical sales. The cardiovascular market is divided 
into four segments: hypertension, heart failure, Ischaemic heart, and stroke. 
Eminase was a treatment for the heart failure that has a fatal consequence. 
However, rather than targeting to the traditional customers - the cardiologists in 
hospitals, Eminase was targeted at the general practitioner (GP) market, which 
was completely new. 
(ii) Customer Need Awareness (CNA) and Market Competitiveness (MC) 
SmithKline committed large investment to promote Eminase in the GP market. 
As a result, 96% of doctors were aware of Eminase after the launch 
(SmithKline source). However, GPs generally had a negative attitude toward 
the drug. They were too worried about mistakes and facing negligence claims, 
having no experience in treating heart attack patients. Normally, GPs treat them 
with Oxygen or heart stimulator and rush them to hospital. 
Several heart attack drugs were in the market competing with Beecham's 
Eminase -a highly expensive drug, costing £1,200. They were Genentech's 
Activase (TPA) which was available for £1,600 and streptokinase, an old drug, 
costing £200 a shot. The competitive pressure was highly intense in that none 
had a clear competitive advantage against the other. (A study called ISIS-3 
found that all three drugs were equally effective at keeping people alive). 
Except for Eminase, all the drugs were targeted at the traditional hospital 
market. Beecham attempted to differentiate Eminase from its competitors by 
using the drug's advantage in time-saving, which is crucial for heart attack 
patients. The drug can be administered in a five minutes intravenous injection 
compared several hours needed by its rivals. 
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(2) Technological Uncertainty 
(i) Cause of Disease (CD) and Mode of Action (MA) 
The cause of heart attacks was clear. When a patient has a heart attack, his body 
continues to form clots in the circulation system to stop the punctures of blood. 
The result is death or damage to the heart muscle through oxygen starvation. It 
was however still a question as to how to make a drug bust up that blood clot 
faster and more directly. 
Eminase is a biotechnology product representing the latest advance in drug 
research. it is the first thrombolytic agent that can be given as a single five 
minute intravenous injection. The idea was to offer patients the benefit of a 
more specific action, longer lasting effects, and greater convenience of use. 
However, the clinical data obtained from the laboratory failed to support some 
of these claims. The reason was not clear. According to Dr. Crowley, manager 
in the R&D department, who participated in the development of Eminase: 
"The clinical data did not show some of the 
advantages that we had expected. The ISIS-3 was a 
disaster for us. It shown that Eminase was merely as 
effective as streptokinase - an old and much cheaper drug. We do not know the reason, maybe because 
we didn't do the right clinical studies, maybe the 
original findings were not correct. If we knew the 
reason, we would have come up with some 
solutions" (face-to-face interview, 25th May, 1991). 
(ii) Side Effect (SE) 
The side effects of Eminase were relatively high. ISIS-3 showed that 1.5% of 
patients receiving Eminase suffered a stroke, compared with 1.5% of those 
getting TPA and just 1.1 % of those getting streptokinase. 
(3) Internal Technological and Marketing Strength 
(i) Marketing Experience (ME) and Company Reputation (CR) 
Beecham was new to the cardiovascular market. Eminase was its first attempt in 
this market. As a result, the company was not seen as a specialist in the 
cardiovascular area. 
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(ii) Research Experience (RE) and Development Experience (DE) 
As described above the company had no previous experience in developing 
cardiovascular treatment. Moreover, the research approach, using genetic 
technology, was completely new to the company. 
6.4.2 Strategic Constructs 
(1) The Corporate Strategic Dimension of the Interface (CSD) 
The commercial evaluation and the competitive analysis of the Eminase project 
at the corporate level were not adequately undertaken. According to Miss 
Clancy, 
"There wasn't a strategic interface before initiating 
the research programme. If there was one, Eminase 
may not have been developed at the first place, 
because it did not present long term market 
opportunities for the company" (face-to-face 
interview, 18th May, 1991). 
(2) The Product Strategic Dimension 
The R&D/marketing interface began from the full development stage to 
evaluate the commercial viability of the research-initiated new product idea. 
However, although attempt was made to jointly conduct a educational 
programme to the customers, it was not effective in changing the negative 
attitudes of the GPs. Consequently, the drug's potential advantage of being 
time-saving through GP administration was not realised. 
(3) The Operational Dimension of the Interface (OD) 
The interface was not very effective in this dimension, because market 
information was difficult to obtain. According to Dr. Sime, 
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"The market for Eminase was only potential. Thus, 
most of the market techniques used for Augmentin 
could not be applied to Eminase. For Augmentin, 
marketing people could go and ask the doctors what 
products they were using to treat the infection, and 
to persuade them to use Augmentin instead of other 
products. However, when you are talking about 
Eminase, you are facing a group of doctors who 
don't treat those patients at all. We have to ask them 
to imagine what they would do if this product was 
available, how many patients could they treat, etc. " 
(face-to-face interview, 18th May, 1991). 
(4) The Product Technical Dimension of the Interface (PTD) 
Eminase was a biotechnological product and was technically complex. Its 
dosage form was a five minute injection, which was assumed to be a big 
competitive advantage in the market. However, No adequate marketing research 
had been conducted to evaluate this pre-claimed advantage. 
6.4.3 Organizational Constructs 
(1) Interface Coordination Mechanism (ICM) 
Similar to the Augmentin project, the Eminase project was developed by 
Beecham prior to the merger. In spite of the time lag between these two project 
(launched in 1981 and in 1989 respectively), there was no fundamental 
difference between their coordination mechanisms except for the strong 
corporate involvement in the Augmentin project. The central marketing 
department mainly assumed a implementation role rather than a strategic one, 
while R&D department was organized into a matrix structure - Therapeutic 
groups led by project managers and disciplinary departments led by department 
heads. 
(2) Interface Communication Flow (ICF) and Interface Conflict (IC) 
The communication between R&D and marketing was not very frequent and 
there was some degree of distrust between these two parties. According to Dr 
Crowley, 
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"1 did not recall a very close relationship we had 
with them, and I still could not imagine in what way 
they would have made it more successful. Something 
must have gone wrong in the clinical trials. If the 
results of the trials had proved those advanta es, 
the drug would be more successful" (face-to-face 
interview, 25th May, 1991). 
On the other hand, marketing people felt that technical staff lacked of 
commercial sensitivity, thus they should be guided by the marketing. Miss 
Clancy believed the disastrous result was caused by the absence of such a guide. 
(3) Relative influence of R&D and Marketing (RIRM) 
Eminase was initiated by the research people who believed that their important 
findings on a molecule association would provide a better treatment for heart 
attack patients. R&D had a dominant influence during most of the development 
process. 
6.4.4 The Innovation Performance 
(1) Development Speed (DS) 
The development programme took six years, which were shorter than the 
industry's average of eight years. 
(2) Innovative Level (IL) 
Eminase was a highly innovative and biotechnology-derived product, an early 
entrant in a new class. It won the Queens Award for technology achievement in 
1990. However, in spite of its innovativeness it was not perceived by the 
customers as being better than competing products in satisfying their needs. 
(3) Sales 
Eminase did not achieve the sales figures that were expected by the company. 
Sales of Eminase were very low (less than £100 million in the second year) 
especially compared to the extremely high R&D cost involved in developing 
this type of drug. 
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6.4.5 Summary 
The same measures as in the previous chapter are applied in assessing the three 
research constructs described above. The assessment is displayed in Tables 6.11 
to 6.14, and the results will be analysed in the cross-case analysis in Chapter 9. 
(1) Assessment 
Table 6.11 Assessment of the Environmental Constructs in 
the Eminase Protect 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Market Technological Internal Marketing & 
Uncertainty Uncertainty Technological Expertise 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
MS MN CNA MC Score CD MA SE Score ME CR RE DE Score 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
02226022400000 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6.12 Assessment of the Strategic Constructs of the 
R&D/Marketing Interface in the Eminase Project 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
PSD OD PTD 
was present in 
evaluating the 
commercial 
viability of a 
research-initiated 
project, and later 
in customer education. 
was present but 
encountered difficulties 
in obtaining required 
information. 
was present 
but not 
effective. 
Table 6.13 Assessment of the Organizational Constructs in 
the Eminase Droiect 
ICM ICF IC RIRM 
no formal 
mechanism at 
Corporate level, 
but a project 
team at lower 
level. 
not frequent. mutual distrust 
and marketing's 
lack of credi- 
bility perceived 
by R&D. 
Mainly R&D 
dominated. 
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Table 6.14 Assessment of the Innovation Performance 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
DT DS Innovative Superiority Sales, £bn 
(yrs) Level ist yr 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
6 relatively High. Early 
fast entrant in 
a new class 
Not better than 0.1 
competing products 
in meeting customer 
needs. 
(2) Preliminary Discussion 
Eminase was not first to market, there had existed several effective treatment 
for heart attacks. However, the company had never developed a heart attacks 
drug, and the technologies required were beyond the company's technological 
base. As a result, the drug belonged to an "unrelated-technology and new- 
market" type of project. Table 6.11 shows that both market uncertainty and 
technological uncertainty in the project were very high, especially the market 
uncertainty, scoring at 6 out of 8. Meanwhile, the company lacked of internal 
expertise for the project (0 out of 8). All this indicate that it was a very risky 
project. 
On the other hand, the R&D/marketing interface only weakly presented in the 
PSD, OD and PTD with a notable absence of a corporate interface. As a result, 
some critical activities such as preliminary market assessment and market 
research for understanding customer needs, buyer behaviour, and market 
potential were poorly undertaken. 
The case evidence suggests an association between the poor innovation 
performance and the lack of the R&D/marketing interface in the corporate 
dimension in a new-market and new-technology type of project. This case study 
also confirms the association between an R&D dominant situation and high 
technological uncertainty. In addition, the lack of marketing's credibility found 
in both the Imigran and Tagamet projects has also been revealed in this case 
study. However, another type of conflict - mutual distrust - was also found in 
this project. Moreover, the latter seems to have a worse effect upon the interface 
than the former. Thus, the conflict of mutual distrust may categorised as the 
serious disharmony. 
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6.5 FINAL ANALYSIS 
SmithKline Beecham is a newly merged UK based pharmaceutical company. 
The former SmithKline was very successful with its anti-ulcer drug Tagamet. 
However, it had a problem in developing newer drugs. Beecham, on the other 
hand had developed several successful penicillin products since the 1960s. 
However, its business needed to expand further. 
All the three drugs studied in this chapter were developed before the merger. 
Similar to the drugs studied in Glaxo Case, they belonged to a "new-technology 
and new-market" type, a "related-technology and existing-market" type and an 
"unrelated-technology and new-market" type of project respectively. However, 
not all of these drug projects were successful. 
The case study has confirmed the relationship between the role of the 
R&D/marketing interface and the changing market and technological 
environment, which has been first revealed in the Glaxo case. In addition, it has 
revealed a link between the effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface and 
the innovation performance. 
In this section, the findings of this chapter are related to the research 
propositions defined in the theoretical work, in terms of the relationships 
between the strategic constructs, the environmental constructs and the 
organizational constructs. 
The research proposition 1 postulates the existence of the R&D/marketing 
interface in one or more of the five dimensions. The three case studies have 
supported this proposition. Specifically, in the Tagamet project the interface 
was present in the PSD and OD; in the Augmentin project the interface was 
present in the CSD, CTD and OD; and in the Eminase project the interface was 
present in the PSD, OD and PTD. 
However, the case evidence indicates that, in different projects, the 
effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface in these dimensions varied 
considerably. For example, whilst in the Augmentin project the interface was 
highly effective in most dimensions that it was involved, in the Eminase project 
the interface was only weakly present. Comparing with the innovation 
performance of these two projects, these findings indicate a link between the 
effectiveness of the interface and the innovation performance. 
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In addition, a direct relationship between the environmental constructs and the 
strategic constructs of the R&D/marketing interface is postulated in the research 
proposition 2. The case studies' results have supported most of the findings 
from the previous chapter regarding this proposition, such as the association 
between the effectiveness of the interface and the type of project, between the 
starting time and the type of project and between the driving force of the 
projects and the technological uncertainty. 
However, the case studies failed to support the claim that the R&D/marketing 
interface in a "related-technology and existing-market" type of project is more 
smooth than in a "new- or unrelated-technology and new-market" type of 
project due to the low environmental uncertainties it involved. Nevertheless, it 
is noted that in a "related-technology and existing-market" type of project the 
conflict mainly occurred at the technical level and at the later stage. This 
suggests that not only the technological uncertainty perceived at the planning 
stage, but also the contiguous technical problems occurred at the later stage can 
have an major impact upon the R&D/marketing interface. 
Finally, The case evidence has supported the association between the type of 
conflict and the type of project. In particular, the lack of marketing credibility 
as perceived by R&D and a mutual distrust are more often found in a "new- or 
unrelated-technology and new-market" type of project. It tends to result from 
the inappropriate marketing research techniques and R&D's restricted view of 
the marketing's role. This type of conflict has a serious effect upon the 
effectiveness of the interface. 
These findings arise from three case studies regarding SmithKline Beecham 
Pharmaceuticals. They will be compared with findings from the remaining case 
studies in this research and be further analysed in the cross-case analysis in 
Chapter 9. 
Note : 
1. Patent Expiry Date. 
2. Several years after the launch, a new dosage form was developed, which eliminated the moisture 
sensitivity problem of Augmentin. This new dosage form has given the company an additional three 
years patent protection in most countries. 
150 
CHAPTER 7 THE ICI PHARMACEUTICALS CASE 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
ICI pharmaceuticals is a major subsidiary of one of the world's most diversified 
chemical company - the ICI Group. ICI pharmaceuticals accounts for 50% of 
the group profit and 27% of the turnover. 
Cardiovascular is a strong therapeutic area in ICI pharmaceuticals, generating 
£850 million in sales in 1990. The company's ischaemic heart treatment, 
Inderal, launched in 1965, was the world's first beta-blocker agent. The research 
team was led by Dr. James Black, later to become one of the recipients of the 
1988 Nobel Prize for Medicine. Table 7.1 shows the principal ICI 
pharmaceuticals discoveries since 1960s. 
Table 7.1 Prin cipal ICI Pharmaceuticals Disc overies 1963 - 
1988 
-------------- 
Brand name 
----------------------------- 
Type 
-------------- 
First Launch 
-------------- 
Inderal 
----------------------------- 
beta-blocker 
--------------- 
1965 
Ketrax anthelmintic 1968 
Hibiscrub antiseptic 1971 
Nolvadex anti-oestrogen 1973 
Tenorhain beta-blocker 1976 
Diprivan intravenous anaesthetic 1986 
Zoladex LHRH analogue 1987 
Zestril ACE inhibitor 1988 
Source: ICI Pharmaceuticals 
In the ICI Pharmaceuticals, R&D consists of two separate departments: The 
Research Department and The Development Department. It reflects the 
company's different management philosophy of these two departments. 
According to Mr Bilyard, Manager of the Product Development, 
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"We believe that the research needs more freedom 
in order to provide new opportunities for the 
development. On the other hand, the target of the 
Development Department should be more clearly 
defined and focused" (face-to-face interview, 14th 
March, 1990). 
The structure of the Development Department has been re-organized since 
1990. The new structure are shown in Figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1 The New Structure of Development Department 
Medical Director Marketing Management 
Physicians Project Management 
CRA's Project Planning 
Similar to R&D, marketing in ICI Pharmaceuticals is also divided into two 
departments: Product Strategy Department(PSD) and Marketing Operation 
Department(MOD). Their names reflect precisely their departmental goals and 
responsibilities: strategic versus operational. The PSD is responsible for 
deciding long term marketing strategies for each of the therapeutic areas. On the 
other hand, the POD is responsible for generating market data to back up the 
strategic plan and for implementing the operational plan of the strategy using 
marketing research techniques. Figure 7.2 shows the structure of the PSD. 
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Figure 7.2 The Structure of the Product Stratecrv 
Department 
Head of department 
Health Senior MKG 
Economics Manager 
& Planning CNS 
Manager 
Senior 
Health Planning 
Economist Manager 
Planning MKG Manager 
Manager 
Planning Associate 
Support MKG Manager 
Senior MKG 
Manager 
Anti-infective 
Planning 
Manager 
MKG Manager 
Associate 
MKG Manager 
Senior MKG 
Manager 
Cardiovascular 
Senior 
Planning 
Manager 
MKG Manager 
Associate 
MKG Manager 
In this chapter, three products, which have been developed during the past 
twenty years - Tenormin, Diprivan and Zoladex - are studied. Tenormin 
is a 
much improved beta-blocker. Launched in 1976, it became the world's number 
six best-selling drug in 1990, generated £640 million in sales. Zoladex is a 
cancer treatment and Diprivan is an intravenous anaesthetic. They received the 
Queens award for Technology Achievement in 1978 and 1992 respectively. 
The criteria for choosing the products have been described in Chapter 2, the 
research methodology. The structure of analysis is identical to that in previous 
chapters which focuses on the relationships between the environmental 
constructs, the strategic constructs and the organisational constructs. Tables 7.2 
and 7.3 show the time scales and descriptions of these three products. 
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Table 7.2 Product Develovment Time Scales 
Zoladex Development 
1976 
Diprivan Development 
1974 
Tenormin Development Launch 
1967 1976 
Launch Post market 
1987 (PED: 2000) 
Launch Post market 
1986 (PED: 1998) 
Post market 
(PED: 1991) 
------------------------------------------------- Year 
1960 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 
Table 7.3 Product Descriptions 
Drug Description Innovative level 
Tenormin A Hypertension treatment. Moderate/high. Novel 
The first successful agent in established 
cardio-selective beta- class. 
blocker. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Zoladex The first effective drug High. Novel agent in 
for prostate cancer, with a growing class. 
new delivery system -a 
monthly injection. 
Diprivan An intravenous anaesthetic, Moderate/high. Novel 
its main property is its agent in established 
applicability in all three class. 
anaesthetic situations. 
7.2 THE R&D/MARKETING INTERFACE IN DEVELOPING 
TENORMIN 
7.2.1 Environmental Constructs 
(1) Market Uncertainty 
(i) Market Size (MS) and Market Newness (MN) 
Tenormin was launched in 1976 in the well established cardiovascular market. 
It is the biggest market in the pharmaceutical industry, consisting of four 
segments: hypertension, heart failure, Ischaemic heart, and stroke. 
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(ii) Customer Need Awareness (CNA) and Market Competitiveness (MC) 
Tenormin is a hypertension treatment. Customer need awareness for this kind of 
drug had been relatively low before the drug was launched. Mr Joseph, the 
International Planning Manager for cardiovascular products explained, 
"Hypertension is asymptomatic. The reason for 
treating it is to prevent problems such as heart 
attack later on, which is rather like an insurance 
policy. Patients were reluctant to take any 
medication that would make them feel even worth" 
(face-to face interview, 14th March, 1990). 
However, Tenormin was launched at the time when a debate on the level at 
which hypertension should be treated was intensified, and the trend was both to 
increase treatment and to favour the use of beta-blocker. 
There were several effective hypertension drugs competing with Tenormin, 
including the company's own product, Inderal, Ciba-Geigy's Trasicor and 
Astra's Betaloc. Nonetheless, there were perceptible customer needs for a new 
drug which could offer the customers the benefit of lower side effects and more 
convenience in use. 
(2) Technological Uncertainty 
(i) Cause of Disease (CD) and Mode of Action (MA) 
The cause of hypertension was relatively clear. It is related to the abnormal 
level of ACE (angiotensin-converting enzyme) in the hormonal system. 
Tenormin is the first cardio-selective beta blocker. it has a novel mode of 
action. Its two main properties - cardio-selectivity and hydro-philicity - 
provided the patients with low side effect and a long duration of action. 
(ü) Side Effect (SE) 
One of the major achievements of the Tenorurin project was the drug's low side 
effect, which was extremely important for the asymptomatic hypertension 
treatment. The project succeeded after the company's earlier attempt Eraldim 
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failed due to the incidence of eye problems which occurred in a few patients 
taking the drug. 
(3) Internal Technological and Marketing Strength 
(i) Marketing Expertise (ME) and Company Reputation (CR) 
The company was well-known in the cardiovascular market with its earlier 
success, Inderal, launched in 1965. Although Inderal was not originally 
developed for hypertension, its later application in hypertension market enabled 
the company's marketing expertise in this area to be developed. 
(ii) Research Experience (RE) and Development Experience (DE) 
As noted earlier, Tenormin was the first cardio-selective beta-blocker, a new 
but related agent to the company's earlier product, Inderal. Thus, the company 
had obtained considerable research and development experience in this field. 
7.2.2 Strategic Constructs 
(1) The Corporate Strategic Dimension of the Interface (CSD) 
Tenormin was not given a high priority until its potency was discovered later in 
the development. It was overshadowed by the company's then successful 
cardiovascular product - Inderal. Mr Joseph recalled, 
"Because of Inderal, Tenormin was expected only as 
the second best by the company. The company only 
began to realize the drug's big potential close to the 
launch, and it started to get very involved" (face-to- 
face interview, 14th March, 1991). 
(2) The Corporate Technical Dimension of the Interface (CTD) 
The Tenormin project represented the orientation of the company's 
"incremental" technological strategy. The goal of the project was to develop an 
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improved beta-blocker for treating hypertension after the company's earlier 
success in this area. 
(3) The Product Strategic Dimension of the Interface (PSD) 
The interface activities in this dimension were focused on differentiating 
Tenormin from the existing products in the market. The major task was to 
create the image of Tenormin as a superior product. According to Mr Joseph, 
"competitive strategy was designed to differentiate 
Tenormin from other beta-blockers and to prove 
that its technical advantages, namely the cardio- 
selectivity and hydro philicity, could offer major 
benefit to the customers" (face-to-face interview, 14, 
March, 1991)" 
(4) The Operational Dimension of the Interface (OD) 
Cardiovascular market was the company's traditional market, the marketing 
department had mastered mature data collecting techniques. Quantitative as 
well as qualitative data were collected to support the strategic decision-making 
regarding the product differentiation and competitive analysis. 
(5) The Product Technical Dimension of the Interface (PTD) 
The interface in this dimension was weak before the launch and became close 
and effective after the launch. For example, a new formulation named 
Tenoretic, which combined the new drug and Dinetic, was developed to target 
to a newly identified market needs. Lower dosage was developed to meet new 
customer needs as the trend in the hypertension market was moved towards 
early treatment. 
7.23 Organisational Constructs 
(1) The Interface Coordination Mechanism (ICM) 
There was no formal interface channel at the corporate level in the Tenormin 
project. The interface at the lower level was coordinated through project team. 
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(2) The interface Communication Flow (ICF) and Interface Conflict (IC) 
The communication between R&D and marketing was relatively effective, and 
no major conflict was reported during this process. According to Mr Joseph, 
"We had frequent discussion with the clinical people 
at the pre-launch stage regarding the drug's 
technical advantages and their benefit to the 
customers, which was rather frui u" (face-to-face interview, 10th September 1991. ý) 
(3) Relative Influence of R&D and Marketing (RIRM) 
The initiative of Tenorurin research programme was the technical people who 
had great interest and faith in beta-blocker and were motivated to prove it. 
Research remained the main drive till the pre-launch stage, where the corporate 
management and marketing began to exert a stronger influence. The drug's 
market potential was largely exploited at the post market development stage, 
where market became a main driving force. 
7.2.4 The Innovation Performance 
(1) Development Speed 
Tenormin development programme took eight years, which were the industry's 
average time for drug development. 
(2) Innovative Level (IL) 
Tenormin is a cardio-selective beta blocker for hypertension treatment. It is a 
novel agent in an established class. The innovative level was moderate high, 
and the drug was perceived by the customer as superior in meeting customer 
needs. 
(3) Sales 
The commercial success of Tenormin was achieved gradually within a period of 
ten years. Launched in 1976, by 1990, it generated £630 million in sales and 
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became the world's number six best-selling drug. It was developed into four 
major indications. It's success is much higher than the company's original 
forecast of peak sales of £ 100 million. 
7.2.5 Summary 
As noted earlier, the same measures are used in every drug innovation case to 
assess the three research constructs defined in the theoretical framework. The 
assessment is presented in Tables 7.4 to 7.7. The results will be compared with 
other case results in the cross-case analysis in Chapter 9. 
(1) Assessment 
Table 7.4 Assessment of the Environmental Constructs in 
the Tenormin Project 
Market Technological Internal Marketing & 
Uncertainty Uncertainty Technological Expertise 
MS MN CNA MC Score CD MA SE Score ME CR RE DE Score 
00123110222217 
Table 7.5 Assess ment of the Strategic Co nstructs in the 
R&D/Marketing I nterface in t he Tenormin Project 
-------------- --------------- 
CSD CTD 
------------- ----------- 
PSD 
----- 
OD PTD 
- --------------- 
effective, 
------------- 
not present, 
----------- 
highly 
----------------- - 
effective weak 
but relatively top effective before 
later, when management in product launch. 
top management provided a differentiation. 
began to get direction. 
involved. 
--------------------------------------------- 
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Tile 7.6 Assessment of the Organizational Constructs in 
The Tenorurin Protect 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
ICM ICF IC RIRM 
no formal mechanism 
at the corporate 
level; project team 
at the lower level. 
relatively relatively 
effective smooth. 
at the pre- 
launch stage. 
mainly research 
driven. But the 
top management 
and marketing 
had a stronger 
at pre-launch 
stage. 
Table 7.7 Assessment of the Innovation Performance 
DT DS Innovative Superiority Sales, £bn 
(yrs) 
----------- 
Level 
-------------- 
5th yr 
-------------------------- 
15th yr 
------- 
8 relatively moderate high, Superior in 0.63 
slow novel agent in meeting customer 
an established needs. 
class. 
(2) Preliminary Discussion 
Similar to Glaxo's Serevent and SKB's Augmentin, Tenormin was a "related- 
technology and existing-market" type of product. It is most notable for its 
similarity to the company's existing products and its closeness to the existing 
markets, which are reflected by the high internal expertise (scoring 7 out of 8). 
Both market uncertainty and technological uncertainty for this project were 
relatively low, scoring 3 out of 8 and 2 out of 6 respectively (see Table 7.4). 
However, the market uncertainty for the Tenormin project was comparatively 
high than the two similar projects mentioned above, because of the high market 
competitiveness the project faced. Nevertheless, there was a good balance 
between the market uncertainty, the technological uncertainty, the internal 
expertise and the commercial attractiveness of the product. Similar to the 
Serevent project, the communication between R&D and marketing was 
relatively effective and smooth. No major conflict was reported. 
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However, unlike the other similar projects, the project was mainly research- 
driven, and the R&D/marketing interface started later in this project. This seems 
to suggest an association between a driving force of research and a later 
starting time for the interface, in addition to the association between a high 
technological uncertainty and a research-driven project, which has been 
suggested by the earlier case study results. 
The interface was most effective in the PSD and OD before launch, and was 
extended to most dimensions at the post market stage when the sales of the drug 
were gradually increasing. This suggests a link between a high drug innovation 
performance and an effective R&D/marketing interface. In other words, a lack 
of corporate involvement and marketing involvement at the early stage had 
resulted in a delayed recognition as well as a delayed realization of the product's 
commercial potential. 
7.3 THE R&D/MARKETING INTERFACE IN DEVELOPING 
DIPRIVAN 
7.3.1 Environmental Constructs 
(1) Market Uncertainty 
(i) Market Size (MS) and Market Newness (MN) 
Diprivan, launched in 1986, was targeted at the well established anaesthetics 
segment within Central Nerves System (CNS) market. Anaesthetics are used by 
anaesthetists in hospital for three purposes. The first one is to put a patient to 
sleep before an operation begins; the second is to maintain the sleep status of 
the patient for certain length of time according to the requirement of the 
operation; and the third is for Intensive Care Unit (ICU). 
(ii) Customer Need Awareness (CNA) and Market Competitiveness (MC) 
there were several major competitors, including thiopetone, an off-patent drug, 
Abbot's Isoslurane and Roche's Midazolom. However, although these drugs 
were very effective in each individual area, none could be used in the same way 
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as Diprivan for all three areas. Therefore, with its important three-in-one 
property, Diprivan was welcomed by the anaesthetists. 
(2) Technological Uncertainty 
(i) Mode of Action (MA) 
Diprivan is a intravenous anaesthetic. Its main ingredient is a chemical 
substance called propofol. Propofol was discovered in the research laboratory of 
having an encouraging anaesthetic property, which, however, has poor water 
solubility. A formulation (Cremophor EL) was therefore developed to solve this 
problem. As indicated earlier, the drug also had a three-in-one property, which 
was realized just before the launch. 
(ii) Side Effect (SE) 
In few patients, Diprivan may cause anaphylactoid reactions. According to ICI 
sources, in a clinical trial programme, anaphylactoid reactions were reported in 
five patients anaesthetised with propofol. 
(3) Internal Technological and Marketing Strength 
(i) Marketing Expertise (ME) and Company Reputation (CR) 
Anaesthetic market was not new for ICI. Before Diprivan, the company had 
successfully developed an inhalational anaesthetic named Fluothane. Thus the 
company had achieved a good reputation in this area. 
(ii) Research Experience (RE) and Development Experience (DE) 
Having developed an inhalational anaesthetic, the company had gained 
considerable experiences in the anaesthetic market. However, new technical 
challenge regarding the drug's solubility confronted the technical staff in their 
attempt to develop the company's first injectable anaesthetic. 
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7.3.2 Strategic Constructs 
(1) Corporate Strategic Dimension of the Interface (CSD) 
The Diprivan project was evaluated against the company's long term strategic 
plan at the planning stage. However, the corporate management was not highly 
involved thereafter. 
(2) Corporate Technical Dimension of the Interface (CTD) 
The Diprivan project was another manifestation of the company's "incremental" 
technological strategy following the Tenormin. Furthermore, the corporate 
management was able to quickly adapt the opportunity emerged during the 
research process. According to Dr Costello, Manager of Pharmaceutical 
Development Department for CNS Product, 
" After the launch of our earlier inhalational 
anaesthetic - Fluothane, the company's initial plan 
was to develop an improved inhalational 
anaesthetic. As the research proceeded, more 
information were available, the company made the 
central decision to switch to finding an injectable 
anaesthetic" (telephone interview, 21st May, 1991). 
Critical information and input had been received from both marketing and R&D 
in making this decision. 
(3) Product Strategic Dimension of the Interface (PSD) 
R&D and marketing cooperated closely at the pre-launch stage to utilise the 
drug's "three-in-one" property that they had realised to convince the customers 
the superiority of the new drug to the existing ones. 
(4) Operational Dimension of the Interface (OD) 
Market research was highly effective, apart from the company's own marketing 
department, external expertise were used for marketing research and 
promotional campaign for the U. K. market and overseas markets. For instance, 
a marketing company called Price Waterhouse Urwick conducted a survey 
analysing the size of the market for anaesthetic in Australia. 
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(5) Product Technical Dimension of the Interface (PTD) 
Difficult technical problems regarding the new compound's solubility and 
stability prevailed at the later development stage, and marketing was not highly 
involved to provide assistance to the technical problem-solving. 
However, the interface became close at post market stage in developing new 
indications for the drug, and included a new indication for patients aged 16 and 
under in the intensive care unit. 
7.3.3 Organizational Constructs 
(1) Interface Coordination Mechanism (ICM) 
Since 1985, the structure of ICI Pharmaceuticals had been re-organised. When 
Diprivan was being developed, formal interface mechanisms were established at 
the corporate level, including Board Meeting, New Product Development 
Committee (NPDC) and Medical Marketing Strategic Plan (MMSP). They were 
responsible for interface activities at various innovation stages (see Figure 7.3) 
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Figure 7.3 The Formal Corporate Interface Mechanism 
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Developing target 
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-1 
MMSP (Medical 
Marketing 
Strategic 
Plan) 
Further defining the 
target profile; conductinc 
more detailed marketing 
research on the market 
penetration, market share 
and financial forecast, 
interacting within not 
between therapeutic areas. 
Maximize the commercial 
attractiveness 
Similar to the Tenormin project, the Diprivan project also had a multi- 
functional project team. 
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(2) The Interface Communication Flow (ICF) and Interface Conflict (IC) 
The communication flow pattern between R&D and marketing was irregular. It 
was frequent during the later research stage and early development stage, and 
during the product launch. According to Dr Costello, 
"We communicated well with the marketing 
department during the product launch, through 
various channels. These included both formal and 
informal meetings 3-4 times a week, an electronic 
mailing system, and participation on each other's 
seminars" (telephone interview, 21, May, 1990). 
However, conflict occurred during the later development stage when marketing 
felt being pushed away by R&D, and were dissatisfied with R&D's prolonged 
time scale. 
(3) Relative influence of R&D and Marketing (RIRM) 
The development of an improved inhalational anaesthetic was stressed in the 
corporate plan. The R&D/marketing interface in the corporate dimension was 
close and effective in adapting emerging opportunity in the research laboratory. 
However, the process became more R&D dominant at the development stage 
when the main focus shifted to deal with the technical difficulties derived from 
the drug's poor solubility. 
7.3.4 The Innovation Performance 
(1) Development Speed (DS) 
The development programme of Diprivan lasted for approximately eleven 
years, which were much longer than the industry's average of eight years. 
(2) Innovative level (IL) 
Diprivan was a novel agent in an established class. The innovative level was 
scored moderate/high, and it was perceived by the customers as being superior 
to the competing drugs. 
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(3) Sales 
Diprivan's unique advantage of "three-in-one" was not realized until the pre- 
launch stage. Its sales revenue was gradually built up during a course of six 
years, and in 1991, the sales figure exceeded the original peak sales forecasting 
of £ 107 million when there were still several new markets for the drug's launch 
including Japan. The drug is likely to become the world number one 
anaesthetic. 
7.3.5 Summary 
In this section, the Diprivan case is assessed in the same way as in the previous 
cases. The assessments on the environmental constructs, strategic constructs 
and organisational constructs are shown in Tables 7.8 to 7.11. The results will 
be compared and further analysed in Chapter 9. 
Table 7.8 Assessment of the Environmental Constructs in 
the Divrivan Project 
Market Technological Internal Technological 
Uncertainty Uncertainty & Marketing Expertise 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
MS MN CNA MC Score CD MA SE Score ME CR RE DE Score 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
10023011222116 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 7.9 Assessment of the Strategic Constructs of the 
R&D/Marketing Interface in the Diorivan Project 
CSD CTD PSD OD PTD 
present 
but the top 
management 
was not 
involved. 
highly effective 
in adopting 
emerging 
opportunities 
arising from 
the research 
laboratory. 
highly effective highly weak 
in designing effective 
launching 
strategy. 
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Table 7.10 Assessment of the Organisational Constructs in 
the DiDrivan Project 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
ICM ICF IC RIM 
New Product Relatively 
Development frequent. 
Committee, 
Medical Marketing 
Strategic Plan 
and Project Team. 
innovation. 
Marketing's 
dissatisfaction 
of R&D's time 
scales. 
A close link 
at the early 
stage, but 
research driven 
at the later 
stage. 
Table 7.11 Assessment of the Innovation Performance 
DT DS Innovation Superiority Sales, fbn 
(yrs) Level 10th yr 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
11 Slow moderate/high Advantageous, 0.2 (estimate) 
novel agent in meeting customers' 
established needs better than 
class. competing products. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
(2) Preliminary Discussion 
Similar to the company's earlier hypertension drug, Tenormin, Diprivan was 
another "related-technology and existing-market" type of project. The internal 
expertise in developing the drug was relatively high, scoring 6 out of 8. 
The scores for both market uncertainty and technological uncertainty in this 
project were identical to those in the Tenormin project. They were scored at 3 
out of 8 and 2 out of 6 respectively (see Table 7.8). However, unlike the 
Tenorurin project, the Diprivan project was more research-driven at the later 
development stage due to the prevalence of drug's technical problems. As a 
result, the communication between R&D and marketing was not smooth, and a 
dissatisfaction of marketing with R&D's prolonged time scale was reported. 
This seems to support the previous finding that the technical difficulties, which 
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occurred in the Diprivan project as well as in the Augmentin projects, limited 
effective cooperation between R&D and marketing. 
The interface was most effective in the CTD, PSD and OD. The interface in the 
CSD was effective at the idea stage to provide important commercial input for 
the direction of the research. However, the corporate management was not 
highly involved in the major part of the innovation process. This seems to 
support the previous finding that corporate management involvement in a 
project is positively related to the development speed of the project. 
7.4 THE R&D/MARKETING INTERFACE IN DEVELOPING 
ZOLADEX 
7.4.1 Environmental Constructs 
(1) Market Uncertainty 
(i) Market Size (MS) and Market Newness (MN) 
Statistics from the World Health Organization (WHO) demonstrate that 19% of 
the deaths are caused by cancer, the second largest cause of death after 
cardiovascular disease. Of all cancers, lung cancer is the most common 
followed by colorectal, breast and prostate cancer. 
Zoladex was developed to treat prostate cancer. The average prostate patient is 
elderly - typical age at diagnosis is about 70. Each year in the U. K., there are 
11,000 new cases of prostate cancer, 7,600 death directly caused by prostate 
cancer. 
The most common method of treatment at that time was surgical castration 
which remains effective in treating the disease. ICI was the first to the prostate 
market with a effective drug treatment, Zoladex, launched in 1987. 
(ii) Customer Need Awareness (CNA) and Market Competitiveness (MC) 
Although surgical castration was effective, a number of patients felt that a 
kinder, less invasive alternative would be welcomed. Meanwhile other 
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companies were also active in this area, daily injections and nasal sprays had 
been newly developed. Thus, ICI was confronting both non-pharmaceutical and 
pharmaceutical competitors. According to Mr. Pleuvry, the Marketing Manager 
for Zoladex, 
" In spite of the recent development from the other 
companies, we felt that we could launch a product 
more suited to Market needs. For example, nasal 
sprays, which, whilst an advantage over daily 
injections, still seemed to leave an aspect of 
convenience to be desired" (telephone interview, 
28th May, 1991). 
(2) Technological uncertainty 
(i) Cause of disease (CD) and Mode of Action (MA) 
The cause of prostate cancer was not very clear. it was found however, the 
secretion of a chemical substance called gonadotrophin in the pituitary was 
responsible for the development of hormone-responsive tissues including 
prostate turnouts. 
Zoladex has a novel mode of action. It is an LHRH (Luteinising Hormone- 
Releasing Hormone) agonist. Although natural LHRH has an effect on 
hormone-responsive tissues including mammary and prostate tumours, the 
effect is largely limited by the rapid degradation of the peptide and the need for 
frequent parenteral dosing. Therefore, Zoladex was synthesized with increased 
stability and potency. When given by the intramuscular or intravenous routes 
Zoladex is 100 times as potent as LHRH. 
(ii) Side Effect (SE) 
Zoladex was a relatively safe drug with a low side effect. 
(3) Internal Technological and Marketing Strength 
(i) Marketing Experience (ME) and Company reputation (CP) 
Zoladex was the company's first attempt in the prostate cancer market. 
Moreover, it was also the first pharmaceutical treatment in this market. 
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Consequently, the marketing expertise of the company in this area was not well 
established. Nevertheless, the company had achieved a good reputation because 
of its earlier success in the breast cancer area. 
(ii) Research Experience (RE) and Development Experience (DE) 
Although Zoladex was the first drug in the prostate cancer market, the company 
had successfully developed breast cancer treatment. As a result, the company 
had possessed some research and development experience. 
7.4.2 Strategic Constructs 
(1) The Corporate Dimension of the Interface (CSD & CTD) 
The corporate management had emphasised the strategic importance of a new 
anti-cancer drug for the company's long-term growth. However, the target was 
set for a lung cancer treatment, rather than a prostate cancer treatment, since 
lung cancer presented the largest category in the cancer market. According to 
Mr Pleuvry, 
"Ideally we would have developed products for lung 
cancer and colorectal cancer, but at that particular 
time there were no very obvious leads, whereas by 
contrast the research lead became available in 
prostate cancer" (telephone interview, 28, May, 
1990). 
Because Zoladex was discovered unexpectedly, it's potential had not been 
thoroughly evaluated at the corporate level in either strategic or technical 
dimensions. Moreover, it was not given high priority and the R&D/marketing 
interface was minimum. As a result, except for the general understanding that 
cancer was the company's traditional and strong area, little has been done at this 
level to assess the balance between the drug's commercial attractiveness and the 
technical risks it entailed in this particular area - the prostate cancer area. 
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(3) The Product Strategic Dimension of the Interface (PSD) 
Because the discovery of Zoladex by the research was beyond the company's 
original plan, extensive market assessment was carried out under the 
collaboration of R&D and marketing. According to Mr Pleuvry, 
"We were asked to describe the market 
characteristics and to state the profile for Zoladex. 
After extensive marketing research, we decided that 
the new drug should have an objective response 
equivalent to castration, would provide a speedy 
onset, long duration, few side effects, convenient 
dosage and a good quality of life" (telephone 
interview, 28, May, 1990). 
In addition, R&D and marketing cooperated in developing promotional 
materials. Because the customers are specialists, an ethical and scientific 
approach was needed to convince them the efficacy, safety and convenience of 
the drug in comparison with surgery. All promotional materials have been 
written, designed, tested, revised and approved for technical accuracy and 
ethical content. Frequent interaction between marketing, medical development 
and pharmaceutical departments occurred in accomplishing this task. 
(4) The Operational Dimension of the Interface (OD) 
Zoladex was launched in a new market. As a result, the marketing department 
encountered difficulties in acquiring market data. According to Mr. Pleuvry, 
"one of the most difficult aspects of the marketing 
research is trying to predict how much it will be 
sold, therefore the decision of what size factory to 
build, especially in a new market where there were 
few quantitative market data available. We built a 
computer spreadsheet model which simulated 
epidemiological and market trends in order to 
estimate the flow of patients to the new treatment" 
(telephone interview, 28th May, 1990) 
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(5) The Product Technical Dimension of the Interface (PTD) 
One of the distinguishing features of Zoladex was its new delivery system, and 
the market implication of this had been identified by the marketing department. 
However, the technical problems later occurred in developing this system 
became such a dominant issue in the project team that the market aspect of the 
drug innovation was largely neglected. 
7.4.3 Organizational Constructs 
(1) Interface Coordination Mechanism (ICM) 
As described in the Diprivan project, the company's structure had been re- 
organized since 1985. Formal interface mechanisms were established at the 
corporate level, including Board Meeting, New Product Development 
Committee (NPDC) and Medical Marketing Strategic Plan (MMSP). They were 
responsible for interface activities at various innovation stages. However, 
because Zoladex was discovered unexpectedly at the later exploratory stage, the 
corporate interface in this project was coordinated through the MMSP only. 
(2) The Interface Communication Flows (ICF) and Interface Conflict (IC) 
The communication between R&D and marketing was frequent. However, 
some personnel in the marketing department expressed a dissatisfaction with 
R&D's prolonged development time scale, which they believed partly resulting 
from the lack of a sense of urgency. 
(3) Relative influence of R&D and Marketing (RIRM) 
The Zoladex project was an unexpected result from the corporate plan of 
developing a lung cancer or a colorectal cancer drug. The development process 
was similar to a research-driven project, where marketing's job was to find the 
commercial application for a research-initiated product idea. Nevertheless, the 
company's R&D and marketing collaborated closely during this process, and 
none had a dominant influence. 
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The interface at the later development stage became more R&D dominant, 
where the main challenge was the realization of the drug's new delivery 
systeml. 
7.4.4 The Innovation Performance 
(1) Development Speed (DS) 
The development programme took eleven years, which was much longer than 
the industry's average of eight years. 
(2) Innovative Level 
Zoladex was a novel agent in a growing class with a new delivery system. Its 
innovative level was high, and it won the Queens Award for technology 
achievement in 1990. However, the drug was not perceived by the customers as 
superior to other treatments. 
(3) Sales 
In 1991 four years after the launch, it generated merely £50 million in sales. ICI 
pharmaceutical's marketing people are still working hard to put the figure up. 
7.4.5 Summary 
In this section, the assessment of the research constructs in relation to the 
Zoladex case is presented in Tables 7.12 to 7.15. The same measures described 
in the previous chapters are used. The result will be compared and further 
analysed in Chapter 9. 
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(1) Assessment 
Table 7.12 Assessment of the Envir 
the Zoladex Protect 
---------------------------------- 
Market Technological 
Uncertainty Uncertainty 
---------------------------------- 
MS MN CNA MC Score CD MA SE Score 
---------------------------------- 
121151203 
---------------------------------- 
onmental 
Internal 
& Market 
ME CR 
01 
Constructs in 
-------------- 
Technological 
ing Expertise 
-------------- 
RE DE Score 
-------------- 
113 
-------------- 
Table 7.13 Assessment of the Strategic Constructs in the 
R&D/Marketing Interface in the Zoladex Project 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
CSD & CTD PSD OD 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
minimal interface, close and effective, difficulty in 
and a low priority esp. in developing the obtaining 
project. drug's target profile quantitative 
and in generating data. 
promotional materials. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 7.14 Assessment of the Organisational Constructs in 
the Zoladex Protect 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
ICM ICF IC RIRM 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Medical Marketing Frequent Marketing's Close link 
Strategic Plan within the dissatisfaction in the 
(MMSP) at the project team. with R&D's strategic 
corporate level, time scales dimension, 
and project team scales. but R&D 
at the lower level. dominated 
in the 
technical 
dimension. 
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Table 7.15 Assessment of the Innovation Performance 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
DT DS Innovative 
(yrs) Level 
Superiority Sales, £bn 
4th yr 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
11 Slow High. Novel agent It was not perceived 0.05 
in growing class, by the customers as 
and a new delivery superior to the existing 
system. treatment. 
(2) Preliminary Discussion 
Zoladex was the first effective pharmaceutical treatment in anti-prostate cancer 
market. Its development involved the discovery of new scientific knowledge in 
cancer treatment beyond the firm's technological base. Therefore the Zoladex 
project was a "new-technology and new-market" type of project. The Zoladex 
case illustrate the fact that, unlike other products, pharmaceutical products 
cannot be developed to order. It was the prostate cancer area that showed a clear 
research lead when the company desperately wanted a breakthrough in lung 
cancer area. 
Both the market uncertainty and technological uncertainty in Zoladex 
development were moderate high, scoring 5 out of 8 and 3 out of 6 respectively. 
Meanwhile, the company's internal technological and marketing expertise was 
relatively low, scoring 2 out of 8. 
The commercial aspect of the drug (moderate sized market, existence of 
effective treatment, etc. ) could not justify the highly demanding development 
effort that the company had to make (big investment over a long period of time, 
overcome difficult technical problems and develop new delivery system, etc. ). 
The R&D/marketing interface was effective in the PSD, where a close 
collaboration between R&D and marketing was achieved. However, this 
delayed effort did not seem to be big enough to compensate the lack of the 
interface in the CSD and CTD, which had failed to address a crucial balance 
between the commercial attractiveness and the development risk of the project. 
Similar to the Diprivan case, this case shows a connection between the interface 
effectiveness and the contiguous technical problems occurred during the later 
176 
stage of development. Although communication was relatively frequent, 
Marketing's dissatisfaction with R&D's prolonged time scales was reported. On 
the whole, the innovation performance of Zoladex was not satisfactory both in 
terms of the slow development speed and the low sales revenue. 
The case study confirms a positive association between the lack of corporate 
management commitment and low development speed. Moreover, this case 
strongly supports the previous finding that the R&D/marketing interface is most 
critical in the corporate dimension at the early planning stage. 
Finally, this case has posed a question to be answered - what measures should 
be taken to deal with those unexpected research findings that are beyond the 
company's original strategic plan? 
7.5 FINAL ANALYSIS 
Unlike Glaxo, which is a concentrated ethical pharmaceutical company, or 
SmithKline Beecham, which is a diversified pharmaceutical company, ICI 
pharmaceuticals is a major subsidiary of a large chemical company. 
Cardiovascular is a strong therapeutic area in ICI pharmaceuticals. There were 
two separate departments within ICI pharmaceuticals R&D: Research 
Department and Development Department. Similar to R&D, marketing in ICI 
Pharmaceuticals is also divided into two departments: Product Strategy 
Department(PSD) and Marketing Operation Department(MOD). Their names 
reflect precisely their departmental goals and responsibilities: strategic versus 
operational. 
The three drugs studied in this chapter are Tenormin, a hypertension treatment, 
Diprivan, an intravenous anaesthetic and Zoladex, a prostate cancer treatment. 
The first two belong to a "related-technology and existing-market" type and the 
last one belongs to a "new-technology and new-market" type of project. The 
driving forces of the three projects were not a clear cut of either research or 
market. The Tenormin project for example was research-driven until the pre- 
launch stage and became market-driven since then till the post market stage. 
The Zoladex and Diprivan projects on the other hand, were more market-driven 
at the early stage, and became more research-driven at the later stage. Their 
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innovation performance also varied extensively with Tenorurin being a great 
success, Diprivan being a moderate success and Zoladex staying as a question 
mark. 
Similar to the previous chapters, in this section, an effort is made to relate the 
findings of this chapter to the three research propositions defined in Chapter 3, 
"The Research Theoretical Framework". These are concerned with the 
relationships between the strategic constructs, the environmental constructs and 
the organisational constructs. 
The research proposition 1 postulates the existence of the R&D/marketing 
interface in one or more of the five dimensions described in Box 3. The three 
case studies have all demonstrated the existence of these interface dimensions. 
In particular, the interface was present in the CSD, PSD and OD in the 
Tenormin project, in the CSD, CTD, PSD and OD in the Diprivan project, and 
in the PSD and OD in the Zoladex project. However, the results reveal that the 
R&D/marketing interface was still weak in both the CTD and PTD. 
Furthermore the research proposition 2 hypothesizes a direct relationship 
between the environmental constructs and the strategic constructs of the 
interface. The case studies in this chapter have supported this proposition. In 
particular, the case evidence suggests that in a "related-technology and existing 
market" type of project, where the external uncertainty is lower and the internal 
expertise is higher, the interface is generally more effective in most dimensions. 
Moreover, the case studies illustrate that unlike other products, pharmaceutical 
products cannot be developed to order. Therefore, a constant interface in the 
CSD and CTD is most important to adapting emergent situations in the 
unpredictable drug research. 
In addition, the interface effectiveness in the PTD tends to be negatively 
affected not only by the new-market and new- or unrelated-technology 
situation, but also by the contiguous technical problems raised during the 
development stage. This contiguous technical problem also has a negative effect 
upon the interface communication effectiveness. This finding revealed a direct 
relationship between the organizational constructs and the strategic constructs, 
which is postulated in the research proposition 3. The most commonly occurred 
interface conflict is marketing's dissatisfaction of R&D's Prolonged time scales. 
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The case studies' results suggest a link between the strategic constructs of the 
R&D/marketing interface and the innovation performance. The lack of 
corporate involvement is also found to be responsible for communication 
difficulty and slow development speed. 
Finally, the case studies reveal that drug differentiation by means of delivery 
systems, dosage forms and so on often involve technical difficulties, some of 
them take long time to overcome. Consequently, a successful technical-based 
drug differentiation becomes an effective entry barrier. The findings indicate 
that the contiguous technical problems also increase the technological 
uncertainty of a drug innovation project. They affect the R&D/marketing 
interface in that the marketing people are uncertain about what messages they 
should deliver to the customers concerning the product's feature, performance 
and delivery time. 
Note 
1. A biodegradable, sustained release formulation which would deliver the drug over a period of at least 
28 days. 
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CHAPTER 8 THE WELLCOME CASE 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Similar to Glaxo, Wellcome is a research-based pharmaceutical company. The 
company was established in London in 1880 by two American pharmacists, 
Burroughs and Wellcome. In 1936, Wellcome's ownership was left to The 
Wellcome trust -a charity body. The trust owned 100% of the company shares. 
All the incomes they received as a result of this were donated to medical 
research and the maintenance of research museums. Table 8.1 lists a series of 
the company's important discoveries in ethical pharmaceuticals. 
Table 8.1 Principal Wellcome Discoveries 1968 - 1990 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Brand name Generic name Type First launch 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Imuran 
Septrin 
Zovirax 
Tracrium 
Retrovir 
Azathioprine 
Cotrimoxazole 
ACiclovir 
Atracrium 
besylate 
Zidovudine 
Immune suppressant 1963 
anti-infective 1968 
Antiviral 1981 
muscle relaxant 1982 
Antiviral 1987 
In 1985, a new holding company was formed called Wellcome plc. Since then, 
25% of the Wellcome Trust's original shares were issued through the 
International Stock Exchange. Wellcome plc is now the UK-based parent of a 
group of human health care companies which include The Wellcome 
Foundation Ltd, Wellcome Diagnostics Ltd and Calmic International Ltd. The 
company employs 19,000 people world-wide, 18% of whom are engaged in 
research and development. Its business includes both ethical pharmaceuticals 
and over-the-counter (OTC) medicine. Table 8.2 shows the financial highlights 
of the company. 
180 
Table 8.2 The Financial Highlights of Wellcome plc 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
1991 1990 1989 
Turnover 1,606 1,469 1,254 
Research and development 230 221 182 
expenditure 
Profit on ordinary 403 315 283 
activities before taxation 
The new holding company, Wellcome plc, has re-organized its structure. The 
purpose is to build up a more coordinated central system, especially between 
the UK headquarter and the US subsidiary - Burroughs Wellcome. Mr 
Heightman, the Strategic Business Manager for Antiviral Products noted that 
"Before the re-organization, the company's 
structure was very fragmented, and our research 
effort had been spread too thinly. There was some 
unnecessary duplication of activities as a result of a 
lack of coordination between us and the highly 
autonomous US subsidiary" (face-to-face interview, 
3rd August, 1991). 
Liaison groups are formed at every stage of the development process to 
coordinate research and development activities between the U. K. headquarter 
and the U. S. subsidiary. The new structure of the R&D Department in the UK is 
illustrated in Figure 8.1. 
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Einure 8.1 Research. Development and Medical (RD&M)1 
Structure (-UK) 
Director RD&M 
Dr TM Jones 
Research Technical Medical Product 
Division Development Science Development 
Division Division Division 
Chemistry Pharmaceutical Clinical Project 
Pharmacology Chemical Pharmacology Management 
Molecular Analytical Research Regulatory 
Cell Biology. Development. Investigation affairs 
Source: Wellcome. 
Drug Safety 
Evaluation 
Division 
Toxicology 
Pathology, 
etc. 
Meanwhile the company's Group Marketing Department is organized under 
three main therapeutic areas, i. e. Anti-Herpes, Anti-Infective and 
CV/CNS/ANA. This new marketing structure reflects the new holding 
company's concentration strategy, which focuses on the anti-herpes and anti- 
AIDS markets (see Figure 8.2). 
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Fiaure 8.2 Grouv Marketina Structure 
Director of Group 
Marketing 
Administration 
Manager 
Scientific Commercial Anti-Herpes 
Adviser Manager SBt Manager 
I T_ 
Marketing Product Mgr 
Controller Genital 
Herpes 
Manager 
Business Product Mgr 
Analysis Shingles 
Adviser Manager SBt Manager 
Marketing Product Mgr 
Controller Genital 
Herpes 
Health 
Economist 
Anti-Infective 
SB Manager 
Product Mgr 
Retrovir I 
Product Mgr Product Mgr 
Shingles Retrovir II 
Product Mgr Product Mgr 
Chicken Pox Other Virus 
CV/CNS/ANA 
SB Manager 
Product Mgr 
Anaesthesia 
Product Mgr 
Cancer 
Product Mgr 
Cardio. 
Product Mgr 
CNS 
Wellcome has established its leading position in the antiviral therapeutic area 
since the early 1980s with its antiherpetic product, Zovirax and AIDS treatment, 
Retrovir. They together account for 37% of the group total turnover in 1990. Mr 
Heightman, the Strategic Business Manager for Antiviral Products, emphasized 
the positive affect of the company's charity background on its research 
achivement: 
"Because the company did not have to endure 
intense financial pressure from the stock market and 
the investors, it was able to engage in more 
fundamental research in some of the most 
challenging areas such as antiviral research. As a 
result we gained extensive expertise and a leading 
position in those areas (face-to-face interview, 3rd 
August, 1991). 
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This chapter is intended to study closely the R&D/marketing interface in the 
development of the three pharmaceutical products: Zovirax, an antiherpetic 
product, Retrovir, an AIDS treatment and Lamictal, an antiepileptic product. 
The criteria for selecting product samples have been described in Chapter 2, the 
research methodology. The R&D/marketing interface during the innovation 
processes of these three drugs is examined using the three groups of constructs, 
i. e. environmental, strategic and organizational constructs. Table 8.3 and Table 
8.4 show the time scales and descriptions of these three products. 
Table 8.3 Product Development Time Scales 
Lamictal Development 
1978 
Retrovir Development 
1983 
Zevirax Development Launch 
1974 1981 
Launch Post market 
1991 (PED: 2006) 
Launch Post market 
1987 (PED: 2002) 
Post market 
(PED: 1997) 
----------------------------------------------------- Year 
1965 70 75 80 85 90 95 
Table 8.4 Product Descriptions 
Drug Description Innovative Level 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Zovirax The first selective antiviral drug Very high, a 
for herpes treatment. The world's novel agent 
number eighteen best-selling drug in new class. 
in 1990, generating £471M in Sales. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Retrovir The first antiretrovir agent for Very high, a 
AIDS and earlier HIV infections. bio-tech drug. 
It can delay the development of First entrant 
AIDS, but has high side effects. ina new class. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Lamictal A new antiepileptic drug, but Moderate high, 
is only passed as an add-on a new agent in 
treatment with existing drugs. established 
class. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
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8.2 THE R&D/MARKETING INTERFACE IN DEVELOPING 
ZOVIRAX 
8.2.1 Environmental Constructs 
(1) Market Uncertainty 
(i) Market Size (MS) and Market Newness (MN) 
Zovirax was the first effective treatment for herpes infections. Thus, it was 
difficult to evaluate the market size. The company's original market forecast of 
£15 million was later proved to have significantly underestimated the real 
market potential. The most recent major indication of Zovirax was launched in 
1989 for the treatment of shingles - or herpes zoster infection - which has a 
large market. 
(ii) Customer Need Awareness (CNA) and Market Competitiveness (MC) 
When Zovirax was first launched in 1981, the need for an anti-herpes treatment 
was low, owing to the following two factors: 
(a) the infrequent occurrence of herpes infections - an average of 
twice a year for one doctor - caused diagnosis difficulty; 
(b) the patients' reluctance in seeking treatment for certain herpes 
infections. 
Meanwhile, there was no competition in the market when Zovirax was first 
launched, and this situation has not changed since then. In spite of several 
research attempts from competitors to develop new anti-viral drug, the technical 
barrier was proved too high to overcome. Bristol-Myers Squibb for example 
developed two anti-herpes compounds, but they were both failed in toxicity test. 
(2) Technological Uncertainty 
(i) Cause of Disease (CD) and Mode of Action (MA) 
Herpes infections are caused by herpes viruses, they include: 
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(a) herpes simplex virus: cold sores, herpes keratitis, genital 
herpes, and 
(b) varicella-zoster virus: chicken pox, shingles. 
There was more scientific knowledge on the herpes simplex viruses than on the 
varicella-zoster virus, and exactly what triggers an attack of shingles is not 
known. 
Zovirax has an unique and highly selective mode of action. Herpes viruses 
replicate in the human body by incorporating a substance called 
deoxyguanosine into the viral DNA chain. Zovirax is an acyclic analogue of 
deoxyguanosine that prevents such an incorporation. 
(ii) Side Effect (SE) 
Zovirax has high antiviral activity and low cellar toxicity. It prevents the virus 
from replicating, but does not destroy the normal cells of the human body. 
Thus, its side effect is low. 
(3) Internal Technological and Marketing Strength 
(i) Marketing Expertise (ME) and Company Reputation (CR) 
The company's marketing department had no experience in the antiherpes 
market neither did any other companies. However, the company had a good 
reputation as an innovator in general. 
(ii) Research Experience (RE) and Development Experience (DE) 
Wellcome did not have development experience in the antiherpes market. 
Nevertheless, the research team had several first class scientists who were 
specialists in the related areas. 
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8.2.2 Strategic Constructs 
(1) Corporate Dimension of the Interface (CSD & CTD) 
Antiviral research was one of the most challenging research programmes 
carried out by the company. These programmes had resulted from the 
company's then technological policy of pursuing scientific excellence. 
However, except for this research orientation, the corporate management had 
little involvement, and there was a lack of R&D/marketing interface in this 
dimension. According to Ms Leaford, the Marketing Manager for Zovirax from 
the development stage: 
"When Zovirax was first discovered, there was no 
effective interface at corporate level. As a result, 
our marketing information was not effectively 
communicated at that level" (face-to-face interview, 
3rd August, 1991). 
(2) Product Strategic Dimension of the Interface (PSD) 
Marketing's involvement started after the drug was discovered in the research 
laboratory. The marketing manager was asked to evaluate the drug's market 
potential. Marketing and R&D also cooperated in deciding pricing strategy near 
the launch, as Ms Leaford recalled, 
"For Zovirax which had no similar drugs to be 
compared with, we were facing the question of "how 
much would you charge for an innovative 
therapy? ". We discussed with R&D on other 
innovative dru s such as Tagamet. A high price 
premium was nally decided - £25 for genital herpes and £ 00 for singles" (face-to face 
interview, 3rd August, 1991). 
The promotion of Zovirax involved both marketing and R&D. The biggest task 
was to educate both doctors and patients the concept that herpes viruses were 
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treatable and Zovirax did not have those awful side effects associated with the 
old treatment. 
(3) Operational Dimension of the Interface (OD) 
Various market research techniques were applied. However, their effectiveness 
was limited in a new market situation especially at the early stage. According to 
Ms Leaford, 
"I was asked to evaluate the market potential of the 
new compound. It was difficult to start with, because there were no similar drugs to compare 
with in the market. Since the existing data could not 
provide the required information, the marketing 
people made direct visits to specialist clinics and 
studied the therapies of related diseases. Figures 
from different sources were then added together, 
which suggested that there was a moderate market, 
worth V5 million per year. A much bigger market 
potential was revealed later as the project 
progressed" (face-to-face interview 3rd August, 
1991). 
(4) Product Technical Dimension of the Interface (PTD) 
The involvement of marketing in this dimension was minimal. The 
development of the first dosage form - an eye ointment - was solely based on 
technical considerations. According to Ms Leaford, 
"we first launched an eye ointment for herpes 
simplex infection because it had the same dosage 
form as an existing old treatment, which provided a 
basis for comparison" (face-to-face interview, 3rd 
August, 1991). 
The cooperation between marketing and R&D became closer after the launch. 
Seven different indications have been launched since the drug was first 
introduced in 1981. They include a series of new launch for genital herpes, 
intravenous serious herpes infection, cold sores , singles and chicken pox. 
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8.2.3 Organizational Constructs 
(1) The Interface Coordination Mechanism (ICM) 
The coordination mechanism of Wellcome was relatively poor before Zovirax's 
launch. There were no formal coordination mechanisms at the corporate level. 
On the other hand, the communication at the lower level was mainly through 
the project team. 
The company's coordination mechanism was largely improved in 1985 when 
Zovirax was at the post market stage. There was a therapeutic area review 
meeting every year, where strategic marketing managers and RD&M managers 
who were in charge of the same therapeutic areas cooperated in deciding the 
priority of the future drug research in this area. Figure 8.3 is the therapeutic area 
review in anti-herpes area. 
Figure 8.3 Review of the Anti-heroes Therapeutic Area 
Commercial 
Attractiveness 
High 
Low 
High 
Cý Shingles 
Genital 
herpes 
Chicken 
Pox 
Low 
Technological Uncertainty 
The different priorities of these diseases in the anti-herpes area have been 
reflected in the group marketing structure (please refer to Figure 8.1 ). 
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(2) The Interface Communication Flows (ICF) and Interface Conflict (IC) 
The communication between marketing and R&D was relatively frequent, 
although it did not happen until the later development stage. Meanwhile, the 
R&D staff expressed their concerns on the inconsistency of marketing 
information in different period of time, and therefore their doubt on the 
credibility of such information. According to Dr Pond, Head of Research in 
Antiviral area, 
"Marketing people has not been very good in 
generating reliable marketing information we need, 
both in terms of its accuracy and the specificity. 
This presents a biggest problem between us as far 
as I am concerned" (face-to-face interview, 27, 
March, 1991). 
(3) Relative influence of R&D and Marketing (RIRM) 
The Zovirax research programme was initiated by the scientists who looked into 
modified nuclear bases in the hope that the resulting compound would interfere 
with virus replication. 
The interface at the early development stage was to evaluate the market 
potential for the new compound, and at later development stage was to decide 
the price strategy and educate customers about the new drug's potency. 
Although the balance had shifted slightly to marketing near the launch, R&D 
remained the main drive behind most activities. 
The interface was close after the launch and was sustained for eighteen years. 
This interface was mainly related to the development of the new indications. 
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8.2.4 The Innovation performance 
(1) Development Speed (DS) 
Although the time for developing the first indication - eye ointment - only took 
seven years, the clinical trials for several major indications took much longer to 
complete. Therefore, the development speed was slow. 
(2) The Innovative Level (IL) 
Zovirax was the first entrant to a new market and a new class of drug. It was the 
first biotechnology derived drug, and the innovative level was very high. 
Furthermore, the drug was perceived by the customers as being unique in 
meeting their needs. 
(3) Sales 
Zovirax's market potential was realized relatively late, and its commercial 
achievement was slowly built up during a period of eleven years. First launched 
in 1981 with only one indication, it achieved a total sales of £471 million in 
1990 with seven indications. 
8.2.5 Summary 
The same measures which were used in the previous chapters are applied to 
assess the research constructs in this chapter. The results are shown in Tables 
8.5 to 8.8. They will be compared with other case study results in the next 
chapter, Chapter 9. 
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(1) Assessment 
Table 8.5 Assessment of the Environmental Constructs in 
the Zovirax Project 
Market Technological Internal Marketing & 
Uncertainty Uncertainty Technological Expertise 
MS MN CNA MC Score CD MA SE Score ME CR RE DE Score 
12104120301102 
Table 8.6 Ass essment o f the Strategic C onstructs of the 
R&D/Marketing 
------------- 
Interfac 
--------- 
e In 
----- 
the Zovirax 
------------ 
Project 
------------------- 
CSD & CTD 
The company's 
technological policy 
provided a direction 
for the research. 
However, the corporate 
management was not 
highly involved in 
the project, and the 
interface was minimal. 
PSD OD 
The interface was 
relatively close 
in evaluating market 
potential and deciding 
pricing and promotion 
strategies. 
In-effective 
at the early 
stage. 
Table 8.7 Assessment of the Organizational Constructs in 
the Zovirax Protect 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
ICM ICF 
No formal link Relatively 
at top level, frequent at 
and project team later stage. 
at the lower level. 
IC 
Lack of 
marketing 
credibility 
perceived 
by R&D 
RIRM 
Mainly research 
driven during 
the process. 
Marketing 
had more 
influence after 
launch. 
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Table 8.8 Assessment of the Innovation Performance 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
DT DS Innovative Superiority Sales, £bn 
(yrs) Level 5th yr 11th yr 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
12 slow very high, first It was gradually 0.2 0.47 
entrant in a new recognized by (estimate) 
class the customers as 
being unique in 
meeting their needs 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
(2) Preliminary Discussion 
Zovirax was the first antiviral drug for herpes infection and singles. Its 
development involved the discovery of new scientific knowledge. Therefore, 
similar to SmithKline's Tagamet, it was a "new-market and new-technology" 
type of product. 
The market uncertainty in the project was only moderately high, scoring 4 out 
of 8, due to a lack of competition in the market. Meanwhile, the technological 
uncertainty was relatively high, which is scored at 4 out of 6. Like most of the 
"new- or unrelated-technology and new-market" type of projects, the Zovirax 
project was not supported by extensive marketing and technological expertise 
(only scored at 2 out of 8). 
Similar to the Tagamet project, the R&D/marketing interface presented in two 
out of five dimensions, namely the PSD and OD. The corporate technological 
policy was critical in providing the direction for the research. However, the 
corporate management was not directly involved in the project. The 
R&D/marketing interface started late. R&D dominated during most of the 
innovation process, and marketing only began to have a stronger influence after 
the launch. The communication was relatively frequent, although a lack of 
marketing credibility as perceived by R&D was reported. On the whole, the 
drug's innovation performance was satisfactory both in terms of the innovative 
level and the sales revenue. 
Fortunately, unlike Tagamet, Zovirax did not meet strong competition at the 
post market stage. The drug remained the only product in the anti-herpes market 
since it was first launched. 
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Similar to the Tagamet and Imigran projects, the case study has confirmed an 
association between an R&D dominance, a later starting time of the interface 
and high technological uncertainty; and an association between a lack of 
marketing credibility as perceived by R&D and the "new- or unrelated- 
technology and new-market" type of project. The case evidence also supported 
the association between a weak corporate management involvement to the 
project and a low development speed. However, the case results seem to suggest 
that the development speed is not a major factor for a successful innovation 
unless the competition in the market was strong, and a strong research base in a 
difficult research area forms an effective entry barrier for competitors. 
8.3 THE R&D/MARKETING INTERFACE IN DEVELOPING 
RETROVIR 
8.3.1 Environmental Constructs 
(1) Market Uncertainty 
(i) Market Size (MS) and Market Newness (MN) 
Retrovir (also called AZT) is the first treatment for AIDS (Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome), which is one of the most recently discovered 
life threatening diseases. Because doctors had never treated AIDS patients prior 
to Retrovir's launch, their attitudes and the patients' response to such treatment 
were poorly understood. 
There are approximately 106,000 current AIDS cases and 1.5 million HIV 
(Human Immunodeficiency Virus) patients, many of whom will develop AIDS. 
Originally, Retrovir was launched for AIDS patients only. Three years after the 
launch, in 1990, it was approved for HIV patients. As a result, the market for 
the drug was significantly enlarged. 
(ii) Customer Need Awareness (CNA) and Market Competitiveness (MC) 
The discovery of Retrovir was highly publicized as a significant scientific 
breakthrough in AIDS field by both the company and the media. It was 
therefore well known to the patients and the doctors long before its launch. 
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After the drug was launched, the market was featured by high demand, highly 
expensive product (costs £4,500 annually per patient for full doses in 1989) and 
the product's high side effects. Consequently, the market was highly 
controversial characterised by high political pressure and deep disappointment 
from the patients for the drug's high price and side effects. 
Being the first drug to treat a serious disease, Retrovir had an unique 
competitive advantage benefiting from drug legislation. In spite of rivals' 
attempts in this area (see Table 8.9), the legislation restricted any following 
entry to an additional medication, which could only be tested and used in 
conjunction with the approved treatment. As a result, Retrovir became a 
standard, first-line therapy for AIDS and HIV infection. 
Table 8.9 New Comvetition for AZT 
Drugs that block 
viral gene replication Manufacturer Drug trial status 
DDI Bristol-Meyers Phase II trials 
DDC Hoffmann-LaRoche In Phase II trials 
D4T Bristol-Meyers In Phase I trials 
Carbovir Glaxo Preclinical 
Source: Business Week, September 11,1989. 
(2) Technological Uncertainty 
(i) Cause of Disease (CD) and Mode of Action (MA) 
The cause of AIDS was relatively clear, it was identified to be an infection with 
a retrovirus known as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). This virus infects 
and destroys specialised cells of the immune system, leading to a profound 
depression of natural immunity. 
Retrovir is a biotechnological product, it is an analogue of naturally occurring 
thymidine. When HIV replication takes place in the presence of Retrovir, 
Retrovir is mistaken for thymidine. As Retrovir does not contain the key 
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element of thymidine, the proviral DNA chain is terminated and viral 
replication is therefore halted. 
(ii) Side Effect (SE) 
Retrovir has relatively high toxicity. It can cause serious side effects, including 
severe anaemia, myositis, and seizures. 
Since Retrovir is toxic, much effort has been focused on developing treatment 
regimens which are tolerated better by patients. This has meant lowering doses 
of Retrovir and alternating it with other nucleotide analogues, such as 
dideoxycytidine (ddC). Because of Retrovir's toxicity, only 60% of patients are 
now receiving the drug. 
(3) Internal Technological and Marketing Strength 
(i) Marketing Experience (ME) and Company Reputation (CR) 
The company had no previous experience in the AIDS market. Nevertheless, 
the company had gained good reputation in the related area with its earlier 
success - Zovirax. 
(ii) Research Experience (RE) and Development Experience (DE) 
Although AIDS research was new to Wellcome, it belonged to the antiviral 
research area to which the company had been deeply committed since the early 
1980s. Thus, the research of Retrovir had a close link to the company's earlier 
antiviral drug, Zovirax. 
8.3.2 Strategic Constructs 
(1) Strategic Dimension of the Interface (CSD & PSD) 
Retrovir project was initiated by the company's American subsidiary, 
Burroughs-Wellcome. It became a major corporate concern after the drug's 
activity against AIDS was discovered in 1985. The chairman of Wellcome was 
appointed as the leader of this programme and most of the strategic decisions 
were made at the corporate level. 
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However, there was a lack of appropriate interface activities between R&D and 
marketing in this dimension. For instance, no sufficient effort was made to 
inform and to educate the customers about the drug's high side effects and no 
proper promotion strategy was developed. Instead, with the high demand in the 
market, the company assumed a favourable attitude from customers toward the 
drug. According to Ms Leaford, the Marketing Manager for Antiviral Products, 
"Retrovir was launched only two years after its 
activity was discovered, whereas the average 
development time for a drug is eight years. As a 
result, there was not enough time for an adequate 
market research, a pre-launch programme, or an 
external consultant, which are usually carried by 
Wellcome for most of its new products" (face-to- 
face interview, 3rd August, 1991). 
(2) Corporate Technical Dimension of the Interface (CTD) 
The Retrovir project was a direct result of the company's technological policy 
of pursuing scientific excellence. A press comment noted that 
"It wasn't just an accident or luck that Burroughs- 
Wellcome got there first. The company specialises 
in obscure diseases and disdains common ones, 
emphasising arcane research so strongly that 
employees proudly call it Wellcome University'. 
That approach helped enormously in the search for 
AZT" (Fortune, Nov. 5,1990). 
From a research viewpoint, the Retrovir project appeared to be a perfect follow- 
up after the company's anti-herpes product, Zovirax. However, very little had 
been done to assess the market consequence of such a project. As a result, The 
company found itself ill prepared for the huge emotions and politics 
surrounding AIDS. 
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8.3.3 Organizational Constructs 
(1) Interface Coordination Mechanism (ICM) 
There was no formal coordination mechanism at the corporate level, and the 
interface between R&D and marketing was present only within the American 
subsidiary at project level before the pre-launch stage. The interface has become 
more effective and more frequent since then because of the strong commitment 
of the corporate management to the project. 
(2) The Interface Communication Flow (ICF) and Interface Conflict (IC) 
As noted earlier, communication within the organization on the Retrovir project 
was effective and smooth, resulting from the strong commitment of the 
corporate management. According to Ms. Leaford, 
"The top management commitment certainly made 
the communication between different parts of the 
organization much more smooth and quicker. 
However, this situation also meant some distraction 
on other projects and on some normal business 
activities" ce-to face interview, 3rd August, 
1991). 
(3) Relative Influence of R&D and Marketing (RIRM) 
Retrovir was originally synthesized in 1964 at an attempt to produce an 
effective anti-cancer drug. The research was stopped due to unsatisfactory 
results. In 1983, two years after scientists identified the cause of AIDS, 
Burroughs Wellcome, which enjoyed high autonomy at the time, initiated the 
project of studying Retrovir as a promising AIDS treatment. After the 
confirmation of anti-AIDS activity of the compound in 1985, the project was 
given top priority by the company. 
During the short development time of three years, the R&D/marketing interface 
was rather brief and superficial. It was driven by urgent political and production 
matters which occurred during the development. 
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8.3.4 The Innovation Performance 
(1) Development Speed (DS) 
The development time of four years for Retrovir was considerably shorter than 
the industry average of eight years. However, some clinical and marketing 
activities were not adequately undertaken due to shortage of time, which caused 
problems after the product was launched. 
(2) Innovative Level (IL) 
Retrovir was a highly innovative biotechnological product. It is the first entrant 
in a new class, and remains the only treatment for AIDs and HIV infection up to 
now. However, its real effect was still the centre of debate. 
(3) Sales 
As indicated earlier, Retrovir is a highly expensive drug, costing £6,500 per 
annum for each patient. This high price contributed significantly to the £400 
million in sales a year. 
8.3.5 Summary 
As in the previous chapters, qualitative measures are used for assessing the 
environmental, strategic and organisational constructs in this chapter. The 
results are shown in Tables 8.10 to 8.13. They will be compared with other drug 
innovation cases in the cross-case analysis presented in Chapter 9. 
(1) Assessment 
Table 8.10 Assessment of the Environmental Constructs in 
the Retrovir Project 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Market Technological Internal Marketing & 
Uncertainty Uncertainty Technological Expertise 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
MS MN CNA MC Score CD MA SE Score ME CR RE DE Score 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
02114022401113 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 8.11 Assessment of the Strategic Constructs of the 
R&D/Marketing Interface in the Retrovir Project 
CSD & PSD 
Corporate management 
was committed to this 
project. However, due 
shortage of time, the 
interface was weak. 
CTD 
The project was strongly 
influenced by the corporate 
to technological policy. However 
the interface was weak. 
Table 8.12 Assessment of the Organizational Constructs in 
the Retrovir Project 
ICM 
no formal link 
at top level, 
but very strong 
top management 
commitment; 
a project team 
at lower level. 
ICF IC RIRM 
highly effective 
and frequent. 
no major 
conflict 
reported. 
mainly corporate 
management 
driven with a 
strong time 
orientation. 
Table 8.13 Assessment of the Innovation Performance 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
DT DS Innovative Superiority Sales, £bn 
(yrs) Level 1st yr 5th yr 
4 very fast Very high, unique, but 0.2 0.4 
first entrant controversial 
in a new class 
(2) Preliminary Discussion 
Similar to the Tagamet and Zovirax projects, the Retrovir project was a "new- 
market and new-technology" type of project. Its technological uncertainty was 
high, scoring 4 out of 6, and its market uncertainty was moderately high, 
scoring 4 out of 8. Moreover, these uncertainties were not adequately dealt with 
due to the shortened development time. However, unlike the other two same 
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type of projects mentioned above, because the company had acquired some 
scientific knowledge and expertise in antiviral field, the Retrovir project 
benefited from a slightly higher internal expertise, which is scored at 3 out of 8. 
The R&D/marketing interface presented in the CSD, PSD and OD. However, 
because of the extremely short development time, the interface was brief and 
superficial, which was mainly for drug registration purposes rather than for 
strategic or technical purposes. Nevertheless, the cross-functional 
communication was highly effective and frequent, which was largely 
attributable to top management's commitment to the project. In addition, the 
unusually fast drug approval from the regulatory authorities contributed to the 
rapid development programme. The drug had achieved a high sales revenue 
during the first two years of its launch. 
This case tends to suggest that an effective R&D/marketing interface is 
important in the "new-market and new-technology" type of project. Since the 
reduction of the high development risk requires extensive market research over 
a certain period of time, the advantage gained from a faster development should 
be weighed against the higher development risk stemming from such a move. 
Nonetheless, the case study has revealed the advantages of being fast or being 
first to market. These include: 
(a) a strong corporate image and a leading position on the 
experience curve that characterizes the new technology, in this 
case, the biotechnology in antiviral area; 
(b) an initial differentiation for the new drug, thus a high price 
policy; and 
(c) a first-line treatment, which is an effective barrier to entry. 
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8.4 THE R&D/MARKETING INTERFACE IN DEVELOPING 
LAMICTAL 
8.4.1 Environmental Uncertainty 
(1) Market Uncertainty 
(i) Market Size (MS) and Market Newness (MN) 
When Lamictal was launched in 1991, the epilepsy therapeutic market was well 
established with a moderate size of approximately £560 million a year 
worldwide. In addition, because Lamictal was only passed by the regulatory 
authority as an add-on treatment to the existing drugs, its usage was largely 
restricted. 
(ii) Customer Need Awareness (CNA) and Market Competitiveness (MC) 
There had already been several effective antiepileptic drugs in the market 
before Lamictal was launched, including Warner Lenbert's Phenytoin, Cibe- 
Geigy's Carbamazepine, and Merow Mon's Sabril, newly launched in 1990. 
Lamictal was developed by Wellcome at the attempt to offer the patients the 
benefit of a low side effect treatment. However, big educational effort was 
needed to implement this differentiation strategy. according to Mr Milton, the 
Marketing Manager for Lamictal, 
"Doctors who had gained their experience in 
treating epilepsy patients with existing drugs were 
convinced that side effects such as sedation and 
depression of the central nervous system function, 
were not separatable with drugs efficacy" (face-to- 
face interview, 3rd August, 1991). 
(2) Technological Uncertainty 
(i) Cause of Disease (CD), Mode of Action (MA) and Side Effect (SE) 
The cause of epilepsy is partly known. It is related to the balance between two 
chemical substances - glutamate and GA (gamma-aminobutyric). The level of 
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glutamate and the level of GA are intimately related. An excess of glutamate 
relative to GA is widely believed to be responsible for epileptic seizures. 
Before Lamictal, most antiepileptic drugs were designed to increase the overall 
level of GA. Such drugs usually provide adequate seizure control but they have 
high incidence of side-effects. Wellcome scientists believed that those side 
effects were not inevitable. Rather, they were related to the increased level of 
GA in those drugs, which reduced the overall responsiveness of the central 
nerves system (CNS). 
Lamictal was therefore developed to overcome such shortcomings of the 
existing drugs by preventing excessive release of glutamate. Because the drug 
does not depress the normal CNS function, it has low side effect. 
(3) Internal Technological and Marketing Strength 
(i) Marketing Experience (ME) and Company Reputation (CR) 
Lamictal was Wellcome's first attempt in the epilepsy market. Thus, the 
company had no previous experience and was not well-known to the customers. 
(ii) Research Experience (RE) and Development Experience (DE) 
The therapeutic use of anti-folate compounds, which were also used in 
Lamictal, was a field in which-the Wellcome Foundation already had 
considerable research expertise. However, as indicated above, the company had 
never developed drugs for treating epilepsy. This lack of experience in the 
project team in handling the clinical trials programme and the registration 
affairs was partly responsible for the unsatisfactory result of this project. 
According to Mr Heightman, the Strategic Business Manager of the company, 
"I think the handling of the clinical trial programme for Lamictal 
was very poor. For one thing, it failed to generate the right data 
for the registration purpose. On the whole, the project was not a 
success. However, it was not a typical example of what we are 
doing in this company" (face-to-face interview, 3rd August, 
1991). 
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Finally, Lamictal was only passed as an add-on treatment in addition to the 
existing drugs, which meant that the new drug's main advantage of having 
lower side effect was largely diminished. Mr Milton defended this result, 
"clinical trials on epilepsy are highly ethical as on 
any other life threatening diseases, The regulation 
requires that the quality of the treatment on any 
patient must not be reduced as a result o the 
clinical trials. Because the existing antic ile tic 
drugs are ofcacious, Lamictal must be 
ested 
in 
addition to an existing drug" (face-to-face 
interview, 3rd August, 1991). 
8.4.2 Strategic Constructs 
(1) Corporate Dimension of the Interface (CSD & CTD) 
Lamictal was not a high priority project of the company. As a result, the 
corporate management had little involvement in the project, and most of the 
R&D/marketing interface activities were carried out within the project team. 
(2) Product Strategic Dimension of the Interface (PSD) 
R&D and marketing cooperated at this level, attempting to provide the right 
direction for the clinical trials. Both the scientific property of Lamictal and the 
existing market conditions were considered. Mr Milton recalled 
"having studied the market condition, we decided 
that clinical data should be collected mainly to 
show Lamictal's safety and tolerability rather than 
its efficacy. Because the existin drugs were already 
efficacious but had high side efect" (personal 
interview, 3, August, 1991) 
Meanwhile, the promotion strategy was designed to educate the customers the 
safety profile of the drug. According to Mr Milton 
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"We carried out early market research four years 
before the launch, which was important for the 
promotion strategy. The message to the market was 
that because of Lamictal's novel mode of action, it 
did not have those side effect which were associated 
with the existing drugs. Education was an important 
part of this strategy" (personal interview, 3, August, 
1991). 
In addition, R&D and marketing also cooperated in identifying new markets for 
the drug. Although Lamictal was originally tested in adult patients, the 
marketing people later realized that a low side effect antiepileptic drug was 
most appealing to children who presented a big potential market. 
(3) Operational Dimension of the Interface (OD) 
Epilepsy was a well established market. Thus, quantitative and qualitative 
marketing research was carried out to provide important input for both strategic 
and technical purposes. 
(4) Product Technical Dimension of the Interface 
The strategic decision of penetrating the children's market confronted technical 
problems regarding the drug's stability in water. As a result, Syrup - the ideal 
paediatric dosage form - could not be developed. Alternatively, under the close 
cooperation between the RD&M department and the Marketing department, a 
special dissoluble tablet was developed. 
8.4.3 Organizational Constructs 
(1) The Interface Coordination mechanism (ICM) 
There was neither a formal coordination mechanism at the corporate level nor 
an informal involvement from the corporate management. As a result, the 
communication at this level was minimal. According to Mr Milton, 
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"We (R&D and marketing) were very close within 
the project team, as I have explained earlier, we did 
lots of things together, but we were not very much 
involved as far as the corporate decision-making 
was concerned" (face-to-face interview, 3rd August, 
1991) 
(2) The Interface Communication (ICF) and Interface Conflict (IC) 
The communication between R&D and marketing was frequent and relatively 
smooth within the project team, and no major conflict occurred. However, there 
was a communication barrier between the project team and the corporate 
management. 
(3) Relative influence of R&D and Marketing 
Lamictal was initiated by the scientists in the Research Laboratories. The 
original research goal was to improve the existing therapy by reducing the 
potential of fatal abnormality. The drug's new mode of action was discovered 
later in research which enhanced its properties. 
Marketing became involved after Lamictal was proceeded to the development 
stage. The interface at the early development stage was the evaluation of the 
commercial viability of the new idea proposed by the research people, and 
R&D was the prime drive behind marketing's activity. Marketing's influence 
became stronger at the pre-launch stage, where the interface focused on product 
differentiation and promotion. 
8.4.4 The Innovation performance 
(1) Development Speed 
The development speed of Lamictal was very slow. The process took thirteen 
years. 
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(2) Innovative Level (IL) 
Lamictal had a moderately high innovative level. It was an new agent in an 
established class. However, the new drug's superiority in meeting customers' 
needs was not recognized, and it was only used as an add-on therapy. 
(3) Sales 
Lamictal's UK sales in the first six months after launch was only £3 million, 
and was slightly increased to £ 10 million in the second year. It was more 
expensive, costing £2 per day, compared with £0.2 per day for the existing 
drugs. 
8.4.5 Summary 
Similar to previous chapters, the research constructs in this chapter are assessed 
by using qualitative measures described in Chapter 3, the theoretical 
framework. Following a brief preliminary discussion at the end of this chapter, 
the results which are illustrated in Tables 8.14 to 8.17 will be further analysed 
in the cross-case analysis in next chapter. 
Table 8.14 Assessment of the Environmental Constructs in 
the Lamictal Project 
Market Technological Internal Technological & 
Uncertainty Uncertainty Marketing Expertise 
MS MN CNA MC Score CD MA SE Score ME CR RE DE Score 
102251203 00101 
207 
Table 8.15 Assessment of the Strategic Constructs of the 
R&D/Marketing Interface In the Lamictal Project 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
CSD & CTD PSD OD PTD 
minimal and no 
top management 
involvement. 
close in market 
evaluation and 
promotion. 
early and close 
extensive 
market research 
for both 
strategic and 
technical 
purposes. 
Table 8.16 Assessment of the Organizational Constructs in 
the Lamictal Project 
ICM ICF IC RIRM 
no formal link 
at top level, 
a low priority 
project; 
a project team 
at lower level. 
effective 
within project 
team, but 
communication 
barrier at 
higher level. 
no mayor 
conflict 
occurred. 
Research driven 
at early stage, 
but a close 
link at pre- 
launch stage. 
Table 8.17 Assessment of the Innovation Performance 
DT DS Innovative Superiority Sales, £bn 
(yrs) 
--------- 
Level 
--------------- 
6th month 
---------------------------- 
2nd yr 
----- 
13 very moderate high. 
slow a new agent in 
an established 
class. 
(2) Preliminary Discussion 
its 
of 
eff 
by its 
dvantage 0 
a lower side 
undermined 
restricted usaa 
. 003 0.01 
e. 
Lamictal was not first to the market. There were a large number of competing 
drugs in this moderate-sized market. Thus the entry barrier for the company was 
very high, stemming from customers' loyalty to existing treatments and 
stringent drug regulation on clinical testing for certain diseases. The Lamictal 
project belonged to an "unrelated-technology and new-market" type of project. 
208 
main a 
having 
ect was 
The market uncertainty in this project was therefore very high, scoring 5 out of 
8. On the other hand, although the company had some research experience, both 
of its marketing expertise and development expertise were lacking in this field. 
This is reflected by its low internal expertise, scoring 1 out of 8. The drug had 
moderate technological uncertainty, scoring 3 out of 6. However, because the 
drug could not be used as a first-line treatment, its major technical advantage of 
having low side effects was diminished. 
Similar to SmithKline Beecham's Eminase project, the R&D/marketing 
interface was only present in the PSD, OD and PTD with a notable absence of a 
corporate interface. As a result, some critical activities which ought to be done 
at this level such as a preliminary market assessment and the provision of a high 
level strategic input into the clinical trial programme were very much lacking. 
Consequently, although considerable effort had been made at the early stage 
within the project team to decide the product differentiation and promotion 
strategies, the premise of their implementation - the drug being a first-line 
treatment - was non-existent. This result provides a support to the findings in 
the previous chapters that a poor innovation performance is associated with a 
lack of the R&D/marketing interface in the corporate dimension. Such an 
interface is especially important in a "new- or unrelated-technology and new- 
market" type of project. The case evidence has also confirmed the relationship 
between the development speed of a project and the degree of the corporate 
management's commitment to the project. 
8.5 FINAL ANALYSIS 
Similar to Glaxo, Wellcome is a research-based pharmaceutical company. The 
company was owned by a charity body until 1985. In 1985 a new holding 
company Wellcome plc. was formed, and 25% of the Wellcome Trust's original 
shares were issued through the International Stock Exchange. Since then the 
company's organizational structure went through a series of major changes, and 
its ethical pharmaceutical division was narrowed to three major therapeutic 
areas: anti-herpes, anti-infective (anti-virus), and CNS. Wellcome had a leading 
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position in the antiviral therapeutic area. Its antiviral products Retrovir and 
Zovirax accounted for 37% of the group total turnover in 1990. 
The three drug projects studied in this chapter are the Zovirax, Retrovir and 
Lamictal projects. They belonged to a "new-technology and new-market" type 
and an "unrelated-technology and new-market" type of project respectively. 
Meanwhile their driving forces varied, and included both research and corporate 
management. The case studies in this chapter have sustained the findings from 
the previous chapters on the relationship between 
(a) the role of the R&D/marketing interface and the changing 
market and technological environment; 
(b) the effectiveness of the interface and the innovation 
performance. 
In this section, the findings of the three case studies are related to the research 
propositions defined in the theoretical framework, in terms of the relationship 
between the trategic constructs, the environmental constructs and the 
organisational constructs. 
The research proposition 1 postulates the existence of the R&D/marketing 
interface in one or more of the five dimensions listed in Box 3. Clearly, all the 
three case studies have demonstrated the existence of these dimensions. For 
instance the interface was present in the PSD and OD in the Zovirax project, in 
the CSD, PSD and OD in the Retrovir project and in the PSD, OD and PTD in 
the Lamictal project. Again the case studies reveal a weak R&D/marketing 
interface in the CTD and PTD. 
The research proposition 2 hypothesizes a direct relationship between the 
environmental constructs and the strategic constructs, to which the case studies 
have also provided positive evidence. For instance, the case studies have 
supported findings from the previous chapters, including a positive relationship 
between a later starting time of the interface and a high technological 
uncertainty as well as the important role of the interface in the CTD in a "new- 
or unrelated-technology and new-market" type of project. 
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The research proposition 3 postulates a direct relationship between the 
environmental constructs and the organizational constructs, which the case 
studies' results have also supported. The results have sustained the findings 
from the previous chapters that the relative influence of R&D and marketing, 
which is reflected by the driving force of the innovation, is related to both 
external uncertainty and internal strength. Specifically, an innovation project 
which involves high technological uncertainty and at the same time has low 
marketing expertise is likely to be research-driven. In addition, the results have 
supported the previous findings that the lack of marketing credibility as 
perceived by R&D is associated with a "new- or unrelated-technology and new- 
market" type of project. 
Next, the results have sustained the previous findings that the interface 
communication flows and the development speed are largely influenced by the 
corporate management's commitment to the project. However, the results reveal 
that comparing with development speed, a company's strong research expertise 
is sometimes a more important competitive advantage which pre-empted the 
possibility of any competitive entry, as the Zovirax Case illustrated. Meanwhile, 
a company's technological policy has a profound influence upon its research 
output, in terms of incremental or radical. On the other hand, although fast 
development speed does bring many advantages to the company such as a 
strong corporate image and a leading market position of being the first-line 
treatment, it has to be balanced with development risk. This risk is negatively 
associated with the development time, and the reduction of such risk requires 
effective interface between R&D and marketing. 
Moreover, the case study results reveal that a clinical trials programme 
including clinical testing and registration affairs is an strategic issue as well as 
an operational issue, and the R&D/marketing interface is important during this 
process. However, the strategic aspect of this programme has been largely 
ignored, as the case Lamictal indicated. 
The total of twelve drug innovation cases within four pharmaceutical companies 
have been presented in Chapters 5 to 8. In the next chapter, the Cross-Case 
Analysis, information from the within-case analyses is further analyzed and 
conclusions are provided. 
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Note 
1. In Wellcome, the R&D department is named RD&M, which reflects the company's recognition of the 
important and unique role of doctors being both scientists and marketers who know the market as well 
as the drug. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS, EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters, four within-case analyses were carried out. Each 
involved detailed case study write-ups of three specific drug innovation projects 
of one pharmaceutical firm. The within-case analysis was organized under the 
three groups of constructs, i. e. the environmental constructs, the organizational 
constructs and the strategic constructs, which have been identified in Chapter 3, 
"The Research Theoretical Framework". Guided by the research propositions 
developed in the framework, the relationships between these constructs have 
been tentatively suggested in the preliminary discussion at the end of each 
within-case analysis. In this chapter, results from the four within-case studies 
are compared and further analyzed. 
In 9.2 the limitations of the existing studies which have inspired the current 
research are briefly summarized before analysing the empirical findings in 
relation to each of the three research 'questions. In 9.3 a general discussion on 
the theoretical and managerial implications of the empirical findings is 
provided, where several unexpected findings are emphasized. Finally in 9.4 the 
important research findings and their implications for the managers and the 
future research are briefly summarized. 
9.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF THE CURRENT RESEARCH IN 
RELATION TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS 
This section is organized under the three research questions defined in the 
framework. The extent to which the research questions are addressed and the 
extent to which the research propositions are confirmed and further elaborated 
by the case studies' results are carefully examined. 
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9.2.1 The Role of the R&D/Marketing Interface in Product Innovation 
In the literature, although the importance of the R&D/marketing interface in 
product innovation has been increasingly emphasized, the exact areas in which 
the interface has been present and effective remain ambiguous. Furthermore, 
most existing studies on the R&D/marketing interface focused only at one level 
of the interface problems, either relating to the efficacy of structural linkages 
for achieving better corporate performance or concerning the effectiveness of 
functional integration for successful product innovation. A understanding of the 
critical link between the interface at corporate level and that at project level was 
thus very much lacking. Therefore, one of the main objectives of the current 
research is to define more precisely the areas of the R&D/marketing interface in 
product innovation at both corporate level and project level through empirical 
investigation. These areas form an integral part of the strategic role of the 
interface. The first question being raised in the research is 
Q I: What is the role of the R&D/marketing interface in product innovation? 
In the research theoretical framework, five dimensions of the R&D/marketing 
interface are defined as the strategic constructs. They are: the Corporate 
Strategic Dimension (CSD), the Corporate Technical Dimension (CTD), the 
Product Strategic Dimension (PSD), the Product Technical Dimension (PTD) 
and the Operational Dimension (OD). The above question is addressed by 
Proposition P1. 
P 1: the R&D/marketing interface plays an important role in one or more of the 
five dimensions, during one or more of the five stages of product innovation. 
The results of the four within-case analyses regarding the interface role and its 
variation are summarized in Table 9.1. 
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Table 9.1 The Role Variation of the R&D/Marketing 
Interface in Drug Innovation 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Presence and Effectiveness 
Low ------------------------ High 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
not present a weak effective highly 
Project presence effective 
Serevent 
Augmentin 
Diprivan 
Zantac 
Imigran 
Tenormin 
Tagamet 
Lamictal 
Zovirax 
Zoladex 
Retrovir 
Eminase 
CTD 
PTD 
CTD 
CSD, CTD 
CSD, CTD 
PTD 
CSD, CTD, PTD 
PTD, OD 
CSD, CTD 
CTD CSD PSD, PTD, OD 
PTD PSD CSD, CTD, OD 
CSD, PTD CTD, PSD, OD 
CSD PTD PSD, OD 
OD CTD CSD, PSD 
PTD CSD, OD PSD 
PTD PSD, OD 
PTD PSD, OD 
CSD, CTD, OD PSD 
OD PSD 
CSD, CTD, PSD 
PSD, PTD, OD 
The projects in Table 9.1 are ordered according to the number of highly 
effective dimensions presented in a project. 
Clearly, the empirical results in Table 9.1 have supported the research 
proposition. The R&D/marketing interface was present in at least two 
dimensions, i. e. the Operational Dimension and the Product Strategic 
Dimension (in the Zoladex project) and at most all five dimensions (in the 
Serevent, Augmentin and Diprivan projects). Therefore the areas of the 
R&D/marketing interface in product innovation can be more precisely defined 
as covering the five dimensions, i. e. the corporate strategic dimension, the 
corporate technical dimension, the product strategic dimension, the product 
technical dimension and the operational dimension. 
Moreover, the responsibilities of the R&D/marketing interface in these five 
dimensions and their relationships are identified. In the corporate strategic 
dimension, the R&D/marketing interface provides critical input to the 
formulation of business strategy with respect to the identification of market 
opportunities over the firm's strategic time horizon. Table 9.1 reveals that four 
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out of the twelve innovation projects had a highly effective or effective 
R&D/marketing interface in this dimension. 
Meanwhile, in the corporate technical dimension, the interface provides critical 
input for the formulation of firm's technology strategies with respect to the 
evaluation of external technological trends and internal technological 
competence. Table 9.1 illustrates that only three out of the twelve innovation 
projects had a highly effective or effective R&D/marketing interface in this 
dimension. This indicates that the R&D/marketing interface at corporate level is 
still lacking in both strategic and technical dimension in many innovation 
projects. 
In addition, in the product strategic dimension, the R&D/marketing interface is 
responsible for deciding various strategies for a specific product. The empirical 
findings in Table 9.1 show that ten out of the twelve innovation projects 
achieved a highly effective or effective R&D/marketing interface in the 
strategic dimension. This finding is in line with the preliminary findings of the 
pilot study regarding the increased importance of strategic marketing in the 
organization. However this finding implies that the strategic marketing role is 
still limited at project level. 
Meanwhile, in the technical dimension, which is responsible for maximizing the 
design characteristics of the product, only two out of the twelve innovation 
projects achieved a highly effective or effective R&D/marketing interface in the 
technical dimension. This finding confirms the existing finding in the literature 
(Bonnet, 1986) that there is a weak product design link in the R&D/marketing 
interface. 
In the operational dimension, the R&D/marketing interface is involved in the 
application of market research techniques to provide required market 
information for either strategic or technical purposes. The findings in Table 1 
illustrate that seven out of the twelve innovation projects had a highly effective 
or effective R&D/marketing interface in this dimension. 
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9.2.2 The Environmental Influence upon the R&D/Marketing Interface 
In the Innovation literature, effort has been made to link the R&D/marketing 
interface to the market and technological environment of the firm. Souder 
(1989) for example suggests that the interface pattern may be different for firms 
facing different customer and R&D sophistication. However, although existing 
studies have provided positive evidence on the environment-R&D/marketing 
interface linkage, only limited interface and environmental variables were 
tested. Therefore, in the current research, the environmental influence upon the 
R&D/marketing interface s thoroughly investigated by examining the 
relationships between the five interface dimensions and the environmental 
constructs, i. e. the market uncertainty, technological uncertainty and internal 
strength, defined in the framework. 
In the framework six major types of innovation project are categorized (please 
refer to Figure 1.1, p. 22). These are the "related-technology and existing- 
market" type, the "related-technology but new-market" type, the "unrelated- 
technology but existing-market" type, the "unrelated-technology and new- 
market" type, the "new-technology but existing-market" type and the 
"unrelated-technology but existing-market" type of project. They differ from 
each other in terms of their closeness to the existing market and technology. 
The within-case analyses reveal that the twelve innovation projects studied 
belong to three different types of project. These are the "related-technology and 
existing-market" type (Cell A), the "unrelated-technology and new-market" 
type (Cell D) and the "new-technology and new-market" type (Cell F) of 
project. The other three types of project (i. e. Cell B, C and E) defined in the 
theoretical framework are not found in the twelve innovation cases. 
Nonetheless, it is not a fundamental requirement of the research design to 
include all six types of project. 
Firstly, the type of project was introduced into the research because it reflects 
(rather than replaces) the environmental uncertainty involved in a project in a 
more systematic way. Thus, as described in Chapter 2, "it is helpful when 
comparisons are made and characteristics are discussed between different drug 
innovation cases in the cross-case analysis. As a result, the question Q2 "do the 
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changing technological and market conditions affect the interface role and 
how? ", can be more easily and effectively answered via the following question 
Q2: Do the types of the projects affect the interface role and how? " 
However, the type of project is not considered as a main criterion for the 
selection of the products (please refer to Table 2.3, p. 45). This is because the 
primary research objective is to study the relationship between the 
environmental uncertainty and the R&D/marketing interface, rather than that 
between the type of project and the interface. This emphasis is indicated by the 
research proposition stated below, which is designed to address the research 
question Q2. 
P2: The changing technological and market conditions that are specified in the 
environmental constructs affect the interface role both in terms of the interface 
needs and the interfacing difficulties. 
As a result, the inclusion of all six types of project is not fundamental to the 
research design for the study of the relationship between the environmental 
uncertainty and the R&D/marketing interface. Nevertheless, an attempt is made 
to understand the reasons for the absence of some of the project types. For 
instance, the "unrelated-technology and existing-market" type (Cell C) is not 
found in the current research, because all the firms studied belong to the leading 
innovators. Thus, they have established a strong technological base in their 
major market. This tends to result in a reluctance to adopt unrelated technology 
(already used by other companies) to their existing market. For example, Dr 
Sime, the Senior Vice President of SmithKline Beecham stated that, 
"Beecham has established a strong base in 
penicillin research since the 1960s. As a result, we 
have successfully launched a series of penicillin 
products in the antibiotic market. Meanwhile, more 
and more non-penicillin based antibiotics have 
emerged in the market. We are at the moment 
evaluating the viability of such approach to our 
antibiotic research. However, this seems to be 
rather remote since we have established a strong 
base in penicillin research area and intend to 
reinforce it" (Face-to-face interview, 18th May, 
1991). 
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In addition, the absence of Cell E, the "new-technology and existing-market" 
type, can be explained also. The market effect of this type of project is noted in 
both innovation literature and marketing literature (Dussauge, et al., 1992; 
Levitt, 1960). Specifically, since a radical innovation or a highly innovative 
activity results in a new market, market broadening or market restructuring, a 
project that entailed a new technology but does not affect the nature of the 
market is rare. In Table 9.2 below, the twelve drug innovation projects studied 
in the within-case analyses are summarized according to their types. 
Table 9.2 Tunes of the Drug Inn ovation Proje cts 
------------------------------- 
Type Project MU 
---------------- 
Score TU Scor 
----------- 
e ITM Score 
------------------------------- 
Related-technology Serevent 
------------- 
1 
--- 
2 
--------- 
7 
and existing-market Augmentin 2 2 7 
Tenormin 3 2 7 
Diprivan 3 2 6 
------------------------------- 
Unrelated-technology Zantac 
------------- 
4 
--- 
2 
---------- 
2 
and new-market Eminase 6 4 0 
Lamictal 5 3 1 
------------------------------- 
New-market and Imigran 
------------- 
4 
--- 
5 
---------- 
2 
new-technology Tagamet 3 5 2 
Zoladex 5 3 3 
Zovirax 4 3 2 
Retrovir 4 4 3 
----------------------------------------------- Notes: MU stands for Market Uncertainty , 
TU for Technological 
and ITMS for Internal Technological and Marketing Strength. 
---------- Uncertainty 
It has been found earlier in 9.2.1 that the R&D/marketing interface was present 
in at least two and at most five dimensions in the twelve innovation projects. In 
addition, it has also been revealed that the presence and the effectiveness of the 
R&D/marketing interface in the twelve projects varied considerably in the five 
dimensions. In this section, it is attempted to explain the underlying reasons for 
this variation guided by the theoretical proposition. 
By comparing the types of the projects illustrated in Table 9.2 and the 
effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface in Table 9.1, it is revealed that: 
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(a) all the three projects that have the largest number of highly 
effective interface dimensions, i. e. Serevent, Augmentin and 
Diprivan, belong to the "related-technology and existing-market" 
type of projects; 
(b) relatively few effective interface dimensions were present in 
the Tagamet, Lamictal, Zovirax, Zoladex, Retrovir and Eminase 
projects which belong to the "new- or unrelated-technology and 
new-market" type of project; 
(c) all the innovation projects that had a highly effective interface 
in the operational dimension belong to the "related-technology 
and existing-market" type of project. 
These findings have generally supported the research proposition of the direct 
environmental influence upon the interface effectiveness in the five dimensions. 
Moreover the findings have further elaborated the research proposition that the 
interface role is influenced by the market and technological environment in 
such ways that 
(a) the overall R&D/marketing interface tends to be more 
effective in a "related-technology and existing-market" type of 
projects than in a "new- or unrelated-technology and new-market" 
type of project; 
(b) the overall R&D/marketing interface tends to be more difficult 
to achieve in the "new- or unrelated-technology and new-market" 
type of project; 
(c) the R&D/marketing interface in the area of market research is 
more effective when the market and technology are not new. The 
lack of appropriate market research techniques in a new market 
and new technology situation still remains a problem. 
It is noticed that the above findings do not provide significant association 
between any individual dimension of the interface (except for the operational 
dimension) and the type of project. This implies that an effective overall 
interface in a certain type of project may be achieved by a combination of 
different rather than fixed interface dimensions. 
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On the other hand, a relatively obscured area is found covering the Zantac, 
Imigran and Tenormin projects, where the findings do not exactly apply. 
Despite that the overall interface effectiveness in the Tenormin project, which is 
categorized as a "related-technology and existing-market" type of project, is 
higher than most of the "new- or unrelated-technology and new-market" type of 
projects, its place is below both the Zantac and the Imigran projects which are 
categorized as the "new- or unrelated-technology and new-market" type of 
project. 
In addition, earlier in 9.2.1 a weak product design link in the R&D/marketing 
interface, which has been suggested by the existing research, is confirmed. 
However this weak product link was suggested to be caused by the new-market 
and new-technology situation confronting a new product development. 
However, comparing Table 9.1 with Table 9.2, it is revealed that not only the 
"new- or unrelated-technology and new-market" type of project suffers from a 
weak product design link, some of the "related-technology and existing-market" 
type of projects including the Augmentin and Diprivan projects were also 
caught up with the same problem. Thus, the above findings suggest that 
although the market and technological environment is a major factor affecting 
the effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface, it is not the sole influence. 
9.2.3 The Organizational Influence Upon the R&D/Marketing Interface 
Numerous studies in the organizational literature have examined the influence 
of organizational factors such as personal motivation, resource dependence and 
conflict upon the R&D/marketing relationship (Ruekert & Walker, 1987). 
However, most of the research in this field is limited to the internal 
organizational environment, and the influence of the external environment is 
not considered. In the current research, the influence of such organizational 
factors as coordination mechanisms, communication flows, conflict and the 
relative influence of functional departments are examined in the context of the 
external market and technological environment. Consequently the following 
research question is posed 
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Q3: How and to what extent does the negotiated exchange process between 
R&D and marketing affect the fulfilment of the interface role? 
Meanwhile proposition P3 has been developed in the framework to address 
question Q3: 
P3: the extent to which the interface role is fulfilled depends on the 
appropriateness of the coordination mechanism, the effectiveness of 
communication, the relative influence of R&D and marketing and the type of 
interface conflict. 
In order to test this proposition against the case studies evidence, we first 
summarize the status of this exchange process observed in the twelve drug 
innovation case studies in Table 9.3. 
Table 9.3 The Stat us o f the R&D/Mark eting Interface 
Exchange Process 
--------- 
Drug 
--------- 
--------- 
ICM 
--------- 
---- 
---- 
-------------- 
ICF 
-------------- 
------ 
IC 
------ 
------------ 
RIRM 
------------ 
--- 
ST 
--- 
Serevent RC, PDC & PT VF &E Smooth RI-MD VE 
Zantac CI, PDC & PT VF & HE LMA RD-CD-MD ER 
Augmentin CI & PT VF DM & DR MD-CC-RD VE 
Retrovir CI & PT VF &E None CD-PD ER 
Imigran CI, PDC & PT F& RE LCM RD-CC RL 
Diprivan PDC, MSP & PT RE DM MD-CC-RD VE 
Tenormin PT RE LMA RD-MD ER 
--------- 
Zoladex 
--------- 
MSP & PT 
---- -------------- 
F (within 
------ 
DM 
------------ 
CC-RD 
--- 
RL* 
project team) 
Lamictal PT E (within None RD-CC RL 
project team) 
CB (at-top 
level) 
Tagamet DS & ad- hoc F (within LCM & RBM RD-CC Late 
subsidiary) 
Eminase PT NF MDS & LCM RD Late 
Zovirax PT RE (within LCM & RBM RD Late 
project team) 
CB (at top 
--------- --------- ---- 
level) 
-------------- ------ ----------- ---- 
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Where: CB - Communication Barrier CC - Close Corporation CD - Corporate management Driven CI - Corporate management Involvement DM - Dissatisfaction of Marketing toward R&D's time 
scale 
DR - Dissatisfaction of R&D toward marketing's time 
scale 
E- Effective 
ER - Early F- Frequent 
HE - Highly Effective IC - Interface Conflict ICF - Interface Communication Flow ICM - Interface Coordination Mechanism LCM - Lack of Credibility of Marketing's information LMA - Lack of Mutual Appreciation MD - Marketing Driven MDS - Mutual Distrust MSP- Marketing Strategic Plan 
NF - Not Frequent PDC - Product Development Committee PD - Production Driven PT - Project Team RBM - Research people has Biased view of Marketing's 
role 
RD - Research Driven RC - Research Committee RE - Relatively Effective RIRM - Relative Influence of R&D and Marketing RL - Relatively Late ST 
- 
Starting Time 
VE - Very Early VF - Very Frequent 
The place of a project in Table 9.3 is determined according to the effectiveness 
of the coordination mechanism and the interface communication flows (ICF) in 
the project. The more effective a project is, the higher up it is in the table. 
The empirical results in Table 9.3 illustrate a difference in the R&D/marketing 
interface pattern in the twelve drug innovation projects as far as the four 
organizational constructs are concerned. The next step is to examine whether 
such a difference has affected the fulfilment or the effectiveness of the 
R&D/marketing interface role in the five dimensions. Here it is important to 
distinguish the effect of the environmental constructs, which has been 
investigated in 9.2.2, with the effect of the organizational constructs upon the 
interface effectiveness. 
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It is found in Table 9.3 that there existed six types of conflict between R&D and 
marketing in drug innovation. They include 
(a) the dissatisfaction of marketing staff towards R&D's time 
scale; 
(b) the dissatisfaction of R&D staff toward marketing's time scale; 
(c) the lack of mutual appreciation between R&D and marketing; 
(d) the lack of credibility of marketing information perceived by 
R&D; 
(e) the R&D's biased view of marketing; and 
(f) the mutual distrust between R&D and marketing. 
Here, an attempt is made to answer the question raised at the end of 9.2.2 with 
regard to the higher interface effectiveness of the Zantac and Imigran projects, 
comparing with the Tenormin project. Table 9.3 reveals that although the two 
projects Zantac and Imigran do not belong to the "related-technology and 
existing-market" type, both the coordination mechanism and the communication 
flows in these projects were more effective while other organizational factors 
remained relatively consistent. 
A earlier observation in 9.2.2 on a weak product design link in the projects 
which do not belong to "new-market and new-technology" types of project is 
explained also. Empirical findings in Table 9.3 reveal that both the Augmentin 
and Diprivan projects which were caught up with this problem had experienced 
a interface conflict resulting from a marketing's dissatisfaction of R&D's 
prolonged time scale and a sudden change in the relative influence of the 
interface from marketing to R&D at later stage of development. 
The above findings confirm that the environmental factors and the 
organizational factors have a combined effect upon the R&D/marketing 
interface. Further implications of the above findings are provided in Section 
9.3. 
In addition, a relationship between the organizational constructs and the 
environmental constructs is revealed by comparing Table 9.1, Table 9.2 and 
Table 9.3 together. It is found that 
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(a) there existed a various degree of power shifting between 
corporate management, R&D Department and Marketing 
Department in a majority of projects during the innovation 
process. Moreover, six out of eight of the "new- or unrelated- 
technology and new-market" type of projects were research- 
driven or mainly research-driven; 
(b) there existed an association between the type of conflict and 
the type of project. In particular, the lack of credibility of 
marketing information (LCM) and research people's biased view 
of marketing's role (RBM) tend to be associated with the "new- or 
unrelated-technology and new-market" type of project, while the 
dissatisfaction of each other's time scale (DM and/or DR) 
escalates in the projects challenged by contingent technical 
problems. 
9.2.4 The Performance of The Drug Innovation Projects 
The measurements for the drug innovation performance have been developed in 
Chapter 3, "The Research Theoretical Framework" with reference to the 
existing literature. With regard to the situations in the pharmaceutical industry, 
three measures are used to evaluate the drug innovation performance. They are 
(a) the absolute and/or the percentage of the new drug sales; (b) the 
development speed, which measures both the time resources needed to obtain 
marketable outputs and the firm's ability in fast-tracking important innovation 
projects; and (c) the innovative level of the drug innovation, which measures 
both the technical resources needed to obtain marketable outputs and the firm's 
ability in producing innovation output of high importance. The performance of 
the twelve drug innovation projects is shown in Table 9.4. 
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Table 9.4 The Performance of the Dru g Innovati ons 
----------- 
Company 
---------- 
Drug 
------------------------- 
Innovative Development 
----------- 
Sales 
--------- ---------- 
Level 
-------------- 
Speed 
----------- --- -- 
Glaxo Zantac Moderate/high Very Fast 
-------- 
Very High 
Imigran Very high Relatively 
Fast High 
Serevent High Fast High 
---------- 
SmithKline 
----------- 
Tagamet 
-------------- 
Very high 
----------- 
Relatively 
----------- 
Very high 
Beecham Fast 
Augmentin Moderate/high Very Fast High 
Eminase High Relatively Low 
Fast 
---------- 
ICI Pharma 
----------- 
- Tenormin 
-------------- 
Moderate/high 
----------- 
Slow 
----------- 
Very High 
ceuticals 
Diprivan Moderate/high Very Slow High 
Zoladex High 
- ----- 
Very Slow 
----------- 
Low 
----------- ---------- 
Wellcome 
----------- 
Zovirax 
------ -- 
Very high Very Slow High 
Retrovir Very high Very Fast High 
---------- 
Lamictal 
----------- 
Moderate/high 
-------------- 
Very slow 
----------- 
Low 
----------- 
Table 9.4 reveals that, in spite of their high or moderately high innovative 
levels, the Eminase, Zoladex and Lamictal projects were commercially 
unsuccessful. This implies that the novelty of a new drug is not sufficient for 
new product success. 
Meanwhile, Table 9.4 indicates that although there were only three out of the 
twelve drug innovation projects studied achieved very fast or fast development 
speed, a much higher percentage of the projects, i. e. three out of four of the 
drug innovation projects studied (including the three fast drug innovation 
projects) achieved commercial success. This suggests that fast development 
speed is important for successful innovation. However, it may not be essential 
in all cases. 
Next comparing Table 9.4 with Table 1, it is found that all the three 
unsuccessful drug innovation projects, i. e. Eminase, Zoladex and Lamictal had 
a weak R&D/marketing interface presence. This reveals that a weak 
R&D/marketing interface is associated with poor innovation performance. 
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In addition, comparing with Table 9.4 and Table 9.2, it is revealed that although 
both the "unrelated-technology and new-market" type and the "new-technology 
and new-market" type of project have relatively weak interface presence, the 
former has a higher failure rate. Further discussion on this finding is carried out 
in Section 9.3. 
Finally, comparing Table 9.4 with Table 9.3 it is revealed that both marketing- 
driven and research-driven projects can lead to successful product innovation. 
However, they are likely to be suitable for different technological and market 
situations. 
9.3 THEORETICAL AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
CURRENT EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The confirmation of the role of the R&D/marketing interface in the five 
dimensions, i. e. the corporate strategic dimension, the corporate technical 
dimension, the product strategic dimension, the product technical dimension 
and the operational dimension, has provided the future research in the 
R&D/marketing interface field with a crucial link to several academic areas, 
including the strategic management, marketing and organization studies. 
Meanwhile, the definition of the five dimensions has a practical value in 
helping managers identify more precisely their responsibilities and detect more 
accurately the weaker interface dimensions that need to be strengthened. 
In addition, on the basis of the theoretical framework the current research is 
able to offer a higher level explanation of the tendencies and variations 
regarding the R&D/marketing interface in drug innovation. Moreover, the 
research framework which has not been constrained to the pharmaceutical 
industry has provided the opportunity for future research in this field to study 
the R&D/marketing interface in other industries. In this section, a wider 
discussion regarding the theoretical and managerial implications of the current 
research is carried out on the basis of the empirical findings. 
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9.3.1 The Combined Effect of the Environment and the Organization on 
the R&D/Marketing Interface 
The empirical findings of the current research have revealed that the variation in 
the effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface in the five dimensions is 
related to the market and technological environment. Thus, the interface tends 
to be more effective in a "related-technology and existing-market" type of 
project, where both market and technological uncertainties are relatively low 
and internal expertise to carry out the innovation task is relatively high than in a 
"new- or unrelated-technology and new-market" type of project. 
However, the market and technological environment of an innovation project 
alone does not determine the effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface. The 
the status of the negotiated exchange process within the organization also has 
have an important impact upon the interface effectiveness. This finding implies 
that managers need to evaluate carefully the market and technological 
environment of an innovation project with reference to the method used in the 
current research, and for those projects that involve high environmental 
uncertainty, effective coordination mechanism, communication flows and 
conflict resolution devices should be strongly emphasized. 
9.3.2 The Different Desired Level of the R&D/marketing Interface in 
Different Projects 
The findings of the current research indicate that the desired level of the 
R&D/marketing interface need is not identical for all the projects. In the 
previous section, it has been revealed that although both the "unrelated- 
technology and new-market" type of project and the "new-technology and new- 
market" type of project had relatively weak interface presence, the former had a 
higher failure rate. This finding indicates that the desired interface level for the 
"unrelated-technology and new-market" type of project is higher than that for 
the "new-technology and new-market" type of project. The reason is that 
although the technological uncertainty in the "new-technology and new-market" 
type of project is slightly higher than that in the "unrelated-technology and new- 
market" type of project, the latter usually encounters intensive competition 
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which leads to a higher market uncertainty. A highly competitive environment 
requires the R&D/marketing interface to be highly effective so that a timely 
product innovation which fills the gap between the existing products and the 
customer needs and is targeted to a profitable segment can be introduced. On 
the other hand, it is noticeable that this competitive situation is similar to that in 
a "related-technology and existing market" type of project. However, being in 
an existing market and with much higher internal technological and marketing 
expertise, both the desired interface level and the difficulty in achieving this 
level are lower in the latter type of project. This has an important managerial 
implication. When the commercial attractiveness of two projects are 
comparable, a "related-technology and existing-market" type of project should 
be favoured against a "new-technology and new-market" type, which however 
may be favoured against an "unrelated-technology and new-market" type of 
project, as far as project selection is concerned. 
9.3.3 The Effect of the External Environment on the Negotiated Exchange 
Process Within Organization 
The empirical findings of the current research have demonstrated a direct 
relationship between the organizational constructs and the environmental 
constructs. The finding that the "new- or unrelated-technology and new-market" 
type of project was mainly research-driven provided positive evidence for the 
existing theory that the department which possesses the most appropriate skills 
and information to cope with critical uncertainty comes to have stronger 
influence. 
In addition, the finding regarding the association between certain types of 
conflict and types of project has an important implication on the organization 
theory regarding the source of inter-group conflict. This finding implies that the 
source of inter-group conflict is not restricted to internal organizational factors 
such as different personalities, background, experiences and group interests, but 
is also related to the external market and technological environment. Thus, it is 
useful for managers to anticipate the likely occurrence of the types of interface 
conflict and to develop appropriate conflict resolution devices. 
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9.3.4 Unexpected Findings From the Current Research 
(1) The Serious Effect of Contingent Technical Problems 
In the research theoretical framework, three facets of the technological 
uncertainty construct were defined in relation to the pharmaceutical industry. 
They are (a) Cause of Disease, which largely determines the nature of the drug 
innovation project, (b) Mode of Action, which reflects the newness of the 
technology applied in the drug research and development, and (c) Side Effect, 
which reflects the product complexity of a new drug. 
However, it is revealed in the current research that the contingent technical 
problems which occurred during the later stage of the innovation process, such 
as moisture sensitivity, poor water solubility and instability of a new compound, 
had substantially increased the drug's technical complexity, and thus had a 
serious effect on the effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface and on the 
innovation performance. 
The findings show that in general the R&D/marketing interface level in terms 
of the effectiveness and the frequency increases when an innovation project was 
approaching the market. However a decreased interface level in some projects, 
including Augmentin, Diprivan and Zoladex, was revealed, resulting from the 
contingent technical problems encountered by the project teams at the later 
stage. Although the vitality of the effect of these technical problems upon the 
interface varied in different projects, the occurrence of such problems at the 
later stage had the following three negative effects: 
(a) a shift of the interface emphasis to technical rather than 
commercial at pre-launch stage and sometimes an exclusion of 
marketing influence; 
(b) a rise in the uncertainty of the product's availability to the 
market; 
(c) an increase in the risk of conflict between R&D and 
marketing. 
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The finding implies that managers should at the early planning stage assess 
carefully the possibility of encountering serious technical problems later in the 
process and their impact upon the project. Therefore, necessary precautionary 
measures can be prepared in advance. 
(2) The Competitive Advantage of the Research Expertise Over the 
Development Speed 
In the previous section, a positive association between development speed and 
corporate management commitment has been confirmed. However, the findings 
have also revealed that although the development speed was an important factor 
for innovation success, it may not be the most important factor in some cases. It 
is found that when the technological uncertainty is extremely high in a drug 
research area, a company's strong research expertise and technical competence 
in this area provided a more important competitive advantage which sometimes 
pre-empted the possibility of any competitive entry as demonstrated in the 
Zovirax case. 
On the other hand, although fast development speed does bring many 
advantages to the drug company such as a strong corporate image, a leading 
market position and a first-line treatment acting as an effective barrier to entry 
as illustrated by the Retrovir project, it has to be balanced with the development 
risk (the risk of the new drug causing high reverse effect even death or failing to 
fulfil the fundamental technical requirements). This development risk is 
negatively associated with the development time, since the reduction of such 
risk requires a certain amount of market information. The on-going controversy 
about Retrovirs' efficacy and side effect has demonstrated the need to keep this 
crucial balance. 
(3) An Association Between the Starting Time of the R&D/Marketing 
Interface and the Types of the Projects 
In the previous section, it is found that the interface starting time is associated 
with the type of the project. All the "related-technology and existing market" 
type of projects had a very early or early interface starting time. The reason is 
that in this type of project, firms have relatively good knowledge and expertise 
in both technology and market, which make the exchange of technical and 
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market information between these two parties easier. Moreover, because this 
type of innovation project is incremental, it can be viewed as a major post 
market development from an earlier product, such as Augmentin from Amoxil 
and Serevent from Ventolin. Thus, being a continuous product development, the 
R&D/marketing interface is also likely to be a continuous one as well. 
Nevertheless, it is revealed that although the two projects, Zantac and Retrovir, 
do not belong to the "related-technology and existing market" type of project, 
they also had a early starting time, resulting from a very strong corporate 
management involvement. This indicates that strong corporate management 
involvement encourages not only effective communication but also an early 
interface. 
9.4 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the empirical findings in relation to each of the three research 
questions and propositions are analyzed following a brief summary of the 
limitations of the existing studies. Next a general discussion on the theoretical 
and managerial implications of the empirical findings is provided, where 
several unexpected findings are generated. 
The case studies' results have generally supported and further elaborated the 
research propositions, which have been purposely developed to remain at a 
relatively abstract level in Chapter 3 "The Research Theoretical Framework". 
The reasons for this have been explained in Chapter 2 "The Research 
Methodology". 
The results have revealed that the role of the R&D/marketing interface in drug 
innovation covers the five dimensions. They are (a) the corporate strategic 
dimension, (b) the corporate technical dimension, (c) the product strategic 
dimension, (d) the product technical dimension and (e) the operational 
dimension. 
However, the effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface in the five 
dimensions varies considerably. For example, it is found that the 
R&D/marketing interface is still relatively weak in the corporate technical 
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dimension and the product technical dimension. The research reveals that the 
variation is influenced by the market and technological environment in such 
ways that (a) the R&D/marketing interface tends to be most effective in a 
"related-technology and existing-market" type of projects and (b) the 
R&D/marketing interface tends to be more difficult to achieve in the "new- or 
unrelated-technology and new-market" types of projects. 
Moreover, the results indicate that the desired level of the interface is not 
identical for all the innovation projects. It is higher for a "unrelated-technology 
and new-market" type of project than for a "new-technology and market" type 
of project. In addition, an overall effective R&D/marketing interface in a certain 
type of project can be achieved by a combination of different rather than fixed 
interface dimensions. 
Nevertheless, although the market and technological environment is a major 
factor affecting the effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface, it is not the 
sole influence. The environmental factors and the organizational factors have a 
combined effect upon the R&D/marketing interface. A weak R&D/marketing 
interface is associated with poor drug innovation performance. 
Meanwhile it is found that both the "marketing-driven" and "research-driven" 
projects can lead to successful product innovation. However, they are likely to 
be suitable for different technological and market situations. For instance, a 
"research-driven" project is likely to be associated with high technological 
uncertainty. 
Several unexpected findings have been derived from the research. First, the 
research has revealed a new source responsible for a weak R&D/marketing 
design link. In the literature (Bonnet, 1986), it is proposed that the major areas 
of difficult in product dimension assessment are the extrapolation of customer 
requirements over the development period and the reconciliation of differing 
requirements from customers over the same period. This source of difficult has 
been confirmed in the current research, which is related to the operational 
dimension of the interface. However, the current research findings further 
suggest that the difficult in this interface dimension is not only caused by the 
market factors suggested in the literature, but also caused by the technical 
factors - the contingent technical problems. It is found that a contingent 
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technical problem occurred at the later stage of the innovation process can 
substantially increase the drug's technical complexity, thus seriously affecting 
the effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface, especially in the product 
technical dimension. The effects upon the interface can be summarized as 
(a) a shift of the interface emphasis to technical rather than 
commercial at pre-launch stage and sometimes an exclusion of 
marketing influence; 
(b) a rise in the uncertainty of the product's availability to the 
market; 
(c) an increase in the risk of conflict between R&D and 
marketing. 
Secondly, the results have revealed that fast development speed is an important 
but not an essential factor for every successful innovation project and a balance 
between development speed and development risk is more crucial. Meanwhile, 
it is found that a strong corporate management involvement encourages not 
only effective communication but also an early interface. Finally, a lack of the 
strategic R&D/marketing interface is found in companies when dealing with 
drug's regulatory issues. 
The current research findings have several important managerial implications. 
The definition of the five interface dimensions can help managers identify more 
precisely their responsibilities and detect more accurately the weaker interface 
dimensions that need to be strengthened. 
In addition, the finding that the environment and the organizational factors have 
a combined effect upon the R&D/marketing interface effectiveness implies that 
managers need to evaluate carefully the market and technological environment 
of an innovation project and to take certain organizational measures. The 
environmental constructs identified in the research framework and the 
checklists method used to measure these constructs can help the managers for 
this purpose. 
The finding regarding the association between the type of conflict and the type 
of project implies that the source of inter-group conflict is not restricted to 
internal organizational factors, such as different personalities and background, 
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but it is also related to the external market and technological environment. 
Thus, managers should make effort to anticipate the likelihood of their 
occurrence and to develop appropriate conflict resolution devices. 
Finally, the current research has certain implications for the future research. The 
definition of the five dimensions of the R&D/marketing interface will provide 
the future research in this field with a crucial link to several academic areas. 
The research framework which has not been constrained to the pharmaceutical 
industry will provide the future research with the opportunity to study the 
R&D/marketing interface in other industries. 
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INTERVIEWS OF THE PILOT STUDY 
---------- 
Name 
------------------- 
Position 
------------------- 
Company 
------- 
Date 
- 
C. 
--------- 
Davies 
------------------- 
Marketing Manager 
------------------- 
John-Brown 
------- 
24/3/9 
Automation 
- 
P. 
-------- 
Shipton 
-------------------- 
Technical Manager 
------------------- 
Courtaulds 
------- 
18/7/90 
- 
G. 
-------- 
Noon 
------------------- 
Vice President 
-------------------- 
Bristol-Myers (UK) 
------- 
20/7/90 
- 
T. 
-------- 
Howard 
------------------- 
Business Director 
-------------------- 
Courtaulds 
------- 
Special Chemicals 
- 
25/7/90 
- - 
S. 
--------------------------- 
Tomschey Subsystem Manager 
----- -------------- 
GPT Telecom 
------ 
12/8/90 
- 
R. 
-------- 
Drucker 
------------------- 
Director 
-------------------- 
UpJohn (Europe) 
------- 
5/9/90 
- 
Z. 
-------- 
Li 
------------------- 
Research Associate 
-------------------- 
Biosym Technologies 
------- 
7/4/90 
- 
L. 
-------- 
Fang 
------------------- 
Engineer 
-------------------- 
COSA Crosfield 
------- 
Graphics Co. Ltd. 5/9/90 
- 
G. 
- 
-------- 
France 
-------- 
------------------- 
Technical Manager 
------------------- 
-------------------- 
SmithKline Beecham 
-------------------- 
------- 
4/3/90 
------- 
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APPENDIX 2 
INTERVIEWS OF THE FOUR CASE STUDIES 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Company Name Position Type Date 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Glaxo D. Richards Former Medical Director Tele. 8/3/91 
of Glaxo Group Research 
B. Railton International Marketing Tele. 24/6/91 
C. Towler 
R. Hotston, 
C. Piggin 
M. Whiteman 
D, Satter- 
thwaite 
M, Owen 
R. Coleman 
A, Pilgrim 
Manager for Zantac 
Director of Development Face 
Planning, Glaxo Group Face 
Research Tele. 
Research Manager, Glaxo Tele. 
Group Research 
Clinical Trials Planner, Tele. 
Glaxo Group Research 
Former Product Manager Face 
for Zantac 
International Marketing 
Manager for Imigran 
Director, Business 
Strategy, 
Member of the Serevent 
Research Team 
International Marketing 
Manager for Serevent 
6/3/91 
4/7/91 
3/9/91 
7/3/91 
17/7/91 
3/8/91 
Tele. 24/6/91 
Face. 23/5/91 
Tele. 28/6/91 
Tele. 24/6/91 
Tele. 26/6/91 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
SmithKline G, Leonard Manager of Pharm. Face. 18/5/91 
Beecham Development Dept. I 
J, Sime Senior Vice President Face. 18/5/91 
of Worldwide Strategic 
Product Development 
A, Clancy, Marketing Director for Face. 18/5/91 
Anti-infective Products 
S. Corkill Former Marketing Face. 21/5/91 
Manager for Anti- 
infective Products 
P, Crowley Manager of Pharm. Face. 25/5/91 
Development Dept. II 
D, Fake Head of Post Product Face. 16/3/91 
Development Dept. Face. 25/5191 
G, France Former Manager of Face. 16/3/91 
Pharm. Depat. II 
M, Whiteman Senior Section Head, Face. 25/5/91 
Pharm. Development 
Dept. II 
P, Martin Marketing Director for Face. 18/5/91 
CNS Products 
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Appendix 2 (Continued) 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Company Name Position 
Strategic Business 
Manager for Antiviral 
Products 
Strategic Business 
Manager for Antiviral 
Products 
Head of Research in 
Anti-viral area 
Marketing Manager 
for Anti-cancer 
Products 
Product Manager, 
Strategic Marketing 
ICI Pharma M, Joseph International Planning Face. 
ceuticals Manager for Cardio- Face. 
vascular products, 
Product Strategy Dept. 
G, Costello Manager of Pharm. Tele. 
Development Dept. for 
CNS products 
A, Pleuvry Senior International Tele. 
Planning Manager for C NS 
Products, Product 
Strategy Department 
M, Cross Manager of Pharm. Face. 
Development Dept. for 
Anti-infective products 
S, Corkill Associate Inter. Face. 
Marketing Manager Face. 
for Anti-infective products 
B, Hinze Marketing Manager, Face. 
ICI Pharmaceuticals 
J, Kelly Marketing Manager, Face. 
ICI Pharmaceuticals 
K, Bilyard Manager of Product Face. 
Development 
D. Nelson Manager of ICI Pharm. Face. 
International 
G. Heselwood Planning Manager Face. 
Wellcome N, 
T, 
K, 
Heightman 
Leaford 
Pond 
D, Milton 
P. Jeffery 
R, White 
R, Mills 
S, Self 
Type Date 
14/3/91 
10/9/91 
21/5/91 
28/5/91 
14/3/91 
14/3/91 
10/9/91 
14/3/91 
14/3/91 
14/3/91 
30/6/92 
30/6/92 
Face. 3/8/91 
Face. 3/8/91 
Face. 27/3/91 
Face. 3/8/91 
Face. 27/3/91 
3/8/91 
3/8/91 
27/3/91 
Manager of Project Face. 
Services, Unite of RD&M 
Technical Adviser, Face. 
Marketing Operation Dept. 
Project manager, Face. 
Unite of Research, 
Development & Medical 
Total number of interviewees 37 
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APPENDIX 3 
COVER LETTER FOR THE INTERVIEWS 
MARKETING STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT GROUP (MSM), WARWICK 
BUSINESS SCHOOL 
COVENTRY CV4 7AL 
15th May, 1991 
To Whom It May Concern 
This is to introduce Mrs Qing Wang, a qualified individual 
with extensive working experience and academic knowledge 
in the field of technology-based industry. Mrs Wang is now 
doing a doctoral research on the pharmaceutical industry 
R&D/marketing interface. She will undertake a series of 
four case studies based on the major UK pharmaceutical 
companies. 
Ultimately, by means of this case study approach, it is 
hoped to identify and document answers to such questions 
as: How and Why is the R&D/marketing interface managed in 
the new product development process in the UK 
pharmaceutical companies? How and Why do the degree and 
effectiveness of the R&D/marketing interface differ? What 
factors have been important for a strong R&D/marketing 
integration? 
This letter is directed to the R&D managers, project 
managers, marketing managers as well as the heads of 
interfunctional organizations in the major UK 
pharmaceutical companies. We must ask your time, 
experience and patience to our interviewer. A draft of the 
case report based on your company will be sent to you for 
your valuable advices and final approval regarding 
confidentiality. 
Your cooperation is most essential if the research, which 
concerns the major and most crucial issue in today's 
pharmaceutical companies, are to be successfully 
completed. On behalf of all members of the MSM group, I 
wish to express our gratitude for your assistance. Should 
you wish to be sent the final report and the thesis, our 
interviewer will be glad to make proper arrangements. 
Again, thank you very much. 
Yours sincerely 
Mel Hirst 
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APPENDIX 4 
OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH AND 
AREAS OF THE INTERVIEWS 
The topic of this PhD research is "The R&D/Marketing 
Interface in Product Innovation in the UK Pharmaceutical 
Industry". In this research, we have selected four U. K. 
leading pharmaceutical firms for in-depth studies, which 
includes a total of twelve cases of new drug innovation. 
Based on the research theoretical framework, the research 
is intended to understand the R&D/marketing interface 
process, and to explain the relationships between the 
interface, the market evolution and competitive condition 
and the technology. For this purpose, the research covers 
the entire life cycle of the drug development starting 
from the idea generation stage. 
Your company has been selected for the in-depth study. Its 
three ethical pharmaceuticals, i. e. (names of the three 
drugs), are selected for the case study. The interviews 
are one of the important sources of data. 
The interviews will cover the five areas of each specific 
drug innovation: 
(1) the organizational structure: what were the structures 
of the company, the marketing department and the R&D 
department at the time the drugs were being developed? 
what was the coordination mechanism between the R&D and 
the marketing departments? how was the relationship 
between these two departments? 
(2) the market: was it new to the company or established? 
what was the estimated market size? what was the 
customer's condition? (from idea generation stage to the 
post launch). 
(3) the competitive pressure: how many competitors were in 
the market when the drug was initiated and later launched? 
what were their products? was your drug the first entrant? 
(4) the technology: is the drug a scientific breakthrough? 
what is the innovative level of the drug? what was the 
drug's chemical structure and mechanism? how does the drug 
treat the disease? 
(5) the R&D/marketing interface process: recall any 
activities and events of the R&D cooperation which 
contributed to the drug development either at the 
strategic level, the product level or the operational 
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level. For instance, did R&D/marketing cooperated in the 
generation of the new product idea and how? 
The interviews are purely for the academic purpose. The 
data obtained from the interviews will be put into the PhD 
thesis. It will have restricted accessibility to the 
public. However, all the case study reports will be senD 
to the company interviewed for final approval. 
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APPENDIX 6 
-------- -DRUG 
CO MPANY 
--- 
R&D PRODU 
--------- 
CTIVIT 
--- 
Y, 1980 -1990 
-- -------- 
Total 
--- --- ------- ----- 
New Total New 
Salesl R&D Sales 
Company 
----- 
in Mill. Rank in Mill. Rank R&D Rank 
----- 
Glaxo 
-------- ------ --------- ------ ------- ----- 
Holdings 11829 1 2503 5 473% 1 
Pfizer 9413 3 3028 2 311% 2 
Squibb 4846 5 1853 9 261% 3 
Merck&Co. 9689 2 4963 1 195% 4 
Upjohn 5272 4 2739 4 192% 5 
Schering- 
Plough 3287 7 2092 8 157% 6 
Eli Lilly 3457 6 2935 3 117% 7 
Warer- 
Lambert 1156 8 1793 10 65% 8 
Bristol- 
Myers 1139 9 2326 6 49% 9 
SmithKline 
Beecham 555 10 2162 7 26% 10 
Syntex 205 11 1441 11 14% 11 
Source: Financial World, January 24,1989. 
Note 
1. Includes only sales from products approved after 1980. 
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APPENDIX 7 
ONE OF THE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
i 
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pt' dL: ot Jevel lpment ý. -, iimmittee. We have meetings for 
Lrainsto'm. 
ý ir:; : (-an you tell me how you -generate a new product idea? 
T, iwter: We are science-driven company, basic ideas come from 
&D. e involve marketing people after we have come up with 
a new product idea. We design the drug and they define the 
market target for us. 
'fling: You have a Research Management Committee. Who are 
involved in this committee? 
Towler: This committee is run by research, marketing people 
are not involved. Marketing people only get involved after 
the compound gets into the full development stage. 
ýing: Can I say that Marketing people is only getting 
important for the development of new product from full 
development stage, but they have started to work long before 
this stage to work with R&D to understand the product's 
sicentific issue. 
Towler: Yes, you are right. Especially in sicence-driven 
products, R&D has to educate the marketing people about the 
product. 
Q ing : You identified two types of projects, i. e. science- 
, driven and market-pull. Can you describe the difference of 
communication in this two projects? 
Towler: In science-driven projects, both marketing and R&D 
are finding their way forward. A lot of new research need to 
be done. They are some unexpected destruction. on the whole, 
we communication very well. One of the important factor for 
Glaxo's success is our communication. We have vedio 
conference, we have very good communication from very senior 
people to very low level. 
Qing: Can you tell me about your interfirm alliences? 
Towler: We have some cooperation with other companies. We 
don't normally ask other company to do research for us. 
There is only a exception in that we ask a company to do 
research for us because in that area they 
have very good 
research team and we have good marketing 
knowledge. The 
reason for us to allien with other companies 
is the 
like merger or aqusition. As a 
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tlh, =ýse two types 
kommun icate and 
driven pr"D. jects 
e communication between R&D and marketing in 
of projects? Do R&D and marketing 
depend on each other more in the science- 
than in the market-pull projects? 
TowlCr; I wouldn't say that,. it depends on each individual, 
there are some projects which have very good communication 
and somre haven't. I think may be in science-driven 
projects, R&D need to teach marketing people more about the 
technology of the product. 
Qi: ig: So it is just that the content of communication is 
dif-erent? 
Towler: Yes. 
Qing; Can you define again the science-driven project and 
the market-pull projects? 
Towler: In science-driven project, the prediction of the 
effect of the new drug from animal to man are not clear, 
whereas in the market-pull project the pharmacology of the 
drug is cleaer. 
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U ý-ýýý'ºina International 
Ms Wang Qing 
Warwick Business School 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV4 7AL 
Your ref Our ref Direct line 
DJNCH517 513089 
Dear Ms Wang 
ICI Pharmaceuticals 
Southbank 
Alderley Park Macclesfielc 
Cheshire SKt 0 4TF 
Telephone (0625) 582828 
Telex 669095/669388 ICIF 
Fax(0625)586296 
Fax Date 
15 June 1992 
I would like to invite you to visit ICI Pharma International at Alderley Park 
on 30 June 1992 to discuss your Phd. thesis on the UK Pharmaceutical Industry, 
with Mr Glynn Hese wood and myself. I suggest you aim to arrive at 11 am, 
stay for lunch and leave sometime during the afternoon. 
Please let me know if this is convenient for you, and whether you require any 
transport to meet you at the railway station. 
Yours sincerely 
DJ NELSON 
Manager 
ICI Pharma International 
c. c Mr JG Heselwood 
ry.,,.... wý. ý..... av1a Ar. a w. wm t aC7 ICI pwaaza V irr-4 tlr1usthes 
PLC 
Chemical House Millbank London SW 1P 3JF 
The t-_............ uu.. ua(IUI, LLU 
NH254/1p 
16th July 1992 
Mrs Q Wang 
Warwick Business School 
University of Warwick 
Coventry CV4 7AL 
Dear Mrs Wang, 
Wellcome 
Langley Cour', ýc. arnam 
Kent BR3 3BS 
Tel: C81-558 2211 Telex 21' 
Telefax 081-658 5927 
Following our telephone conversation of 16th July I would just like to 
confirm the arrangements that I have put in hand. 
We will expect you at our Beckenham Site between 
August. The discussion programme will cover the 
in your briefing note and involve myself and two 
from The Wellcome Foundations organisation in 
programme to run approximately as follows: 
10: 30am and 11: 00am on 3rd 
questions you have raised 
or three other colleagues 
Beckenham. I expect the 
10: 30 - 12: 30 NJ Heig tman 
Imocha -,, 1: 30 - 13: 45 Lunch wi h 
52N 
J Hei9htman and and Dr R Mills 
14: 00 Dr Ralph White - Project Services Unit of Research Development and Medical 
15: 00 Dr R Mills - Technical Advisor Group Marketing 
16: 00 - 17: 00 Either Mr D Milton or Mr T Ravenscroft - Group Marketing 
J&j 
I am confident that between us we can contribute effectively to the subject 
of your thesis. 
I look forward to meeting you on 3rd August. 
Yours sincerely, 
11ro 
NJ Heightman 
ý+ ..,.,... e,., ,... , e9istered Off i( 
England Number 194814 
soup - Jarkeli»g 
